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Abstract  
 
 
Judges are responsible for creating case law, and each case is important, because 
each develops (in theory) the body of law as a whole. Each judgment should be 
able to meet the definition of ‘art’ that I will set out and apply in this thesis. Where 
a judgment meets that test of art, it will be successful in relaying the ‘truth’ of the 
law in a rich, lasting and forceful manner. It is important for case law to relay the 
truth of the law in such a way because case law’s function is to communicate and 
reinforce social values by recognising and applying universal principles of justice 
and fairness to situations that arise from social life.  
 
In summary, this thesis examines whether the each of the main cases that have 
developed the duty of care test in negligence meets the criteria in the definition of 
art set out in this work, so that they may be called works of art. Each of the 
relevant cases will be evaluated to see: whether each embodies a ‘system of rules 
and principles’ (rules and principles being separate concepts) as these relate to 
the duty of care test; and whether each may be called beautiful. For, a work of art 
is one that incorporates all of these aspects: rules, principles and beauty.  
 
I will define what art is, and I will describe art’s function in the world. I will 
explore and define the concept of truth, as it relates to this thesis, and I will 
attempt to make clear the analogy between truth as Idea (in the Greek sense) and 
the law as Idea. Further, I will look at the context in which the judicial opinion is 
created, and I will consider the responsibilities judges have to reason by analogy 
under the doctrine of precedent.  
 
Then, I will consider the concept of beauty itself, and how it affects us as those who 
experience the work. Finally, I will show that the concept of ‘duty of care’ in 
negligence, leading up to and culminating in Lord Atkin’s dictum in Donoghue v 
Stevenson (1932) AC 562 (HL), has been developed by judges so that only 50% of 
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the cases considered meet the test of: a system of rules and principles governing 
that particular aspect of the law; and beauty. Thus, only the cases that meet the 
test will be considered to be successful in conveying the truth of the law (and 
allowing us to access that truth) in a rich, lasting and forceful manner, because 
this is art’s function in the world.  
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Introduction 
 
Judges are responsible for creating case law, and each case is important because it 
adds (in theory) to the whole. I will argue that it is imperative that each judgment 
meets the definition of ‘art’ that I will set out and apply in this thesis, and I will 
seek to show why that is so. Where a judgment meets the definition of art, it will 
be successful in relaying the ‘truth’ of the law in a rich, lasting and forceful 
manner. An important co-requisite of the test, of whether a judgment can be 
defined as art, is that it must also be a work of ‘beauty’. 
 
Why should each judicial text relay the truth of the law in a rich, lasting and 
forceful manner? Law is a means of social control, and it fosters social order in 
society by communicating and reinforcing social values. The law must be taken to 
be always speaking, and every person must live with certainty of the substance of 
the law. The law’s vital function in society means that judges have a responsibility 
when writing judgments to act ethically and apply sound moral practice. As 
Aristotle says, natural law precepts are the true law; they are the Idea of law. The 
Idea is the constant and natural law, and it is one which beings inherently know at 
their core to be ‘true’. Case law should be able to apply and communicate the true 
principles of the law in a rich, lasting and forceful manner because of the important 
social and moral function of judge-made law.  
 
The present thesis examines whether the each of the main cases that have 
developed the duty of care test in negligence meets the criteria in the definition of 
art set out below, so that each case may be called a work of art. In particular, I will 
focus on the definitional elements of truth and beauty. 
 
Firstly, I will analyse the duty of care case law in order to ascertain whether each 
case embodies the Idea of law, that is, whether it exemplifies a ‘system of rules 
and principles’.1 Secondly, I will consider the cases to see whether each of them 
                                                 
1
 Rules and principles will be treated as separate entities in the definition of art infra at 9. 
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may properly be called beautiful. I will show that a work of art is an entity that 
embodies rules and principles as well as being beautiful. 
 
Beauty is a vital component of case law, as the ‘truth’ (the ‘principle’ aspect of our 
definition of art) of a judgment must be easily accessible to lawyers and lay-people 
alike. I will show that it is through beauty that truth shines most richly, lastingly 
and forcefully. 
 
Before looking at how we are able to access truth in a work of art (ie, before 
examining the phenomenon of beauty), I will define what art is, and I will describe 
art’s function in the world. Having discovered art’s function, which will be 
explained as conveying truth in the world, I will explore and define the concept of 
truth, as it relates to this thesis. The question to be answered in this section is what 
is it, exactly, that art conveys through being a work? I will examine the concept or 
Idea of truth, based predominantly on ancient Greek2 conceptions of the 
relationship between humans, the world and the heavens.  
 
Next, I will attempt to make clear the analogy between truth as Idea (in the Greek 
sense) and the law as Idea (in Aristotle’s natural law sense). Put another way, I will 
explore and define the concept of truth in law, particularly as it relates to judicial 
opinions. I will argue that the legal conception of truth in a judgment, set out in the 
principle of the case, is analogous to the universal Idea of truth. Further, I will look 
at the context in which the judicial opinion is created, and I will consider the 
responsibility imposed on judges to reason by analogy under the doctrine of 
precedent (this is the ‘rule’ aspect of our definition of art).  
 
Then, I will analyse several of the main cases that have developed the concept of 
‘duty of care’ in the tort of negligence, with a view to exploring whether in this 
area of judicial opinion the truth or principle has remained constant throughout its 
                                                 
2
 I will refer to ancient Greek beliefs in the present tense, as I believe they continue to be highly relevant to 
today’s society. Thus, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle will also be referred to as if they were living and 
presently speaking. 
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development. More specifically, I will undertake the analysis with a view to seeing 
whether or not each judicial opinion meets the “system of rules and principles 
governing a particular human activity”3 portion of our agreed definition of art.  
 
I will show that the concept of ‘duty of care’ in negligence, leading up to and 
culminating in Lord Atkin’s dictum in Donoghue v Stevenson,4 has been developed 
by judges so that only 50% of those cases meet the test of a system of rules and 
principles governing that particular aspect of the law. The courts’ expansion of the 
duty of care dicta has developed over time, and for the most part by way of the 
process of analogous reasoning. In half of the cases analysed, the essence of the 
duty of care test (ie, the principle or truth) has remained recognisable and constant, 
while being open (aletheia) to necessary revision in light of new factual situations.  
 
The final question the present work considers is how does art convey truth in its 
work? Put another way, by what process does the truth appear to us as what is in 
the work? The vehicle for truth appearing in a work of art is beauty; the work must 
be beautiful if we are to meaningfully access the Idea in a work (judicial or 
otherwise). Here, I will consider the concept of beauty itself, and how it affects us 
as those who experience the work. 
 
In order to see whether the duty of care case law affects us in the requisite manner 
(ie, whether it is beautiful), I will briefly analyse those of the judicial opinions that 
I consider meet the ‘system of rules and principles’ test in our definition of art. The 
reason for leaving out the cases that fail the first part of the definition is because, 
as I will show, beauty and truth are inextricably linked; there cannot be beauty in a 
work without truth, and vice versa. This is not to say that we will take it as a given 
that the true judgments reviewed here are beautiful, it is prudent to show that this is 
so. I will conclude that all of the 4 judgments considered in this section are in fact 
                                                 
3
 A fuller explanation can be found infra at 9. 
 
4
 Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) AC 562 (HL). 
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beautiful, and I will explain why I think this so with reference to the concept of 
beauty utilised in the present thesis.  
 
Finally, I will return to our agreed definition of art. I will set out my findings from 
the above two analyses of the duty of care case law (in relation to truth and 
beauty), and refer these back to the definition of art. I will conclude that in 50% of 
the cases considered, both aspects (ie, a system of rules and principles, and beauty) 
of the definition are met, and that these cases may properly be called art-forms. 
Therefore, these cases will be considered as being successful in conveying the 
truth of the law (and allowing us to access that truth) in a rich, lasting and forceful 
manner, because they meet the test of art, and because this is art’s function in the 
world.  
 
I will conclude that the remaining 50% of cases considered do not meet the 
definition of art set out here, because both aspects under consideration (ie, truth 
and beauty) need to be met, and the remaining 4 cases do not meet the former part 
of the test. Therefore, these cases will be considered as being unsuccessful in 
conveying the truth of law in a rich, lasting and forceful manner.  
 
Chapter I  Truth and Art 
 
I.I Art’s Nature 
 
The New Penguin English Dictionary5 defines art in two main ways: 
(i) “works6 produced using skill and creative imagination”; and  
(ii) “an activity which requires a combination of practical knowledge, 
judgement, and imagination”.  
                                                 
5
 Allen, R (ed) The New Penguin English Dictionary (2000). I have deliberately used a commonly held and 
easily accessible dictionary for the meaning of ‘art’, as opposed to compilations such as the Grove Art 
Dictionary or the Online Etymology Dictionary. I wanted a plain, everyday, meaning of the term because 
‘art’ should be easily accessible and understood by the whole community. 
6
 The term ‘work’ is referred to in common usage as including literary, visual and musical works. The 
Penguin English Dictionary defines work as, inter alia, “something produced in a specified way, [a] thing”, 
and “something produced by the exercise of creative talent or effort”.  
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In addition, the Collins English Dictionary7 defines art as:  
(i) “the creation of works of beauty”; and  
(ii) “the system of rules [and] principles governing a particular human 
activity”. 
 
Taking both of these definitions together, in reference to written works, art can be 
defined as those works dealing with rules and principles governing human activity, 
produced using skill and imagination, which require knowledge and judgement, 
and which are beautiful. This amalgamated definition is the one I will use as a 
reference point, throughout the thesis, in order to see whether the duty of care case 
law considered may be defined as ‘art’. 
 
Broadly, this thesis examines whether the cases that have developed around the 
duty of care test in negligence meet all of the criteria above, so as to be called 
works of art. Judicial opinions ought to meet our reconstituted definition of art 
because, if they do so, they will be successful in conveying the ‘truth’ of the law in 
a rich, lasting and forceful manner. Beauty is as important as the ‘truth’ of a 
judgment, because it is only through beauty that truth can shine. The truth of a 
judgment is its principle, often but not always stated as part of the ratio of the case, 
whereas, the system of rules aspect of our definition of art relates to the secondary 
rules that make our system of law work (ie, the doctrine of precedent, the rules 
governing ratio and obiter, and reasoning by analogy).  
 
Law is a means of social control, and it fosters social order in society by 
communicating and reinforcing social values. As every person should be able to 
live with some certainty as to how the law applies in daily life, the law must be 
accessible and applied as if it were ‘always speaking’. Law’s vital social function 
places upon judges a responsibility when to act ethically and apply sound moral 
practice when judging. As will be shown, the Idea of law is the constant and 
                                                 
7
 Butterfield, J (ed) Collins English Dictionary (6th ed, 2003). 
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natural law. The essence of law is one which beings inherently know at their core 
to be ‘true’. Case law should be able to apply and communicate the true principles 
of the law in a rich and lasting manner because of the important social and moral 
function of judge-made law.  
 
The artistic factors of truth and beauty in a judgment are the main focus of this 
thesis, although it considers the case law below in light of the system of ‘rules’ 
aspect of our definition of art, also. As to the remaining aspects of the definition of 
art, I consider it acceptable to take as a given that these are present in all judicial 
pronouncements. All judicial opinions are literary works, produced using skill (all 
judges have legal skills) and imagination (for example, imagination in the sense of 
creating obiter, on hypothetical facts), and which require knowledge and 
judgement (case law requires both because of its nature as a medium between the 
law and the facts).8 
 
Before looking at how truth gets expressed through a work of art (ie, before 
examining the phenomenon of beauty), we need to know what art is. Put another 
way, we need to understand art’s function in the world.  
 
I.II  Art’s Function 
 
The ancient Greek word for art is techne. The term techne denotes a “sense of 
being well versed in something, of a thoroughgoing and therefore masterful know-
how.”9 Part of this ‘know-how’ is “knowledge of the rules and procedures for a 
course of action.”10 Put another way, art includes knowledge of a ‘system of rules’. 
 
In order to properly understand the word technes, it would be instructive to 
examine its opposite. The latter is called physis, which may be translated into the 
                                                 
8
 See generally White, J B The Legal Imagination (1985) and Bagnall, G Law as Art (1996). 
9
 Heidegger, M The Will to Power as Art (trans) Farrell Krell, D (1979) 164.  
10
 Ibid, 164. 
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word ‘nature’.11 Human-kind has always attempted to master physis by creating 
‘things’, and the knowledge required to do this – to create - also falls under the 
Greek concept of techne.12 
 
Martin Heidegger elaborates on the concept of techne, by saying: 
 
[that] [f]rom the very outset the word is not, and never is, the designation of a 
‘making’ and a producing; rather, it designates that knowledge which supports 
and conducts every human irruption into the midst of beings [ie, every human 
‘creation’, as such]. For that reason techne is often the word for human 
knowledge without qualification.13 
 
According to the ancient Greeks, we can only claim to have knowledge proper 
when we are no longer captivated by the subjectivity and the sensibleness of 
things.  On the contrary, we acquire knowledge when we grasp the universal 
regularity in things.14 This is not to say the sensible has no place in knowledge or 
theory, that we must ignore common sense totally; rather, the proper place for the 
sensible is where it presents itself as a particular expression of universal law, that 
is, in a specific case to which universal knowledge must be applied.15 
 
Heidegger goes on to explain that, by knowledge, techne always means “the 
disclosing of beings as such, in the manner of a knowing guidance of bringing-
forth”.16 I interpret this passage to mean human beings create works of art, in the 
midst of nature, not only to master nature but to express themselves, to bring-forth 
their knowledge and skills into the world. I would surmise that one reason we do 
this is to create order among human beings, perhaps even to replicate the order 
inherent in the universe, in nature. 
 
                                                 
11
 Ibid, 81. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Gadamer, H G The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays (ed) Bernasconi, R (trans) Walker, N 
(1986) 16. 
15
 Ibid, 16. 
16
 Heidegger, supra n 9 at 81. 
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To have knowledge means to have ‘seen’, “in the widest sense of seeing, which 
means to apprehend what is present”.17 For Greek thought, the nature of knowing 
itself consists in the term aletheia, that is, in “the uncovering of beings”.18 The 
ancient Greek concept of truth is also aletheia, literally meaning ‘openness’, or 
‘disclosure’, that is, the disclosure of beings, or of our Being-ness.19 
 
Heidegger elaborates on the relationship between techne and Being when he says 
that knowledge, as experienced in the Greek manner, is “a bringing forth of beings 
in that it brings forth…beings”20 into presence in the world. Techne, or art, brings 
us as beings “out of concealedness and specifically into the unconcealedness of 
[our] appearance”21; that is, art brings us into the openness of our Being-ness. 
 
Heidegger tells us that the noun ‘Being’ calls by name what we mean by the is of a 
thing. It is within the “wealth of meaning in the ‘is’ [that] the essential fullness of 
Being shows itself.”22 Another way to say that the is of a thing is disclosed in a 
work of art would be to say that being or aletheia (truth) discloses itself in its 
presencing.23 Thus, put simply, art discloses truth in a work – its is-ness or Being. 
 
Seeing things in light of what is permanent and essential in them is part of the 
human process of recognition, for “what imitation reveals is precisely the real 
essence of the thing.”24 Plato uses the term ‘remembrance’ to describe the way we 
‘know’ the permanent essence of the idea when we see it.25 
 
                                                 
17Heidegger, M Poetry, Language and Thought (trans) Hofstader A (1971) 59.  
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Gadamer, supra n 14 at 107. 
20
 Heidegger, supra n 17 at 59.  
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Heidegger, M Basic Concepts (trans) Aylesworth, G E (1993) 38. 
23
 Heidegger uses this term, ‘presencing’, to describe the way in which the ‘is’ shows itself in openness 
(aletheia).  
24
 Gadamer, supra n 14 at 99. 
25
 Gadamer, supra n 14 at 120. Gadamer is speaking about Plato. 
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Knowledge shows itself “in a mediating relation that derives from what is 
represented”.26 The result is what the ancient Greeks call theoria.27 Plato calls 
theoria ‘non-sensuous presentation’, also known as ‘super-sensuous presentation’ 
or ‘super-sensuous knowledge’.28 The super-sensuous in Plato’s terms is the 
universal realm of the Idea, or Being. Heidegger puts it another way; he states that 
knowledge sets itself up as Being in the unconcealed (ie, the openness created by 
art).29  
 
Heidegger says that, for Plato, “the conception of knowledge as ‘theoretical’ is 
undergirded by a particular interpretation of Being.”30 That is, the ‘theoretical’ is 
not merely something that is defined by its opposition to the ‘practical’, but it is 
itself grounded in our basic experience of Being.31  
 
To experience something in life, means to attain it for oneself, so that it becomes 
part of oneself.32 To have an experience of something means that the something we 
experience “meets and makes its appeal to us, in that it transforms us into itself.”33  
 
Heidegger points out the similarities between Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s 
conception of experience and his own concept of presencing (Anwesen), when he 
says that “[e]xperience, the presentation of the absolute representation, is the 
parousia of the Absolute.”34 The word parousia simply means presencing.35 
Experience is the presencing of the absolute, that is, of essence itself.36  
 
                                                 
26
 Heidegger, supra n 9 at 151. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid.  
29
 Heidegger, supra n 17 at 61.  
30
 Heidegger, supra n 9 at 152. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Heidegger, M On the Way to Language (trans) Hertz, P D (1971) 73. 
33
 Ibid, 73-74. 
34
 Bernasconi, R The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being (1985) 83. 
35
 Ibid.  
36
 Ibid.  
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Taking Plato’s example of bed-frames and tables in The Republic37 to illustrate the 
concept of essence (of what it is that shows itself in the work), Heidegger puts the 
matter thus: 
 
[T]here are many bed-frames and tables at hand, instead of a few; the only thing 
we must see is what is co-posited already in such a determination, namely, that 
there are many bed-frames, many tables, yet just one Idea bed-frame’ and one 
Idea ‘table’. In each case, the one of outward appearance is not only one 
according to number but above all is one and the same; it is the one that 
continues to exist in spite of all changes in the apparatus, the one that maintains 
its consistency.38 
 
Here, Plato describes the Idea, or the is-ness of that which is created; the true ‘bed-
frame’, the true ‘table’ shows itself in mimesis (art), regardless of the form the 
representation takes. For Plato, it is only the Idea of ideas that makes a work 
meaningful (and, therefore, useful).39  
 
Heidegger considers that what makes a table a table (he calls this ‘table-being’) 
must be seen not through the eyes of the body, but through the eyes of the soul.40 It 
is the soul that sees the what-ness of a matter, its Idea. What is seen is non-
sensuous, to be sure, but we first come to know it as something sensuous, as a 
thing that is there as a table in physical form. Its essence, however, that which we 
‘know’, is a thing’s what-being, the Being of the being.41 Therefore:  
 
knowledge must measure itself against the supersensuous, the Idea; it must 
somehow bring forward what is not sensuously visible for a face-to-face 
encounter: it must put forward or present.42 
 
In Plato’s Symposium,43 Socrates recalls a conversation he had with Diotima, from 
Mantinea, where she advises Socrates: 
                                                 
37
 Plato The Republic (2nd ed) (eds) Jones, C A and Radice, B (trans) Lee, D (1974) 20.  
38
 Heidegger, supra n 9 at 173.  
39
 Heidegger, M “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics” in Barrett, W and Aiken, H (eds) 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Vol 3) (1962) 185.  
40
 Heidegger, supra n 9 at 150. 
41
 Ibid.  
42
 Ibid. 
43Plato Symposium and Phaedrus (trans) Griffith, T (1986) 22. 
 15
 
[that] [w]hat we call studying presupposes that knowledge is transient. Forgetting 
is loss of knowledge, and studying preserves knowledge by creating memory 
afresh for us, to replace what is lost. Hence we have the illusion of continuing 
knowledge.44 
 
Art dwells in the sensuous realm, the region of what the ancient Greeks call ‘non-
being’.45 Nevertheless, art shares in beauty, and as such is a way of letting the 
essence of beings appear. However transient art forms may be, they are imitations 
of the constant Being, the eternal and permanent Idea.46  
 
The word techne names, for the Greeks, not only art but also handicraft.47 Both the 
craftsperson48 and the artist may properly be referred to as technites.49 Aristotle 
believes that the object of the craftsperson is to produce a product or work that can 
be called good, the goodness being “comprised in the work itself”.50 He gives the 
example of a shoemaker, who aims at making good shoes, and he states that “the 
goodness of the shoes lies in them.”51 For Aristotle, the shoemaker must:  
 
know what a good shoe is and how to make it: but this knowledge is, so to say, 
detachable from his character as a man. A shoemaker is good if his shoes are 
good: from the goodness of the shoes, we infer his goodness as a shoemaker.52 
 
How is the goodness of the object relevant to art’s function? Aristotle draws an 
analogy between the craftsperson shoe-maker and a just person. Harold Joachim 
states that, for Aristotle: 
 
                                                 
44
 Ibid, 62.  
45
 Dewey, J “Changed Conceptions of the Ideal and the Real” Barrett, W and Aiken, H (eds) Philosophy in 
the Twentieth Century (Vol 3) (1962) 323.  
46
 Gadamer, supra n 14 at 32. 
47
 Heidegger, supra n 9 at 80. 
48
 Greeks talked of men not women, so sometimes in quotes the reference will be to men, because that is 
how the text was written. I mean to include both genders. I will refer to both genders in text, ie, sometimes 
I will say ‘he’, and other times I will say ‘she’, to show that I have both genders in contemplation 
throughout this piece of work. 
49
 Heidegger, supra n 9 at 81. 
50
 Rees, D A (ed) Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: A Commentary by the Late HH Joachim (1970) 79. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid. 
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[t]o know what a good shoe is and how to make it is comparatively a mere 
superficial knowledge: but to know what the right ideals in life are, and how to 
secure them – this is a knowledge which is, so to say, the whole character of the 
man.53 
 
Aristotle sees the just person as: 
 
[doing] what is just from a settled purpose, whose formation presupposes a long 
training in acting rightly, and the kind of knowledge which involves a 
development of the whole character of the man.54 
 
Here, an analogy may be drawn between Aristotle’s ‘just person’ and the judge, 
whose training in legal knowledge and acting rightly reflects on and shapes (by 
way of legal proclamations) the development of the character of men and women 
in society. It is my assertion that judges should be technites; that is, they should be 
artists. Judges’ goodness qua judges will be determined by the goodness of their 
craft. 
 
The New Penguin English Dictionary defines the word ‘good’ as something which 
is “deserving of respect, honourable, [and] well-founded; true”.55 Thus, we can see 
that the good is also a form of the true. For present purposes, the ‘good’ in a work 
is the showing of that which is true, the Idea. As it will be shown, the Idea in law 
equates to the natural law concepts of equity and justice. Good case law is that 
which discloses the truth or Idea in its openness, so that we may ‘know’ the Idea 
itself. A judge is a craftsman if his or her judgments can be called ‘good’. 
 
To recapitulate, an art-work is a creation or thing, which functions to disclose the 
Being of beings. The ontological disclosure that art produces for us, with respect to 
the unconcealment or uncovering of ourselves (our knowledge) as beings in the 
world, is what we may term simply as ‘truth’ or aletheia. Art discloses or uncovers 
the Idea of what is represented in the work.  
                                                 
53
 Ibid, 79-80.  
54
 Ibid, 79.  
55
 I have chosen a common-place and easily accessible dictionary to define ‘good’ for the same reason as 
set out supra n 5.  
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I.III Art’s Action 
 
How does art disclose truth? Art functions to disclose truth because “all art is 
mimesis.”56 Or, put the other way around, “mimesis is the essence of all art.”57 
Plato states, in Book X of The Republic, that the essence of mimesis is imitation.58 
Aristotle believes that, because all art-forms are mimesis, or imitation, the only 
difference between them is the means each art-form employs to do the imitating.59  
 
The word mimesis means not only imitation, but also recognition of that which is 
imitated.  Put another way, the word mimesis allows “something [to] be there [for 
us] without trying to do anything more with it.”60 For Aristotle, mimesis is “a 
representation in which we ‘know’ and have in view the essential content of what 
is represented.”61  
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer states that mimesis “implies that something is represented in 
such a way that it is actually present in sensuous abundance.”62 In the traditional 
Greek sense, “the [concept of] mimesis is derived from the star-dance of the 
heavens”63 with the stars representing pure mathematical regularities that make up 
the heavenly order.64 
 
                                                 
56
 Heidegger, M The Will to Power as Art (trans) Farrell Krell, D (1979) 169. 
57
 Ibid, 186. 
58
 Ibid, 169. 
59
 Aristotle Poetics (trans) McLeish, K (1998) 4. 
60
 Gadamer, H G The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays (ed) Bernasconi, R (trans) Walker, N 
(1986) 119.  
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Gadamer, supra n 60 at 36. I will explain ‘sensuous abundance’ infra in text. For now, the term can be 
read in light of the natural and plain meaning of its words. 
63
 Ibid.  
64
 Ibid. 
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In The Will to Power as Art,65 Heidegger explains that mimesis is the “basic 
representation the Greeks entertained concerning beings as such, their 
understanding of Being.”66 He reasons:  
 
[that] [s]ince the question of truth is sister to that of Being, the Greek concept of 
truth serves as the basis of the interpretation of art as mimesis.67 
 
 
Pythagoras also teaches that “things are really imitations”.68 Aristotle speaks of 
imitation as deriving from the fact that: 
 
[the] universe itself, the vault of the heavens, and the tonal harmonies that we 
hear, can all be represented in a miraculous way by numerical ratios…Mimesis 
reveals the miracle of order that we call the kosmos.69  
 
Gadamer believes that the Greek idea of mimesis as “imitation and recognition in 
imitation”,70 is “broad enough to help us understand the phenomenon of modern 
art more effectively.”71 Both Gadamer and Pythagoras appear to view the concept 
of truth as the truth of Being in the cosmic sense. We derive from physis and the 
techne we craft is mimesis, that is, it is representation of beings as Being (or, the 
truth of being) in light of the order of the universe itself. 
 
For Pythagoras, the establishing of ‘pure numbers’ through the presencing of 
imitation in art directly relates to: 
 
[the] miraculous order visible in the heavens above, where, apart from the 
irregular motion of the planets, which do not seem to describe a perfect circle 
around the earth, the same pattern constantly recurs.72 
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In addition, Pythagoras believes that, alongside the order of the heavens there also 
exists the order of the soul (or Being).73 Circularly, Xenocrates defines the human 
soul as: 
 
the movement of the heavens; or better, it is the sequence of numbers which is 
forever unfolding itself in the heavens and closing itself together again: the 
repetitive sequence [of order]74  
 
Whereas, Aristotle believes that the soul’s experiences are likenesses of things.75 
Poetic statements are incantations, rituals of the soul, which dissolve all conceptual 
and physical distance.76 Socrates also sees the soul as belonging to “the realm of 
true Being.”77 
In his Phaedrus,78 Plato vividly describes a procession of souls that race their 
chariots to the “vault of the heavens”,79 following chariots driven by the Olympian 
gods. It is “[a]t the vault of the heavens, [that] the true world is revealed to 
view.”80 Plato considers it is our attachment to the “earthly burden of the sensuous 
life of the body”81 that disconnects us in daily life from the knowledge inherent in 
the divine cosmos. We need a guide to show us the way home, and art does the job 
of winged chariots for us; it represents the cosmic order, the truth of our Being.  
Gadamer believes that “in place of the disorder and inconstancy that characterise 
our so-called experience of the world down here on earth”,82 we may know in art 
the “true constant and unchanging patterns of being.”83 
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Gadamer interprets the differing forms of order all relating to the mimesis of 
number as being significant because “the numbers and the pure relationships 
among them constitute the very nature of these manifestations of order.”84 Put 
another way, there is numerical order at work in all of our technes, because all art 
is mimesis. Gadamer believes that all order in life, of the kind that beings create as 
well as in nature, depends on the continuing order of the cosmos.85 This premise 
would logically include legal order. Indeed, law is defined in one dictionary as 
being “a statement of an order or relation of natural phenomena, a necessary 
relation between mathematical or logical expressions”.86 Thus, art is required in 
law to disclose legal truth in the sensuous realm, just as art is required in life to 
disclose Being. 
 
Gadmer’s view is that we experience order in art of every kind, for “[e]very work 
of art…resembles a thing…insofar as its existence illuminates and testifies to order 
as a whole.”87 Moreover, he says: 
 
[that] there is in every work of art an ever new and powerful testimony to a 
spiritual energy that generates order.88 
 
The Pythagorean view is that: 
 
[the] periodic cycle of the year and of the months, the alternation of day and 
night, provide the most reliable constants for the [human] experience of order89.  
Gadamer adds that these experiences of order “stand in marked contrast with the 
ambiguity and instability of human affairs”.90 One could argue that it is the 
inherent instability of human affairs that presents us with the need to create art, so 
that we may create order (by representing cosmic order) in the world. 
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As to the practical function of the cosmos, Plato’s view is:  
 
[that] the constant order of motions in the heavens of our universe, though always 
selfsame, nevertheless brings about the manifold phenomena and processes 
which keep the world we know in motion.91 
 
For Gadamer, the work of art exemplifies a universal characteristic of human 
existence: the desire to build a world.  He says:  
 
[that] [i]n the midst of a world in which everything familiar is dissolving, the 
work of art stands as a pledge of order.92  
 
In fact, he states:  
 
[that we] must always order anew what threatens to dissolve before us. This is 
what the productive activity of the artist and our own experience of art reveals in 
an exemplary fashion.93 
 
To be clear, mimesis does not merely refer to the original idea of something as 
being other than the art itself, rather mimesis means that the idea is there in the 
work, it presents itself as itself. This is the true meaning of imitation or 
representation in the Greek sense.94 Mimetic imitation is a ‘true’ showing, as a 
showing of what is there.95 Whereas, the ‘good’ refers to the work itself if the work 
is also a mimetic imitation of the cosmic order (ie, the true). 
 
Gadamer defines the word ‘showing’ as meaning that the one to whom the thing is 
shown sees it accurately for him or herself.96 To show something means to bring it 
into the light, and to let that which has come into the light be clearly perceived.97 
In every work that succeeds in speaking to us, there prevails a ‘showing’ – the 
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work shows itself to us. As showing literally makes something come to light for us, 
we are able to properly perceive and examine its essence.98  
 
Heidegger calls showing Saying.99 Showing brings to light what is present in a 
work, and fade from sight that which is absent. All radiant appearance of the truth 
of a work is grounded in the work’s showing or Saying.100 Heidegger believes that 
Saying “sets all present beings free into their given presence, and brings what is 
absent into their absence.”101 Put another way: 
 
Saying is the gathering that joins all appearance in manifold showing which 
everywhere lets all that is shown abide within itself.102  
 
Heidegger observes: 
 
[that] [l]anguage has been called ‘the house of Being’. It is the keeper of being 
present, in that its coming to light remains entrusted to the appropriating show of 
Saying. Language is the house of Being because language, as Saying, is the mode 
of Appropriation.103  
 
In Heidegger’s philosophy, the driving force in the showing of Saying is Owning. 
Owning allows beings to come into their own “from where they show themselves 
in what they are, and where they abide according to their kind.”104 The Owning 
that brings beings to a place of openness, and which drives Saying as showing, 
Heidegger calls Appropriation. Appropriation “yields the opening of the clearing 
in which present beings can persist.”105  
 
Appropriation cannot be understood either as an occurrence or a happening, rather 
it is something that can only be experienced. Appropriation is the gift of Saying, 
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but it is not an outcome.106 Appropriation is the gift that gives beings a ‘there is’, 
“a ‘there is’ of which even Being itself stands in need to come into its own 
presence.”107 Appropriation grants to us our place in nature, so that we may be 
capable of being those who speak (ie, show).108  
 
Further, Heidegger talks of the neighbourhood between poetry and thinking, and 
by poetry he means all art-forms.109 Neighbourhood, for Heidegger, means simply 
dwelling in nearness. As poetry and thinking are both modes of saying, the 
nearness brings the two together into the neighbourhood of his Saying.110  
 
Interestingly, the phrase ‘to say’ is semantically linked to the Old Norse word 
‘saga’, which means to show, to make appear or to set free.111 Another way to 
make something appear or to set it free is “to offer and [to] extend what we call 
World”,112 which then lights up a space in the work in which the truth can appear. 
 
 
The German words anschauen (to intuit) and schauen (to look upon), both relate to 
the English word show.113 These words are also connected with the German word 
for the beautiful, which is das Schone. Anschauen refers to the sphere of the 
visible, but with a particular view toward what is there to be seen.114 Gadamer says 
that the word anschauen was first used to describe the mystic’s vision of God. As 
can be seen from the use of these words, there is a very temporal element of 
dwelling contemplated in the act of showing.115  
 
                                                 
106
 Ibid. 
107
 Ibid.   
108
 Ibid, 128. 
109
 In particular, see Heidegger, M On the Way to Language (trans) Hertz, P D (1971) 93. 
110
 Heidegger, supra n 97 at 93. 
111
 Ibid, 93. 
112
 Ibid.  
113
 Gadamer, supra n 95 at 158. 
114
 Ibid. 
115
 Ibid, 159. 
 24
Further, Gadamer calls art welt-anschaung, which can be related back to 
anschauen (to intuit), and which means literally “an intuition of the world.”116 He 
says that “the way in which we look upon the world, and upon our whole being-in-
the-world, takes shape in art.”117  
 
The concept of intuition, oriented as it is toward sense perception, may be 
extended to include conceptual knowledge. Thus, we may treat intuition as 
“intellectual intuition”.118  
 
Edmund Husserl119 calls intellectual intuition “bodily givenness”,120 and by this he 
means “the intuitive fulfilment of an intention.”121 For Gadamer, however, 
intuition is “an abstraction from the mediations through which human orientation 
in the world is achieved.”122 Either way, intuition is said to mediate between the 
ideal and the real, between the Idea and our given reality.  
 
Gadamer argues that: 
 
[it is] not the immediacy of sensible givenness that provides the basis of all the 
arts, but rather what Kant calls the ‘representation of the imagination’, the 
formative process of intuition together with the resulting formed intuition. The 
object of aesthetics as the theory of art would then be appropriately called 
cognitio imaginativa. For even in aesthetics, it is a question of a kind of 
cognition.123  
 
In his Critique of Pure Reason,124 Immanuel Kant’s concept of intuition forms an 
important alliance with the concept of ‘concept’ itself. According to Kant, 
something can be given to beings, being as we are ‘finite’, only through the 
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phenomena of space and time, which are for him the “forms of intuition”.125 
Gadamer says that Kant’s doctrine lends legitimacy to the concept of ‘intellectual 
intuition’ that his successors developed as an essential dimension of aesthetics.126 
Intellectual intuition is an important feature of “the ‘infinite intellect’ that is not 
granted to human beings.”127 For Kant, the infinite intellect ‘sees into’ being 
itself.128 Put in Heideggerian terms, intuition is an active ‘seeing into’ the 
Beingness of beings. Kant considers that “concepts without intuition are empty and 
incapable of yielding knowledge.”129  
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines the place and function of intuition: 
 
Psychologists have hitherto failed to realise that imagination is a necessary 
ingredient of perception itself. This is due partly to the fact that this faculty has 
been limited to reproduction, partly to the belief that the senses not only supply 
impressions, but also combine them so as to generate images of objects. For that 
purpose, something more than the mere receptivity of impressions is undoubtedly 
required, namely, a function for the synthesis of them.130  
 
Gadamer says that insight “always involves an escape from something that had 
deceived us and held us captive.”131 Thus, through insight we must always gain a 
certain amount of knowledge. Insight enriches our experiences, and it is part of our 
essential nature as beings to exercise this intuitive and intellectual function.132  
 
In The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays,133 Gadamer discusses the 
concepts of intuition and vividness in the same breath because, for him, intuition is 
an aesthetic concept, not an epistemological one. In this way, intuition is related to 
the wider realm of imagination.134 He says that: 
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[it is] in the use of language, in rhetoric and literature, that the concept ‘vivid’ is 
truly at home: namely, as a special quality of description and narration such that 
we see ‘before us’, so to speak, what is not as such seen, but is only told.135  
 
Vividness may be best described as the “authentic presence of that which is 
narrated: ‘we literally see it before us’.”136 In order to see something before us, we 
need imagination to bring that ‘presencing’ about, hence the close relationship 
between imagination and intuition.137  
 
Art arouses our intuition and imagination, and in this way it can establish itself in 
its own right and make of itself a ‘work’.138 Gadamer refers to “the free play of 
imagination”,139 and says that it should be purposeful in presenting the “given 
concept”140 in a work.  
 
Thus, a work of art does not merely blend into life’s context as something 
decorative, rather it ‘stands out’ in its own right. Art presents itself as something 
provocative; it does not necessarily please us, but it makes us dwell upon its 
essence. As Gadamer says, art elevates us into the realm of the super-sensuous, 
using beauty as its vehicle and inviting us to engage intuitively with its message.141 
 
Art is techne or knowledge in the Greek sense of the word aletheia, which also 
means openness. In the openness of art, the eternal and permanent Idea of its 
essence is disclosed. The function of art is to reveal the truth. The revealing of art’s 
essence or truth comes about because all art is mimesis, or the imitation of the 
cosmic order, and in this way may equally be said to represent the logic of the 
legal order. Art presences for us in the sensuous realm, where we experience the 
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absolute and unchangeable essence of a work in its presencing. It is the soul that 
sees the true, through its intuitive intellect.  
 
Having set out art’s function in the world, and having touched on the concept of 
truth, as it relates to mimesis, I will now elaborate on the concept of truth and 
attempt to show how truth manifests itself in a work.  
 
I.IV   Truth, Idea and Being  
 
In a work of art, the truth of an entity “set[s] itself into work”.142 According to 
Heidegger, to ‘set’ means to bring to a stand. A particular entity represented in an 
art-work comes through the work to “stand in the light of its being.”143 In 
describing the truth of an art-work, Heidegger uses the example of a van Gogh 
painting, depicting a pair of peasant shoes.144  He explains that the painting, as art, 
discloses what the pair of peasant shoes is in truth. The pair of shoes thus emerges 
into “the unconcealedness of its being.”145 If there occurs in a work the disclosure 
of the what and the how an object (or subject) is, then there is here “an occurring, a 
happening of truth at work.”146 
 
Heidegger describes poetry (which is a literary art-form) as “the saying of the 
unconcealedness of what is.”147 When Heidegger says that ‘un-concealment’ is the 
openness of beings, he means un-concealment in the Greek sense of aletheia.148 As 
we know, another word for both un-concealment and aletheia is truth. The 
opposite of the openness of beings (ie, Being) is lethe, which is the Greek word for 
concealment.149  
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Gadamer explains that, traditionally, the expression aletheia was used in 
connection with speech; in particular, with words concerned with speech.150 Thus, 
the concepts of aletheia and lethe relate aptly to judicial pronouncements, and to 
the law in general. 
 
Heidegger explains that the Greek word lethe also means ‘to forget’ – however, it 
is not in the sense of psychological forgetting. Lethe means forgetting in a 
metaphysical sense, in the sense that “[t]he majority of men sink into oblivion of 
Being.”151 He believes we sink into oblivion because we only concern ourselves 
with the temporal, and that the things that dwell there are not beings as such, but 
only ha nym einai phamen or “of which we now say that they are”.152 What 
genuinely matters to beings, and makes a claim on us in a metaphysical sense, can 
only be homoioma or something that brings us closer to Being.153 Nietzsche says 
many do not emerge from this oblivion because they do not recognise the 
appearance of Being when they see it. Yet, even the most fleeting recognition of 
Being in art is capable of making beings remember their essence.154  
 
What Heidegger calls “the view upon Being”155 belongs to all beings as their most 
inherently valuable possession. Because of our oblivion, and our loss of connection 
with Being, the view upon Being is “one which can be quite easily disturbed and 
deformed, and which therefore must always be recovered anew.”156 
 
Heidegger believes that the Greek view of truth as aletheia “comes under the yoke 
of”157 Plato’s concept of the Idea. They are interconnected so that it would be 
telling half the story to speak of truth without speaking of the super-sensuous Idea, 
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and vice versa.158 Heidegger observes that, for Plato, aletheia also means ‘non-
distortion’. He says that we must understand the fundamental concept of aletheia 
well, in order to properly grasp the ancient Greek view of the relation of mimesis to 
truth.159   
 
The absolute Idea may also be called the ‘absolute spirit’. The universal or 
absolute spirit is what determines what is there in a work. The absolute spirit 
determines what is ‘true’, and it does so from within itself.160 
 
As mentioned above, it is in The Republic that Plato explains the concept of the 
Idea in art. Socrates describes the difference between the many representations of a 
thing that are available to an artist or craftsperson, and the one Idea which is 
always represented in each, regardless of its form.161 Socrates says that God 
created “only one real bed-in-itself in nature”,162 and that while representations 
may differ each artist still represents God’s one bed, or the one true Idea of bed.163 
 
Socrates then turns his proposition into a negative form, for clarity, by way of the 
following example: 
 
What I mean is this. If you look at a bed, or anything else, sideways or endways 
or from some other angle, does it make any difference to the bed? Isn’t it merely 
that it looks different, without being different? And similarly with other things.164 
 
For Plato, the real bed – the Idea bed - represents the object of knowledge, and not 
the creative form, which is merely an object of opinion.165 Plato uses the term 
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Form to refer to the Idea of bed. One author believes that in doing so, Plato puts 
Form in the place of God.166 
 
We have mentioned that for Plato, the super-sensuous is the Idea, that is, it is the 
true world (as opposed to the sensuous, which is viewed merely as the world of 
appearances). Fundamental to Plato’s philosophy is his view that the world of the 
Idea equates to the essence of Being. According to Plato, the Being inherent in 
beings is the true being, or quite simply the ‘true’.167 Heidegger discusses Plato’s 
view in The Will to Power as Art, and states that even though Plato’s philosophy 
on Being and the Idea looks simple, it is magnificent because it enables every 
being to become “present to itself.”168  
 
Being is named, too, with the metaphysical concept of dike. The Greek word dike 
is properly translated as ‘justice’, and may be described as a metaphysical concept, 
as opposed to one of morality.169 Knowledge of this concept – dike – equates to 
knowledge of “articulating laws of the Being of beings.”170 Dike “names Being 
with reference to the essentially appropriate articulation of all beings.”171 We can 
see, then, an ancient connection between truth and justice (ie, law). 
 
All knowledge is committed to beings that appear in the light of Being under their 
own power. According to Plato, though, Being itself becomes subsumed in the 
‘Idea’ itself. The Idea constitutes the Being of beings, and therefore is itself the 
true Being, or the true.172
 
 
In Western thought, knowledge most often means not merely descriptive 
knowledge of what exists in form, but also knowledge of values, of ‘right living’ 
and ‘right acting’. Knowledge includes knowledge of “how to live, what to do, 
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which forms of life are the best and worthiest, and why.”173 The English word 
knowledge stems from knowlechen, which means ‘to acknowledge’.174 Thus, as we 
pointed out in the context of mimesis above, when we know something, we are 
acknowledging that which is there, that which exists in its own form.  
 
Aristotle believes that, while we can learn a techne or craft, we cannot learn ‘moral 
knowledge’, nor are we able to forget it. It is something that we already know on a 
deep level, but that takes remembrance or acknowledgement to reawaken.175 He 
observes that we can only apply moral knowledge because we actually possess it. 
However, there is a contextual element to the application of knowledge. Aristotle 
says:  
 
[that] [w]hat is right, for example, cannot be fully determined independently of 
the situation that requires a right action from me.176  
 
The Idea, or concept, is always applied in the context of reality. Of justice, 
Gadamer says:  
 
[that] what is right is formulated in laws and [is] contained in the general rules of 
conduct that, although un-codified, can be very exactly determined and are 
generally binding. Thus the administration of justice is a particular task that 
requires both knowledge and skill.177 
 
We can see that the administration of justice is in fact a techne. Judges apply laws 
and rules to the specific facts of a case. However, Aristotle describes the judge’s 
form of phronesis (ie, prudence) as dikastike phronesis, and not techne (art).178 
Why is this?  
 
For Aristotle, the situation of a craftsperson is quite different to someone who 
applies the law because with a work requiring craft, such as a table, she may need 
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to adapt the design to suit the particular circumstances. However, the alteration 
made does not make the craftsman’s knowledge of the Idea of what is to be made 
more perfect, rather, she just leaves out certain aspects in the creation.179 Gadamer 
explains that “[w]hat we have here is the application of [the craftsman’s] 
knowledge and the painful imperfection that is associated with it.”180  
 
In comparison, there will be times where a judge (as someone who applies the law) 
will have to refrain from applying the law in its totality, because to do so would 
not produce the ‘right’ outcome (ie, the equitable or just outcome) in the case to 
hand. In ‘holding back’ from applying the full force of the law, the judge is not 
diminishing it but, rather, finding law or form of application that better does justice 
in the situation.181 In this way, the judge still upholds the law, because of the need 
to do justice in the case. Aristotle calls this type of application of the law epieikeia, 
or equity. For him, “epieikeia is the correction of the law.”182 Aristotle believes 
that everything that is set down in law is in a necessary tension with the real world 
of action, in that it is conceptual and cannot contain within itself practical reality in 
all of its nuances. He believes that the law is imperfect, not because it is itself 
imperfect, but because: 
 
in comparison with the ordered world of law, human reality is necessarily 
imperfect and hence does not allow of any simple application of the former.183  
 
For my part I do not see any difference in the application of the Idea between a 
craftsperson making a table and a judge applying the law. Both need to tailor the 
outcome of their work to suit the situation, but neither are modifying the Idea of 
their craft (ie, the table is still recognisable as a table, and the law is still 
recognisable as the law). The Idea presented in the work should not alter. For 
example, a judge may tailor the application of a particular principle to do justice in 
a particular case, but she still applies that right principle. The judge’s underlying 
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reasoning may be equitable but, as I explain below, equity is for Aristotle part of 
the ‘natural law’, and it is because of those origins that equitable principles do not 
open themselves up to fundamental alteration. The right question for Aristotle to 
ask, in my view, is whether the judgment is truthful, ie, whether it shows the Idea 
of the law, the applied rule, as remaining true in itself.  
 
Gadamer explains that Aristotle’s reasoning stems from his view that moral 
knowledge has no particular end in sight, rather it is concerned with right living 
generally.184 Whereas technical knowledge, for Aristotle, has its ends in sight; it is 
a particular type of knowledge and serves particular ends in the world.185 Gadamer 
says this of Aristotle’s view: 
 
Where there is a techne, we must learn it and then we are able to find the right 
means. We see, however, that moral knowledge always requires [a] kind of self-
deliberation.186  
 
So, for Aristotle, knowledge is viewed as an ideal, and is juxtaposed with techne, 
which is viewed as the real. In order to have knowledge, one must deliberate with 
oneself, but not so with technical knowledge.  
 
Again, I do not make much of Aristotle’s distinction in the context of the law, 
because judges must do both things: apply the ideal to the real; and as craftsmen 
use their technical skills to create a judgment (techne). However, I agree that the 
capacity for morality, and the conceptualisation in a practical way of moral 
knowledge, cannot be learned. But, I do think the knowledge itself can be passed 
on through literature, speech and action. Judges, as arbiters between law and fact, 
and as between beings themselves, are in a position to pass on moral knowledge in 
the Aristotlean sense where they consider it appropriate and relevant. Knowledge 
of the ‘right means’ cannot be known in advance of any given situation, because 
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all knowledge must be applied to be meaningful. It is in this final sense that I agree 
with Aristotle’s view of knowledge.  
 
For the Greeks, art’s usefulness lies in the realm of making the Idea appear. Art 
allows something to make an appearance as what it is, that is, it allows the Being 
of what is to be present in its permanence. The Idea is simply the Being of all that 
is.187 Mimesis allows Being to appear in pure presencing by representing the Idea 
in outward appearance or form.188 In relation to the one Idea, Socrates in Plato’s 
Republic says: “eidos gar pou ti hen hekaston eiothamen tithesthai peri hekasta tap 
olla, hois tauton onoma epipheromen.”189  
 
In The Will to Power as Art, Heidegger translates Socrates’ speech as meaning: 
 
We are accustomed to posing to ourselves (letting lie before us) one eidos, only 
one of such kind for each case, in relation to the cluster (peri) of those many 
things to which we ascribe the same name.190 
 
Heidegger tells us that, in the context of The Republic, eidos does not mean 
‘concept’ (although the passage would make equal sense with this translation), but 
rather the outward appearance of something. In its appearance, a thing does not 
become present in its particularity (that is, the thing is not seen as the individual 
item (peri)), rather it presences in the world as that which it is.191 And, as we have 
seen, that which comes into presence is Being or the Idea. As Heidegger explains, 
we connect with the knowledge of the Idea through the representation or imitation 
of what is in the work of art, because what art imitates (ie, shows) is the Idea 
itself.192 
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Being is the Idea, as we have said, but to be clear there is another type of being for 
Heidegger, which may be called ‘being in the world’.193 In light of the difference 
between Being and being, Heidegger says “[t]he ontological disclosure that an art-
work functions to produce in respect to a being is ‘truth’”,194 or Being. Hence, 
“[t]he art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings.”195 Heidegger calls 
this opening up, or ‘clearing’, “the truth of beings”196 (which we also know as 
aletheia). And, in the artwork itself, “the truth of what is has set itself to work.”197 
Art for Heidegger is subordinate (or, functional) in relation to the opening up of 
Being, or to the disclosing of Being in the unconcealed.198 
 
In Philosophy in the Twentieth Century,199 Heidegger offers a variety of 
interpretations for what he means by ‘being’: 
 
In whatever manner beings are interpreted – whether as spirit, after the fashion of 
spiritualism; or as matter and force, after the fashion of materialism; or as 
becoming and life, or idea, will, substance, subject, or energeia; or as the eternal 
recurrence of the same events – every time, beings as beings appear in the light 
of Being. Wherever metaphysics represents beings, Being has entered into the 
light. Being has arrived in a state of unconcealedness.200  
 
Truth occurs in a work of art as what Heidegger calls the “lighting up 
(Lichtung)…of beings”.201 Tautologically, truth is merely the nature of the true. 
Truth, as understood in the Greek manner, merely means non-distortion, or 
openness; namely “for the self-showing itself.”202 Something that is made is, 
because the Idea lets it come to presence in its outward appearance, and lets it be 
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for us in the sensuous realm.203 A thing that is created is only to the extent that, in 
its appearing for us, Being radiates.204 
 
As mentioned above, it is through the eyes of the soul and not through the body 
that beings experience the absolute essence of a thing.205 While our intellectual 
intuition ‘sees’ what is in the sensuous realm, the Idea itself dwells in the realm of 
the super-sensuous. Such sight apprehends what a matter is; that is, its Idea. 
Therefore: 
 
knowledge must measure itself against the super-sensuous, the Idea; it must 
somehow bring forward what is not sensuously visible for a face-to-face 
encounter: it must put forward or present [Emphasis added].206 
 
Gadamer says “[t]he soul belongs to the realm of true Being.”207 Pei has pointed 
out that language has long been thought of as “the outer manifestation of a 
people’s soul, and the creator of their pattern of thought.” 208 
 
Gadamer tells us that the word ‘soul’, in the context of truth and Being, must be 
conceptualised in the same way as the ancient Greeks know the concept to be; that 
is, ‘soul’ must be viewed as “expressing the essence of life.”209 
 
Plato knows the soul to be “the invisible basis of the constancy and alteration in 
the cosmos”,210 and in this way he uses the word soul as also meaning “the 
knowing soul.”211 Gadamer says that we can see this from the doctrine of the soul 
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set out in Plato’s Timaeus,212 which demands that we view the soul as 
‘knowing’.213  
The essence of the true, ie truth, is a generic and universal concept that appears as 
its constant self in amongst a diverse range of inconstant things.214  Essence itself 
is a universally valid phenomenon, because it “makes everything true be what it 
is”.215 The truth of essence has universal validity; put another way, this proposition 
may be linked back to Pythagoras’ cosmos by saying that the truth of essence has 
cosmic (ie mathematical and scientific) validity. Truth, as Being, is universal. As 
with Plato’s example of the bed-frames, there are many techne of bed-frames, but 
only one universal bed-frame, only one Idea of bed-frame. The true proposition 
belongs in the super-sensuous realm of the universal, and it is changeless in itself.  
 
In fact, Descartes interprets truth as ‘certitude’.216 Put another way, “[t]ruth is the 
system of propositions which have an unconditional claim to be recognised as 
valid.”217 William James states that, while this view of truth is “absolutely true, of 
course”,218 it is also “absolutely insignificant”,219 because it means nothing without 
being placed in context. Truth must exist “for someone and for itself, as well as for 
the spirit in general too.”220 The concept of truth, in order to be meaningful, must 
be dealt with pragmatically.221  
 
James argues that true ideas are those that we can “assimilate, validate, corroborate 
and verify”,222 and false ideas are those that we cannot. In order to meaningfully 
define truth, it must be ‘known’ as something, it must be able to be verified in the 
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context of the entity being called ‘true’.223 According to our above discussion on 
knowledge and techne, to know something as true is merely to ‘remember’ that it 
is so; that is, to reconnect with the universal knowledge of the true, in the context 
of any given form. 
 
According to Aristotle, there are two spheres of truth. The first is the sphere of the 
necessary and universal, the “eternal coherence of subjects and attributes”.224 
Within the first sphere, he includes hard science, “in its most perfect and strictest 
form.”225 This is the truth of which we have been speaking. The second is what 
Aristotle calls “the sphere of changeable connexions”.226 These are seen as mere 
coincidences or conjunctions. It is the less strict, and more imperfect, forms of art, 
science, conduct that dwell here.227  
 
Truth in the first of Aristotle’s spheres is “attained by demonstrative reasoning 
resting on immediate apprehension of unalterable laws, of immediately necessary 
complex facts.”228 Truth in sphere one is reasoned truth, which does not change 
form; that is, we know it to be “one and the same for all and always – at all times 
and in all places.”229 The principles of truth here are those that are both necessary 
and eternal.230  
 
Truth in the second sphere is attained by “reflection, calculation, deliberation – 
reasoning, …on probable grounds.”231 Odd though it seems, this truth can be seen 
as a matter of fact, as reasoning of this nature involves consideration of what has 
happened, and apprehension of what is likely to happen in the future.232 It is 
obvious that the reasoning and calculation Aristotle talks of in relation to the 
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second sphere of truth is employed for the most part in the philosophical sciences, 
such as law. Legal reasoning involves reasoning, deliberation, calculation, 
foresight and in many branches uses the concept of probability. However, for the 
purposes of our above definition of art, we are dealing here with Aristotle’s first 
category of truth – the unalterable, universal and logical one. Here, we are more 
interested in the concept of truth as principle than his second concept of truth as 
philosophical reasoning, although the process of analogical reasoning is discussed 
below as part of the system of rules that support our system of laws.  
For Plato, the process of disclosing truth is a rhetorical act, that is, it dwells in 
dialogue and interpretive rhetoric.233 Interpretive rhetoric is “the art or the process 
of leading oneself and others toward understanding.”234 Plato’s dialogic approach 
to truth and rhetoric make it plain that while truth is universal, it is not static. Truth 
is a “dynamic process of continual and inter-subjective disclosure.” 235 
 
For Gadamer, the superiority of knowledge over “preconceived opinion consists in 
the fact that it is able to conceive of possibilities as possibilities.”236 Put another 
way, the quest for knowledge (as opposed to the knowledge itself) is dialectical. In 
his Metaphysics,237 Aristotle says that:  
 
[dialectic] is the power to investigate contraries independently of the object, and 
to see whether one and the same science can be concerned with contraries.238 
 
In The Republic, Socrates and Glaucon discuss the relationship between dialectic 
and knowledge in the context of the parable of the prisoners in the cave. Socrates 
asks him “can [people] ever acquire any of the knowledge we say they must have 
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if they can’t argue logically?”239 Glaucon replies “no, they can’t.”240 Socrates 
explains: 
 
When one tries to get at what each thing is in itself by the exercise of dialectic, 
relying on reason without any aid from the senses, and refuses to give up until 
one has grasped by pure thought what the good is in itself, one is at the summit of 
the intellectual realm, as the man who looked at the sun was of the visual 
realm.241 
 
Glaucon agrees. “And isn’t this progress what we call dialectic?”242 asks Socrates. 
Glaucon again concurs. 
 
Then, a while later Socrates talks about dialectic: 
 
Dialectic, in fact, is the only procedure which proceeds by the destruction of 
assumptions to the very first principle, so as to give itself a firm base. When the 
eye of the mind gets really bogged down in a morass of ignorance, dialectic 
gently pulls it out and leads it up, using the studies we have described to help it in 
the process of conversion. These studies we have often, through force of habit, 
referred to as branches of knowledge, but we really need another term, to indicate 
a greater degree of clarity than opinion but a lesser degree than knowledge – we 
used the term “reason” earlier on.243  
 
Further, Socrates says: 
 
Then you agree that dialectic is the coping-stone that tops our educational 
system; it completes the course of studies and there is no other study that can 
rightly be placed above it.244  
 
“I agree”,245 says Glaucon.  
 
Mastering the art of dialectic is not about winning every argument. Rather, the art 
of dialectic is the art of asking the right questions. Dialectic is fundamentally about 
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persistent questioning, with a view towards achieving openness.246 Gadamer treats 
the art of questioning as being the art of thinking.247  
 
Dialectic is “the art of conducting a real conversation.”248 In order to conduct a 
conversation, one must allow oneself to be directed by the object of the 
conversation itself. One must thoughtfully consider the weight of another’s 
opinion, and this requires openness and the ability to think in a questioning 
manner. Dialectic is the art of ‘testing’ premises to make sure they are logically 
sound. Dialectic does not try to discover the weakness in what is said, but rather 
wills to bringing out its strength.249 As Gadamer explains: 
 
It is not the art of arguing that is able to make a strong case out of a weak one, 
but the art of thinking that is able to strengthen what is said by referring to the 
object.250 
 
Further, dialectic is the art of viewing things in their unity, that is, of working out 
the common meaning of concepts. We can see how dialectic may be contrasted 
with the rigid form of statement and opinion, each of which demand that the other 
see its point of view. As a result of dialectic’s process of “question and answer, 
giving and taking, talking at cross purposes and seeing each other’s point”,251 
communication between beings may properly occur.252 For Gadamer, where 
people reach an understanding through dialogue, the communication then 
transforms into a ‘communion’, which is a happening “in which we do not remain 
what we were.”253 In this way, Gadamer’s concept of communion may be related 
to Hegel’s concept of experience discussed above. Gadamer believes: 
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[C]onversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language used in it bears its 
own truth within it, ie that it reveals something which henceforth exists.254  
 
In order to represent what exists, that which is, it makes sense that the thing itself 
must hold within it agreement with the actual Being. In the Middle Ages, such 
agreement was termed adaequatio.255 Aristotle speaks of homoiosis when referring 
to agreement with what is.256 Heidegger confirms this state of affairs when he says 
that “[a]greement with what is has long been taken to be the essence of truth.”257 
 
We need art in order to remember what it is that we know, and in this way we 
‘acknowledge’ the true. There is only one real Idea, but many representations or 
situations in which the Idea can show itself. We have seen that the Greek word 
dike names Being, and is also the word for justice. It would be fair to say, then, 
that there is an inherent relationship between truth and justice. 
 
Moral knowledge is something that we know but cannot learn, rather we must be 
re-awakened to its existence in the universe by art. Truth (aletheia) is certain, yet 
dynamic, in that it always makes itself relevant in the changing and uncertain 
context of the sensuous. Dialectic, then, is the process of achieving openness and 
letting truth’s essence shine forth.  
 
At this point, it is prudent to briefly elaborate on the way in which truth occurs for 
beings in the sensuous realm, and it is Heidegger’s theory of the World and the 
Open that provides a brief explanation in light of the happening of truth. 
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I.V  The Happening of Truth  
 
Heidegger believes that language in a work of art brings what is into, and holds it 
in, the ‘Open’.258 He considers that the art-work “opens up…the Being of 
beings…ie, the truth of beings.”259 Put another way, a work of art functions to 
establish ‘World’ for us, which in Heidegger’s view is the ontological context for a 
work’s isness. In Heideggerian terms, an art-work holds open the openness of the 
World (the context of the work itself).260 In the World, art (mimesis) is then free to 
show or represent to us its is-ness (its Idea, or truth). 
 
Because a work is created by beings, it is created in the context of what Heidegger 
calls Earth, which is the place where beings “ground [their] dwelling in the 
world.”261 The Earth is fundamentally self-closing and sheltering. However, the 
work establishes World, setting itself into the Open and thereby shows its Idea.262 
Put simply, “World is the context of the dialectic of an art-work’s truth.”263 
 
In Heidegger’s view, the truth of an art-work contains an ironic quality. Truth in 
art is not merely ontological openness, but is also an openness that has been 
granted in a dialectical relationship with its opposite, untruth.264 So, for Heidegger, 
the truth of an art-work is not only the disclosure of Being, it is also a truthful 
disclosure that takes ‘un-truth’ into account. It is the strife of truth and untruth that 
produces the clearing or ontological openness in which the art-work stands and 
shows the truth of itself.265  
 
Works of art do not fade into historical uselessness, because they ‘stand’ in their 
own light of Being in the World. Art ‘stands written’ as a saying because it brings 
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forth its own presence.266 Art is the “‘setting to work’ of the ontological disclosure 
of beings…as well as the preservation of the disclosure.”267 Thus, art is “the 
creative preservation of truth in a work.”268 Art, then, is both the becoming and the 
happening of truth.269 Art results in the nihilation of ordinariness, and of all that is 
merely factual; art produces a ‘clearing’ (Lichtung).270  
 
In a metaphysical sense, the word ‘existence’ means simply ‘being there’. The 
word refers to the actuality of anything that is in the world.271 In Heidegger’s 
seminal work Being and Time272 the term ‘existence’ is used to describe the being 
of beings.273 In this light, the essence of being can be seen as meaning ‘being in its 
openness’, where Being manifests itself in the ontological dialectic of concealed 
and unconcealed (of Earth and World).274 When Heidegger says that ‘being exists’, 
he means “the being whose Being is distinguished by the open-standing standing-
in in the unconcealedness of Being, from Being, in Being.”275 
 
The World exists in opposition to the Earth, and strives to surmount it. As the 
World is ‘self-opening’, it cannot co-exist with the Earth, which is self-closing and 
concealing. This opposition Heidegger calls ‘a striving’.276 However, he does not 
see their oppositional striving as one of discord, rather World and Earth interrelate 
to “raise each other into the self-assertion of their natures.”277 Allan Hutchinson 
considers: 
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[that] [t]o be in a state of tension is not aberrational or anomalous; it is the usual 
experience of life and tradition.278 
 
For his part, Heidegger observes that the inherent conflict of World and Earth is 
the location of “all nearness and remoteness of the gods.”279 Heidegger has named 
the effect of this strife between World and Earth ‘rift-design’.280 Rift-design is:  
 
the mark of createdness which is left by the truthful ontological disclosure: 
‘Being-created discloses itself as a strife Being-established in a figure (Gestalt) 
through a rift-design’.281 
 
Thus, rift-design is a manifestation of bringing truth into the open. Art lets the truth 
of beings ‘happen’.282 In Heidegger’s view, truth presences in a work by way of 
“the conflict between lighting and concealing in the opposition of World and 
Earth.”283  
 
Put another way:  
 
Truth establishes itself as a strife within a being that is to be brought forth only in 
such a way that the conflict opens up in this being, that is, this being is itself 
brought into the rift-design. The rift-design is the drawing together, into a unity, 
of sketch and basic design, breach and outline. Truth establishes itself in a being 
in such a way, indeed, that this being itself occupies the Open of truth.284 
 
A work, by its nature of being a work of art, “makes space for…spaciousness.”285 I 
take the saying to mean that the work liberates itself into the Open and establishes 
itself as strife in its open structure. In this way, the work qua work sets up World, 
and then holds open the Open of the World.286 In the Open, truth (the Idea of a 
work) may shine forth. 
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Art functions to establish World, which is the ontological context for work’s 
Being. World itself is the context of the dialectic of art’s truth. It is the strife of 
truth and un-truth that presents the dialectical context in which the truth of art can 
appear. Art holds open the World so that the work’s essence may become present. 
For Heidegger, art is created in the context of Earth, which is where beings ground 
their dwelling.   
 
Before proceeding to examine how this truth makes itself known to us in the work 
(ie, by the work itself being beautiful and the effect of this on us as those who 
experience the work), I will clarify the tacit analogy made thus far between truth 
and Being as Idea and the law as Idea.  
 
In particular, I will consider the context in which the judicial opinion is created, 
and I will consider the responsibilities judges have to reason by analogy under the 
doctrine of precedent (this is the ‘rule’ aspect to our definition of art). Ultimately, 
the following section aims to show that the legal conception of truth in a judgment, 
most often (but not always) set out in the ratio of the case, is analogous to the 
universal Idea of truth; that is, the Greek conception of Being in the universe.   
 
Chapter II  Truth and Law 
 
II.I  Truth and the Judicial Context  
 
One judicial commentator describes law as a “means of social control fostering 
social order in modern society.”287 Law fosters social order by recognising “certain 
basic underlying interests and provides a framework of rules for giving effect to 
them.”288 The Law.com Dictionary defines ‘law’ as:  
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any system of regulations to govern the conduct of the people of a community, 
society or nation, in response to the need for regularity, consistency and justice 
based upon a collective human experience.289  
 
It may further be said that the “law communicates and reinforces social values.”290 
Put another way, the law can be understood as “a set of literary practices 
that…create new possibilities for meaning and action in life.”291 
 
Societies, and their norms and values, change and evolve. There are always new 
situations which “breed [their] own new needs and problems”,292 and which place 
new demands on the law. For practical reasons, Parliament cannot be expected to 
lay down rules for all of the possible consequences of life. Or, as Berlin says, 
Parliament cannot possibly legislate for the “unknown consequences of 
consequences of consequences.”293 Adjudication is an essential connecting tool, 
between legal rules and principles themselves and the reality of life.294 The 
application of the law also expands and changes the law itself, because of the 
multitude of ways that factual matters come before the courts. 
 
A legal problem may, by its very nature, be characterised in a rich variety of ways, 
and the judge is responsible for her use of language and ultimately for the resulting 
decision.295 As Edward Levi, a distinguished professor of law emeritus at the 
University of Chicago, states: it is “only folklore which holds that a statute if 
clearly written can be completely unambiguous and applied as intended to a 
specific case.”296 As a court sometimes has to apply a piece of legislation in 
circumstances that Parliament could not have foreseen, the meaning given in 
interpreting that legislation must also be new.297 By the very nature of the plurality 
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and unpredictability of humans, judges necessarily have adjudicatory and 
applicatory discretion.298   
 
Further, because adjudicative decision-making is context-dependent and because it 
is not possible to analyse the facts with total completeness or certainty, the exercise 
of judicial discretion is indispensable and will always be a characteristic of the 
common law.299 Bastarache points out that adjudication “concerns itself with more 
than legal theory”,300 it is also “guided by a search for the correct balance of all 
relevant factors.” 301 
 
However, judges’ discretion is fettered to a large extent by the very system in 
which they adjudicate. The doctrine of precedent lays down rules about value, 
order and hierarchy within common law jurisdictions. In order for a judge’s 
decision to be legitimate within that system, she or he must follow the rules.302 
Being bound by rules means that, while judges have necessary discretion as 
adjudicators, that discretion (to make and to follow primary legal rulings) is also 
exercised within its own underlying system of rules and principles which judges 
are duty bound to follow.303 
 
While it is understood that Parliament’s law is supreme, and the judges must apply 
it,304 judges have considerable discretion in interpreting the words of a statute and 
applying them to the facts. (Further, I would agree with the Realists that the facts 
themselves can come within the realm of judicial discretion.) As Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer states, “a statute means what the courts say it means”305; the executive 
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function does not extend to its final interpretation or application, and this is as it 
should be according to our constitutional separation of powers.306  
 
Palmer makes the comment that the judicial branch of government is the one most 
likely to be “reliable in its adherence to principle, neutrality, and rationality.”307 
Neil MacCormick elaborates on Palmer’s thinking, when he says that because 
judges are required to weigh and balance competing factors:  
 
it may take time for a line of decisions to emerge that deserve full respect as 
settled law. Statute law is less likely to be accurate, since the lawmaker has to get 
everything right all at once.308  
 
The world in which judges work is often one where they are faced with choosing 
between equally ultimate ends and equally absolute claims.309 The judge knows 
that the realisation of some of these ends and claims must inevitably result in the 
sacrifice of others. The extent of a person’s liberty to choose how he or she lives 
must be weighed against a myriad of other social values - equality, fairness, 
justice, security, public order and happiness, to name a few.310 As Isaiah Berlin 
says, there is in any society a “constant need to compensate, to reconcile, to 
balance.”311  
 
Berlin uses the example of divergent goals in nature to illustrate his point: 
 
Both liberty and equality are among the primary goals pursued by human beings 
through many centuries; but total liberty for wolves is death to the lambs, total 
liberty of the powerful, the gifted, is not compatible with the rights to a decent 
existence of the weak and the less gifted.312  
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Equality for all, and liberty for most, sometimes demands the restraint of the 
liberty of a few. Without this restraint there would be no room for humanity in 
social life, or for justice and fairness to be administered. Berlin says “these 
collisions of values are of the essence of what they are and what we are.”313 
 
James Boyd White argues that the law:  
 
should be responsive and responsible to the tradition of which it is a part, to the 
larger cultural community in which it takes place.314  
 
Judges are aware that tradition is not something static, but is dynamic and 
continually open to reinterpretation. Judges should progress the legal tradition by 
“combining heresy and heritage into fruitful tension.”315 However, as Hutchinson 
states:  
 
[W]hat is fruitful will itself be contingent and contested so that there is no settled 
or adequate combination that can claim to be authoritative by dint of its balance 
or fruitfulness. To be in a state of tension is not aberrational or anomalous; it is 
the usual experience of life and tradition.316 
 
Case law’s normative content, the application of its Idea, must be determined in 
relation to the unique factual matrix before the court.317 White illustrates the 
plethora and variety of matters that come before the courts when he says: 
 
[that][w]hatever is problematic in a contract, a statute, a regulation, or an 
administrative decision – indeed whatever is problematic in our collective life – 
is likely to end up in a judicial opinion.318 
 
In fulfilling their constitutional task of deciding cases, Hutchinson argues: 
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[that]judges must understand that there is not a two-step process of first 
understanding and then applying; the latter is part of the former because we 
cannot understand in the abstract or general but only in concrete and particular 
situations [Emphasis added].319 
 
For Gadamer: 
 
judging the case involves not merely applying the universal principle according 
to which it is judged, but co-determining, supplementing, and correcting that 
principle.320 
 
The aim is that a judicial opinion can be “understood at every moment, in every 
concrete situation, in new and different way.”321  
 
In Truth and Method,322 Gadamer states his fundamental hermeneutical point as:  
 
[T]he law is always deficient, not because it is imperfect in itself but because 
human reality is necessarily imperfect in comparison to the ordered world of law, 
and hence allows of no simple application of the law.323 
 
Through the adjudication of interpretation, the common law should gain both 
constancy and growth.324 Arguably, the function of adjudication is to reach an 
equitable outcome for both parties by balancing and weighing their rights at law. In 
light of the court’s task, Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart considers the essential 
judicial virtues to be:  
 
impartiality and neutrality in surveying the alternatives; consideration for the 
interest of all who will be affected; and a concern to deploy some acceptable 
general principle as a reasoned basis for decision. No doubt because a plurality of 
such principles is always possible it cannot be demonstrated that a decision is 
uniquely correct: but it may be made acceptable as the reasoned product of 
informed impartial choice. In all this we have the ‘weighing’ and ‘balancing’ 
characteristic of the effort to do justice between competing interests.325 
                                                 
319
 Hutchinson, supra n 315 at 172.  
320
 Ibid. Hutchinson quotes Gadamer, H G Truth and Method (1979) 39.  
321
 Ibid. Hutchinson quotes Gadamer, H G Truth and Method (1979) 309.  
322
 Gadamer, H G Truth and Method (1979) 291. 
323
 Hutchinson, supra n 315 at 172. Hutchinson quotes Gadamer, H G Truth and Method (1979) 318. 
324
 Ibid.  
325
 Hart, H L A The Concept of Law (2nd ed) (1994) 205.  
 52
 
Ronald Dworkin considers that judges not only have a duty to follow the law and 
legal rules in place, they also have an obligation because of the discretion awarded 
them to act ethically and to apply sound moral practice.326 John Finnis believes that 
the nature of judicial duty requires judges to resort to moral argument.327 Where 
legislation and common law do not offer up equitable solutions on the particular 
facts of a case, judges are responsible for filling the gap and must be guided by a 
sense of fairness, equitableness and morally valid principles.328 Moral choice itself 
is “always a matter of compromise between competing goods rather than a choice 
between the absolutely right and the absolutely wrong.”329  
 
For Dworkin, the purpose of the law is:  
 
to lay principle over practice to show the best route to a better future, keeping the 
right faith with the past.330  
 
As to the truth of law, Dworkin argues that legal propositions may be called true if:  
 
they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due 
process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal 
practice.331  
 
In contrast to Dworkin, Aristotle does not regard any system of laws as the ‘true 
law’ itself, rather he considers that the concept of equity (in broad terms) is the true 
law.332 In a general sense, equity may be defined as “fairness in the resolution of 
disputes through the application of good conscience.”333 In The Principles of 
Equitable Remedies,334 Spry states: 
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Equitable principles have above all a distinctive ethical quality, reflecting as they 
do the prevention of unconscionable conduct. Further, they are of their nature of 
great width and elasticity and are capable of direct application…in new 
circumstances as they arise from time to time.335  
 
In Lord Dudley and Ward v Lady Dudley,336 the Court made the following 
observation about the place of equity in the common law: 
 
Now equity is no part of the law, but a moral virtue, which qualifies, moderates, 
and reforms the rigour, hardness, and edge of the law, and is a universal truth; it 
does also assist the law where it is defective and weak in the constitution (which 
is the life of the law) and defends the law from crafty evasions, delusions, and 
new subtitles, invented and contrived to evade and delude the common law, 
whereby such as have undoubted right are made remediless; and this is the office 
of equity, to support and protect the common law from shifts and crafty 
contrivances against the justice of the law. Equity therefore does not destroy the 
law, nor create it, but assist it [Emphasis added].337  
 
Aristotle distinguishes between that which is ‘naturally’ lawful and that which is 
legally or procedurally lawful.338 The latter type of law may be called ‘positive 
law’, and Aristotle says that this type of law is subject to change and revision. 
Natural law, however, is an absolute concept, although he admits is it may be 
applied in differing ways.339 For Aristotle: 
 
[T]here are laws that are entirely a matter of mere agreement (eg traffic 
regulations) but there are also things that do not admit of regulation simply by 
human convention, because the ‘nature of the thing’ constantly asserts itself. 
Thus it is quite legitimate to call such things ‘natural law’ [Emphasis added].340  
 
For Aristotle, the concept of natural law has a critical function, but we are not able 
to apply it dogmatically, because all application is situational. In view of all human 
laws being imperfect, the inviolable concept of natural law becomes 
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indispensable.341 Aristotle believes that the idea of what is equitable is what first 
created the system of law.342 He equates natural law with “the nature of the 
thing”,343 and says that the nature of a thing must be determined on a case by case 
basis by application and by the use of our inherent moral consciousness.344  
 
Plato writes about justice in a more absolute sense than does Aristotle. Aristotle 
appears to focus more on the application of natural law, while Plato focuses more 
on the absoluteness of the nature of the Idea. Plato believes: 
 
Accepting the existence of a realm, an order universal, harmonious and just, the 
wise man will draw upon this to present the ideal of a just political community 
for which he will formulate just laws which in his capacity as a judge he will be 
able to apply in an unequivocal way, without giving rise to criticism or 
controversy.345  
 
Aristotle’s application of the true, universal order, is what he calls “practical 
wisdom”.346 When beings are faced with a problematic situation of their own 
creating, judges must seek out “on the basis of equity, a solution which is more just 
than that of the law”,347 and in order to do so must apply practical wisdom. 
Practical wisdom is related to phronesis or prudence, which itself is inherent in 
Roman jurisprudentia.348 
  
By way of background, the ancient Greeks make no distinction between the 
physical laws of nature, which control the universal order, and the decrees of the 
gods, which determine societal order.349 Nature is entitled to be worshiped because 
it was given to us by the gods. Further, it is considered that there are inviolable 
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laws (natural laws) that were also given by the gods as a gift to humanity.350 
Aristotle considers natural law to be something that is “common to all 
mankind.”351  
 
In the latter part of the Middle Ages, Aristotle’s writings were re-discovered by the 
Catholic church, and incorporated into the scholastic philosophy of the time.352 A 
main proponent of Aristotle’s natural law views is Saint Thomas Aquinas, who 
makes the distinction between: 
 
divine law, which could be known only by revelation, and natural law, which was 
wholly rational and which could be understood and interpreted by the light of 
unaided human reason.353  
  
Thus, Aquinas saw natural law (ius naturale) as being intrinsic to reason and, as 
such, universally applicable.354 There were positive laws that (if they were just) 
espoused natural laws, also, and those positive laws could be seen to relate directly 
back to the laws of nature  (reducuntur ad legem naturae).355 Aquinas called those 
aspects of positive law having natural law bases ius gentium.356 It is arguable that 
the inclusion of natural law precepts into positive law assists them in gaining social 
legitimacy – ie, that sense of fairness and justice, along with the rules of procedural 
fairness and due process.357 Positive laws that incorporate or have as their 
normative base natural moral law are for Aquinas the “requirements of practical 
reasonableness.”358  
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To use Finnis’s example, the positive rule that you should return any item that you 
have borrowed is based a natural law concept.359 However, there are times when it 
would be inequitable to apply this law, for example, where “the thing borrowed is 
a deadly weapon and the lender has turned into a maniac.”360 Thus, the natural law 
would prevail in this case in the decision to not return the thing.361 As we have 
seen, natural law equates to equity; it is the universal Idea of law. A ‘good’ 
judgment is one in which the ‘true’ shows itself. 
 
Finnis observes: 
 
[W]hile the natural precepts…are the same for all peoples, it is the variety of 
circumstances that causes the readily observable variety among positive laws 
[Emphasis added].362  
 
We can see that natural law is intrinsic to reason and related to moral virtue. 
Natural law may be equated with the ‘nature of a thing’, or with its essence. The 
essence of a thing or matter, as we have seen above is its truth or Idea. It is a 
judge’s moral consciousness, via practical reasoning, that enables equitable or 
natural laws to be laid down in unique factual situations. Natural law is for our 
purposes analogous to Plato’s Idea of a thing, because natural law is ‘there’ in a 
way that our moral consciousness ‘remembers’ the right outcome and is able to 
assess the equity or justice of a situation.  
 
As moral knowledge only needs to be ‘remembered’, it cannot be taught like a 
techne can be taught; rather knowledge or aletheia is the outcome of mimesis, 
which itself can be taught. Art as mimesis (that is, the judicial opinion as mimesis) 
imitates the real essence of a thing, thereby revealing the truth of a thing or of a 
matter in the Open.  
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The natural order of the cosmos may be equated with the continuing (rational) 
legal order. Art embodies the cosmic order, the Idea, the truth of a thing as equally 
in a judgment as in a painting. In the judgment, the Idea is the universal and 
constant natural law. Our moral knowledge is inherent in us as beings, but we need 
art in order to ‘remember’ that we have it and that we remain connected on a soul 
level to a knowledge of the star-dance of the heavens, reflecting the universal 
order. 
 
We have seen that the law is applied and interpreted in context and, because of 
this, judges have discretionary power within our common law system of rules. 
Judges must weigh and balance relevant factors and come to a decision that is fair, 
rational and equitable. The court system needs procedural due process to give 
legitimacy to its findings, but it is the principle itself that is the authoritative law. 
The authoritative law may equally be termed ‘natural law’ in the Aristotlean sense. 
Natural law is analogous to the Idea and Being discussed above, because it is 
constant and universal, and because it equates to the essence of a thing.  
 
Thus far, I have only provided a brief example to show the workings of natural 
law. The reason being that natural law or the Idea of the law, although constant, 
will manifest itself differently in different situations. However, I will elaborate 
further on the Idea of law in the duty of care cases analysed below.  
 
Before analysing the duty of care principle for its consistency, I wish to elaborate 
on the procedural rules (mentioned above) that bind the courts in our common law 
system. One of the ingredients of our agreed definition of art is that the thing made 
conforms to a system of rules and principles. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
principles are what we are terming the legal truth, and this aspect has been 
discussed above (in theory). The rules aspect is what we will now briefly consider, 
again in theory, as the application of the system of rules and principles can only be 
examined in light of the cases themselves. 
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II.II Legal Systems in the Common Law 
 
The case law that judges create necessarily brings out the tensions inherent in a 
legal statement of value. For example, ‘we all have the right to liberty’. Case law, 
or common law, gradually builds up a rich dicta around each statement of value, 
and in doing so firmly locates it in situational experience.363  
 
Textual meaning shows itself in the “encounter between the text and its 
interpreter.”364 Thus, the hermeneutic task consists in bringing out the tension 
inherent between the legal text and its factual matrix.365 It is the judge’s role to 
bring this tension to the fore and to mediate it. This process may properly be called 
‘dialectic’; that is, the process of judicial reasoning ought to involve thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis.366 Dialectic is a way of uncovering and resolving the 
tensions in a legal text, in order to create a new richness and aptness of meaning.367  
 
Hutchinson believes it is important not to cover up the tension between the law and 
the facts, rather judges should aim to bring it to the fore. In bringing out the tension 
in a text, judges are in a better position to reason openly, questioningly and 
logically; that is, there is a greater opportunity for them to find and apply the 
‘truth’ of the law.368 As Heidegger says, the truth of an art-work appears in the 
context of dialectic or World. This being the case, good judicial texts will be 
written so that there is an openness, a space between Saying and meaning that 
allows for both future application and revision, as well as continuation of the legal 
Idea in question. 
 
For White, the standard by which a judicial opinion is measured for its excellence 
is the extent to which it recognises both sides of the argument and incorporates that 
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recognition within itself.369 He says that “an opinion that simply adopted one side’s 
brief would not be worthy of the name.”370  Like White, Hutchinson believes it is 
important to bring into the open contradictions and tensions within the judicial 
text, so that they can be contextualised, reformulated and appropriated to 
progressive effect.371 
 
The skill of interpretation is necessary in order for the law to be useful to us, so 
that it may be applicable in a variety of differing situations. The work of 
interpretation is actually the work of application; interpretation and application 
cannot be meaningfully separated from one another.372 While judges are free to be 
creative in applying/interpreting the law, they remain subject to the law in the same 
way as every other member of the community and are duty bound to act within the 
system’s rules in their professional role.373  
 
The legitimacy of our legal system requires that a judge’s judgment is not based on 
arbitrary or unpredictable reasoning. Judges must have as a prime consideration the 
just weighing up of the relevant law as a whole.374 These controls and requirements 
allow for legal certainty, which is part of what gives the law its legitimacy. It ought 
to be possible to know in principle what the law says in any given situation. In this 
way, the legal order is valid for all people, and applies even-handedly to all 
people.375 Hence, the law is always speaking to us (Saying), and it remains both 
open and constant, even in the face of (necessary) situational revision. 
 
In terms of legal interpretation, Gadamer states that the application of imagination 
(what he calls the ‘free-play of imagination’) ensures that “the gap [between the 
text and its application] can never be completely closed.”376 This free-play of 
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imagination works to establish an openness in which the law is able to constantly 
re-invent itself.377  
 
White believes imagination to be an essential skill of the lawyer and the judge. For 
him, the activity of legal professionals is:  
 
an enterprise whose central performance is the claim of meaning against the 
odds: the translation of the imagination into reality by the power of language.378  
 
White views the art of law as a literary one, because it deals with and controls the 
use of language. Participation in such an art-form requires the use imagination.379 
 
Yet, it is innovation which is the quality that most represents the common law 
tradition.380 Indeed, those cases that we know of as ‘important cases’ tend to 
change the legal tradition by revealing the Idea by way of new and innovative 
applications. Put another way, the Idea of law is revealed as universally applicable 
by ‘showing’ itself in variety of sensuous situations. The phrase ‘important cases’ 
is interchangeable with the phrase ‘good cases’ as both refer to the work itself 
showing the Idea of the law, or the true.  
 
Judges who have mastered judicial reasoning and interpretation enable the past to 
be seen in a new light.381 Not only is it possible to continue legal tradition by 
adapting it, but such “a judicial attitude and approach is in the very best traditions 
of the common law.”382 Further, it is by examining the past that we can learn from 
it, and make beneficial changes for the future.383 In fact, it is arguable that 
interpretation and application are the raison d’etre of legal adjudication.384 
However, the Idea of law should remain constant, it is just its shape that alters (like 
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Plato’s Idea of table). Just because a particular judgment has been accepted over 
time, does not mean that it is clear or certain.385 Not all case law meets the 
definition of art, and thus not all case law embodies the legal Idea.  
 
The meaning and re-construction of any judgment is always open for review; 
precedents do not speak for themselves, rather they require interpretation and 
application to factual situations to be meaningful. New circumstances cast new 
light on existing rules and procedures, so that while total revision of the Idea of 
such rules is not achieved (and nor should it be), judges are free to rework them 
and re-interpret them in a meaningful way.386 Interpretation “is an occasion for 
interested and creative attempts at hermeneutical appropriation.”387 In Heidegger’s 
terms, appropriation is the gift of Saying, it allows beings to see the is and grants to 
us our place in nature so that we may be capable of being those who speak (ie, 
show) the truth.388  
 
A well-known example of an important (or ‘good’ in Aristotle’s terms) judicial 
text is Lord Atkin’s dictum in Donoghue v Stevenson389, because its Idea is not 
only legally consistent and universal (ie, true), it is also a wonderful example of 
dialectic at work. Most valuably his dictum is profligate, meaning it lends itself to 
new and diverse renderings. This flexibility, combined with clarity of legal and 
equitable principles, is what makes a case embody the Idea of law.390  
 
The analogical reasoning applied by Lord Atkin suggests an inductive form. His 
‘neighbourhood principle’ attempts to lay down a reformed and generic test of duty 
of care in negligence, and in doing so Lord Atkin succeeds in formulating a 
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principle that is wide enough to incorporate the dicta in earlier cases.391 Both forms 
of judicial reasoning (deductive and inductive) are applied as a way of ensuring 
consistency in any given body of law.392 As will be shown later, the 
neighbourhood principle has since been invoked often by judges as the starting 
point of inquiry in negligence cases. Lord Atkin’s dictum in Donoghue v Stevenson 
has stood the test of time and legitimacy because, as will be seen below, the dictum 
is validly reasoned and logical, and the progression of law set out there is 
universally valid (true).  
 
As we mentioned above, precedents cannot speak for themselves, they require 
interpretation/application. Precedents provide the judicial and lawyerly opportunity 
for creative hermeneutical appropriation, and past legal decisions provide the 
opportunity for further manufacture and revision of meaning just as much as they 
present the authority for a present case’s resolution. It is the richness and opacity 
of important cases that recommend them as good judicial texts.393  
 
The conceptual opposites of change and stability need not be opposing in the law. 
In fact, one of the constants of the adjudicative function is change. Stability in the 
law is maintained through judicial acts of revision; “[t]ransformation is the 
lifeblood of the common law’s vibrant tradition.”394 Professor John Farrar 
describes case law as a mosaic, “where the pattern emerges as the work 
develops.”395 
 
Put another way, past judicial opinions combine to form:  
 
a valuable institutional almanac of experimental strategies whose relevance and 
results are to be tested and retested in the service of making society a better place 
to live.396  
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For lawyers and judges, every factual discovery, every legal conclusion is 
provisional and open to further interpretation. There always exists the possibility of 
future revision, while being guided by the Idea.397 White illustrates this point by 
giving the example of a Platonic dialogue. In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates makes 
two speeches: one against love, and one in favour of it. White says it is a common 
feature of Platonic dialogue to end with Socrates being perplexed about the matter 
of which he speaks; either that, or he reaches a conclusion that, even in the context 
of the dialogue, leaves itself open to doubt.398 White draws the analogy between 
Platonic dialogue and the law, by saying: 
 
[that] each performance in the law is the best we can do at the time, but it is 
always open to revision: by appeal, by distinction, by overruling, by 
amendment.399 
 
Farrar explains that, once judicial pronouncements have been recorded, they 
become part of the system of precent and, in so becoming, are subject to the 
Aristotlean practice of treating like cases alike.400  
 
The doctrine of precedent produces in a legal system certainty and consistency.401 
The Latin term stare decisis literally means ‘to stand by what has been decided’, 
and is most often used to describe the doctrine of precedent.402 However, Farrar 
says that, strictly speaking, the term should read “stare rationibus decidendis since 
it is the ratio decidendi not the decision which binds.”403  
 
In Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd,404 Richardson J states:  
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Adherence to past decisions promotes certainty and stability. People need to 
know where they stand, and what the law expects of them. So do their legal 
advisers…However, any judicial development and change reflects an assessment 
that the obtaining of a socially just result outweighs the considerations of 
certainty and predictability in the particular case.405  
 
The basic method of legal reasoning is that of analogy between cases. Farrar 
describes analogy as: 
 
an imperfect form of induction, [as] it proceeds on the basis of a number of 
points of resemblance of relations or attributes between cases.406  
 
Analogical reasoning relates not merely to the number of common attributes or 
relations which are found to exist between cases, but also to the legal relevance 
and factual importance of these attributes or relations.407 These matters are 
ultimately ones of “practical judgement”,408 or what Aristotle calls ‘practical 
wisdom’, which includes judges’ own normative belief and moral value bases. 
 
The main rhetorical device applied in law is the judicial appeal to authority.409 
Analogical reasoning uses ‘resemblance’ between facts as a normative step in 
determining the relevance of the legal rule to the present facts.410 Farrar says that 
the judicial debate that takes place about similar and dissimilar facts actually just 
skims the surface of the process.411 Behind the issue of factual resemblance is “the 
complex question of the desirability and expediency in extending the rule to the 
new fact situation.”412 Issues of desirability and expediency are fundamentally 
policy and value considerations, which arise for the judge as part of her 
adjudicative function.413  
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It is common knowledge that case law involves using reasoning by analogy, but 
there is another important aspect to judicial reasoning. Case law must develop by 
using the skill of reasoning by way of legal rules. Farrar explains that, in 
formulating rules, judges classify them into categories and then determine the 
concepts within the categories.414 This approach is part of the system’s treating like 
cases alike, and is an important part of the legitimacy of case law.415 
 
Edward Levi, in his book An Introduction to Legal Reasoning,416 describes legal 
reasoning in more detail: 
 
The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It is reasoning from 
case to case. It is a threefold process described by the doctrine of precedent in 
which a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and 
then applied to a next similar situation. The steps are these: similarity is seen 
between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced; then 
the rule of law is made applicable to the second case.417 
 
Joseph Horovitz believes legal reasoning, or reasoning by analogy, to be inductive 
in its concept and highly intuitive in its practice.418 For my part, I consider that 
analogical reasoning is capable of being both inductive and deductive, but I would 
say that it is more commonly deductive, in that the court takes a general principle 
set down in a similar-fact case and applies it to form a particular conclusion in the 
present case. However, as we will see subsequently, it is in important judicial 
opinions that inductive reasoning is present. 
 
Horovitz says the legitimacy of judicial interpretation depends on three kinds of 
grounds: 
 
legal grounds supplied by the existing system, methodological grounds, and 
empirical grounds regarding the pertinent aspects of the general will.419  
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Judicial reasoning combines the facts of the case with the above types of grounds. 
The ability to adapt: 
 
such crude supporting material to the purpose of rational legislation, 
interpretation, and judgment, is a major task of legal methodology.420 
 
Klug Ulrich uses the phrase “analogical inference (argumentum a simile)”421 to 
describe the legal process of analogical reasoning. Horovitz, using Klug’s phrase, 
states that analogical inference occurs when:  
 
a legal rule whose explicit formulation refers to a certain state of affairs is 
applied to a different state of affairs, congruent with the first ‘in all essential 
respects’. In other words, by means of analogical inference a given legal rule is 
brought to bear upon an unforeseen case which corresponds, nevertheless, to the 
‘basic idea’ of the rule [Emphasis added].422 
 
As the law develops, we are able to pull out broad, conceptual statements of legal 
principle, which dwell in the realm of generality but that correspond to the ‘basic 
idea’ of the rule. Farrar says these far-reaching principles often epitomise the legal 
system’s basic values or traditions.423 To illustrate his statement, he gives the 
example of equitable maxims - such as ‘no man may profit from his own wrong’ 
and ‘she who comes to equity must do so with clean hands’.424 Over-arching 
common law principles will often, but not always, express an ethical or moral 
value base that has gained legitimacy at law.425 The ethical or moral value base of 
which Farrar speaks is what we have referred to as natural law, or the Idea of law. 
 
The term legitimacy, in accordance with its Latin origins, means conforming with 
the law, or simply legality.426 Legitimacy works:  
                                                 
420
 Ibid. 
421
 Ibid, 21. Horovitz discusses Klug Ulrich’s theory in Ulrich, K Juristische Logik (2nd ed) (1958).
422
 Ibid, 32. 
423
 Farrar, J Introduction to Legal Method (1977) 64.  
424
 Ibid. 
425
 Ibid. 
426
 Ibid, 10. 
 67
 
in terms of the impersonal rational authority of the law – the rule of law not men 
– accepted both by those who administer the system and by the population at 
large.427  
 
Rationality is vital to the ‘law’s’ legitimacy,428 because every legal rule and 
practice ought to be justifiable on logical and rational (ie, impersonal) grounds. 
 
Weber tells us that rationality has two aspects to it. The first being that rationality 
is “a formal logical aspect based on intellectual consistency between the legal 
rules, principles, standards and concepts.”429 Farrar observes that Weber’s first 
aspect is relatively static.430 The second aspect is “a substantive ideological or 
value aspect in the sense of conformity with the changing values of society.”431  
 
Farrar observes that the second aspect is more dynamic than the first.432 The two 
Weberian aspects, inherent in rationality, represent: 
 
an antinomy which is constantly being resolved in the course of legal 
development. Law must be stable, yet it cannot stand still.433  
 
Ulrich defines legal logic as being “the theory of the rules of formal logic applied 
within the framework of adjudication.”434 Like Farrar, Klug sees legal logic as 
being an example of practical logic (as occurs in dialectic), as opposed to general 
logic (which is purely theoretical). In the context of adjudication, or judicial law-
making, arguments are presented, law is applied, application is openly reasoned 
and conclusions are drawn.435  
                                                 
427
 Ibid. 
428
 At least, it is to those who accept the Enlightenment or the Greek idea of logos. 
429
 Farrar, supra n 423 at 10. Farrar discusses Weber’s views of rationality in Weber, M Law in Economy 
and Society (trans) Rheinstein, M (1954).  
430
 Ibid.  
431
 Ibid.  
432
 Ibid. 
433
 Ibid. 
434
 Horovitz, supra n 418 at 21. Horovitz quotes Klug Ulrich in Ulrich, K Juristische Logik (2nd ed) (1958) 
6.
435
 Ibid. Horovitz discusses Klug Ulrich’s theory in Ulrich, K Juristische Logik (2nd ed) (1958) 7.
 68

A judge’s decision on the facts of any case, which may be called res judicata 
(literally meaning, the thing has been adjudicated upon), is binding only on the 
parties to that particular action.436 In saying this, we are distinguishing between the 
decision in a given case and the concept of law that is explicitly relied upon in that 
case. The latter is what we call the ratio, which is something more abstract than the 
decision itself, and is a concept that gets absorbed into the general body of law.437  
 
Farrar defines the ratio as “the reason for the decision or as the underlying 
principle of a case which forms its authoritative element.”438 Sir Rupert Cross 
describes the ratio as: 
 
Any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in 
reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him, 
or a necessary part of his direction to the jury.439  
 
Farrar says that ratio decidendi, as a concept, is difficult to define comprehensively 
“since its function is to bridge the gap between reasoning by analogy and reasoning 
with rules.”440  
 
In determining whether to follow the ratio set down in a previous but similar case, 
it is: 
 
necessary to examine the way in which the case was argued and pleaded, the 
process of reasoning adopted by the judge and the relationship of the case to 
other decisions. It is also necessary to consider the status of the court itself.441  
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Generally speaking, the ratio is only prescriptive, for use in a later case, where the 
facts in that case are ‘on all fours’ in every sense with the former.442 However, in a 
practical sense, the court considers whether:  
 
some of the facts at some of their levels of generality [are] more relevant to its 
present decision than is the absence of the rest of them.443  
 
Put another way, the question is one of analogical relevance of the former case’s 
ratio to the circumstances of the present case.444  
 
Farrar says that the concept of ratio is best understood as “a technique or process 
of abstraction and generalisation which assumes its importance in later cases.”445 
Put more generally, the ratio is not so much a rule in itself, but rather it is “an 
analogical technique used to create a rule.”446  
 
In contrast to the ratio of a case, sometimes judges will espouse what we call 
obiter dicta. Obiter consists of a judge’s comment on the case based on 
hypothetical facts – that is, facts that are not before the court for adjudication.447 
Both ratio and obiter are analogical techniques, but whereas ratio provides the 
certainty of having a rule to follow, obiter merely sets out statement that may be of 
value to subsequent judges.448 Usually, obiter is not a judicial pronouncement that 
has been fully reasoned or deeply considered as it relates to the case at hand, and 
so the absence of dialectic supporting obiter makes it less valuable (depending, of 
course, on the court from which the dicta emanates).449  
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However, as we have seen, no legal rule or case law principle is settled for all time. 
The other elements involved in the process of judicial reasoning – making it one of 
practical reasoning, mean that adjudication is not a strictly logical process.450 
 
Professor Julius Stone sums up the common law tradition:  
 
In short a ‘rule’ or ‘principle’ as it emerges from a precedent case is subject in its 
further elaboration to continual review, in the light of analogies and differences, 
not merely in the logical relations between legal concepts and propositions, not 
merely in the relations between fact situations, and the problems springing from 
these; but also in the light of the import of these analogies and differences for 
what is thought by the latter court to yield a tolerably acceptable result in terms 
of ‘policy’, ‘ethics’, ‘justice’, ‘expediency’ or whatever other norm of 
desirability the law may be thought to subserve. No ‘ineluctable logic’, but a 
composite of the logical relations seen between legal proposition, of observations 
of facts and consequences, and of value judgments about the acceptability of 
these consequences, is what finally comes to bear upon the alternatives with 
which ‘the rule of stare decisis’ confronts the courts, and especially appellate 
courts. And this, it may be supposed, is why finally we cannot assess the product 
of their work in terms of any less complex quality than that of wisdom.451  
 
Thus, case law develops as a product of practical wisdom, and emerges out of 
adjudicative situations. Judges must combine the skills of reasoning by analogy 
with reasoning by rules.452 Indeed, legal rules may be expanded or narrowed down 
according to the situation. To a certain degree, and within the limits of our legal 
system, judges may choose to follow or disregard certain rules, in order to do 
justice in the case before them.453 For example, judges may choose to distinguish, 
follow or affirm other judgments in any given area, and while this ability depends 
largely on the factual matrix at hand, it is the judge who ultimately decides the 
facts of a case. Farrar sums up the judicial position by saying that judges are given 
“pockets of discretion within a framework of rules.”454 
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White believes that the most important result a judicial opinion can achieve is “the 
character the court gives itself in its writing and the opportunities for thought and 
community that it creates.”455 
 
The most useful way for judges to ‘do’ legal philosophy, in the context of 
adjudication, is to do it “pragmatically, usefully, and poetically.”456 Hutchinson 
says that law is not only the calling of thinkers, which is the commonly held view, 
but also a place for artists and poets.457 He says that the difference between science 
and art, or philosophy, is one of “emphasis and practice, not essence and 
theory.”458 If more artistic and poetic, Hutchinson says that judges will also 
become better legal thinkers and political theorists.459 While I agree with 
Hutchinson, I think that law needs to be defined as art, so that it is more likely to 
be successful in relaying the Idea of the law in a rich, lasting and forceful manner. 
 
Art can be seen as something that gives us a performance, and in so doing it 
performs both itself and its function in the world. Hutchinson says that art’s 
performance is not something that is peripheral, rather it is actually “essential to 
any genuine attempt to understand the text’s meaning.”460 Further, he explains:  
 
[E]very performance is an event, but not one in any way separate from the work 
– the work itself is what takes place in the event of performance.461  
  
With this, we have come back to the Aristotlean view that application is an 
essential element to the meaningful determination of the law. We have seen the 
importance and function of dialectic in judicial pronouncements, and we now have 
a conceptual understanding of the system of legal rules that forms part of the 
agreed definition of art.  
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The next part of this thesis analyses the development of the duty of care rule in 
negligence, leading up to and culminating in Lord Atkin’s dictum in Donoghue v 
Stevenson, with a view to determining whether this body of law meets the ‘system 
of rules and principles’ aspect of our definition of art.  
 
II.III  Development of a Principle: Duty of Care 
 
In lay terms, the word ‘negligence’ is used to connote a carelessness.462 In legal 
terms, negligence is the name given to a particular type of tort (ie, a civil wrong), 
for which legal redress is available.463 The threshold test for liability in negligence 
at law is that the defendant must owe to the plaintiff a duty to take care when 
performing a task. The duty of care test acts like a filter for potential legal action, 
as there are sound policy reasons for limiting the cases of negligence brought 
before the courts.464  
  
The duty of care test is primarily concerned with the relationship of the parties. 
The nature and scope of the test is described by Stephen Todd, thus: 
 
There is no satisfactory all-embracing test that can be applied in any case to 
determine the question of duty: indeed, the inquiry that has to be made is 
incapable of formulation in such a way. However, the courts have laid down 
some guiding principles which can resolve the more straightforward case and 
which provide at least a reference point in others.465 
 
The guiding principles that Todd refers to are discussed infra in the present 
chapter.  
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Farrar observes that the development of the tort of negligence took place in the 
context of:  
 
a period of great economic and social change which is marked by the gradual 
growth of mass manufacturing as a result of the industrial revolution.466 
 
Todd affirms Farrar’s statement, explaining that it was the arrival of 
industrialisation that gave rise to a substantial number of tort actions, giving 
impetus to the courts to consider a new category of duty that sat outside contract 
law.467 Todd calls the early development of negligence cases ‘ad-hoc’, and says 
that by the late 19th century, the courts began searching for a “general statement of 
principle explaining when a duty would be imposed.”468 
 
The present chapter considers the common law development of the duty of care 
test in negligence, leading up to and culminating in the famous case of Donoghue v 
Stevenson. I will analyse the developing case law for its consistency with the 
existing common law and equitable principles, and I will point out any deficiencies 
that I consider appear in the judges’ reasoning. The object of the present exercise is 
to see whether the duty of care case law may properly be called true. 
 
It is fair to say that the development of the duty of care test began with the case of 
Dixon v Bell,469 and the category set out in that case of ‘dangerous things’. The 
facts of the case are brief. The defendant, being in possession of a loaded gun, sent 
one of his servants to fetch it for his use. He instructed another man, with whom he 
lodged, to take the priming out of the gun before giving it to the servant girl, who 
was aged around 13 or 14 years. The second man removed the priming from the 
gun and gave it to the girl, who proceeded to play with the gun and, in so doing, 
accidentally shot the plaintiff’s son.470 
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The lower court found for the plaintiff and awarded him damages. However, the 
Attorney-General moved for a new trial on the basis that the defendant had taken 
every precaution to render the gun safe for transportation. Lord Ellenborough CJ 
dismissed the application, finding on the facts that the defendant ought to have 
done more to make the gun safe.471 
 
The Court in Dixon v Bell lays down the general principle that, where a dangerous 
thing is in someone’s care, that person has a duty to make it “safe and 
innoxious”.472 Where there is a want of care, and the thing itself is left in such a 
state that it is able to do mischief, the law will hold the defendant responsible for 
the resulting harm.473  
 
In the present case, the defendant could have discharged all of the gun’s contents, 
making it completely safe to handle, but because he didn’t do so he showed want 
of care. It is interesting to note that the Court’s decision is such, despite His 
Lordship recognising that “it was the defendant’s intention to prevent all 
mischief”474 by taking out the priming.  
 
In this case, Lord Ellenborough CJ recognises that natural law propositions of right 
and wrong exist, both in equity and common law. That he does so may be seen by 
the nature of his ratio. The Court here allows the common law rule that ‘where 
there is a wrong, there is a remedy’475 to come to the fore, that is, he allows the 
truth of the law to assert itself on the facts. In summary, Lord Ellenborough CJ 
acknowledges the universal validity of natural law by implying that the rules of 
right and wrong exist as ‘the nature of the thing’.  
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Nor can we criticise Dixon v Bell on logical or procedural grounds. The principle 
laid down in this case may be called true in the Dworkin sense of the term, as 
following from the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process, as 
well as the Aristotlean sense of the term.  
 
The Court may be said to have applied practical wisdom, in the sense that “a 
solution which is more just than that of the law”476 was reached, and because 
practical wisdom is the application of the true, the universal order in the world. It 
is my view that Lord Ellenborough CJ has provided the best constructive 
interpretation of the law in the present case.  
 
An important point to remember about Dixon v Bell is that it is a case involving a 
thing that is inherently dangerous. The Court did not analyse the concept of duty in 
relation to the plaintiff’s son; rather, it considers that because of the nature of the 
thing (ie, a gun) there is a duty to take care when handling it. This case is narrowly 
drawn, both in law and fact. 
 
The next significant case in the development of the duty care principle is 
Langridge v Levy477. The case states that the plaintiff’s father bought from the 
defendant a gun, which the father told the defendant both he and his son would be 
using. The defendant told the father that the gun was made by a well-respected 
gun-maker (Nock), but it was later found that the gun was not one made by Nock 
at all. In fact, the gun in question was ill-manufactured, unsafe and dangerous. The 
Court found that the defendant knew of the truth of these matters at the time he 
warranted the gun’s pedigree and suitability to the father. The gun exploded while 
being used by the plaintiff son, and as a consequence the son lost the use of one of 
his hands.478 
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Counsel for the plaintiff argued Dixon v Bell in support of his case, but Lord Parke 
has this to say about the width of the Dixon principle: 
 
We are not prepared to rest the case upon one of the grounds on which the 
learned counsel for the plaintiff sought to support his right of action, namely, that 
wherever a duty is imposed on a person by contract or otherwise, and that duty is 
violated, any one who is injured by the violation of it may have a remedy against 
the wrong-doer; we think this action may be supported without laying down a 
principle which would lead to that indefinite extent of liability…and we should 
pause before we made a precedent by our decision which would be an authority 
for an action against the vendors, even of such instruments and articles as are 
dangerous in themselves, at the suit of any person whomsoever into whose hands 
they might happen to pass, and who should be injured thereby.479  
  
In my view, Their Lordships may have applied different reasoning had Dixon v 
Bell been authority for a duty of care being owed to those the defendant ought to 
reasonably foresee might be harmed (ie, Lord Atkin’s ‘neighbourhood 
principle’).480 Instead, the duty related to the gun itself and as Lord Parke rightly 
observes, there was no filter in place to prevent the floodgates from opening in 
relation to that duty concept. Another reason for the differing approach appears to 
be the different circumstances in the two cases: the case of a gun-owner being 
narrower than a shop-keeper, who in theory may owe a duty to the world at large. 
 
Instead, the judgment proceeds under the head of fraudulent misstatement. The 
case’s principle may be stated thus: while a mere falsehood is not enough to give 
rise to a right of action, where that falsehood is accompanied by an intention that it 
be acted on by the injured party (and the injury relates to the falsehood), the 
plaintiff will have a remedy for deceit.481 Further, it does not matter whether the 
instrument, which is the object of the falsehood, is given to a third party for 
delivery to the plaintiff, or even that the third party was also intend to be 
deceived.482 What matters is that harm occurs while the thing is in the possession 
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of a person to whom the defendant’s representation was either directly or indirectly 
communicated, and for whose use the defendant knew it was bought.483  
 
The Court found that, when the defendant sold the gun to the father and son for 
their use, he knew that it was of inferior quality to that which he represented. The 
father and the plaintiff would not have used the gun ‘but-for’ the defendant’s 
warranty as to its pedigree and suitability for their purposes (ie, hunting).484 A 
deciding factor for the Court appears to have been that the consequences of the 
fraud were not too remote: 
 
We therefore think, that as there is fraud, and damage, the result of that fraud, not 
from an act remote and consequential, but one contemplated by the defendant at 
the time as one of its results, the party guilty of the fraud is responsible to the 
party injured.485  
 
To sum up, Langridge v Levy is a case of fraudulent misstatement, as opposed to 
being framed as a duty of care case. The important factors for the Court in their 
decision are that the defendant knew of the falseness of his statement and that he 
knew the plaintiff and his son would be the users of the gun. While this case 
provides, in my view, the ‘right’ decision on the facts, it does not continue the line 
of Dixon v Bell dictum relating to a duty owed where one is in charge of a 
dangerous thing.  
 
Thus, the right outcome was reached here, even though the ratio in each case 
differs completely: one case puts forward a duty principle; and the other puts 
forward a fraudulent misstatement principle. The Court may be said to have 
applied practical wisdom, in the sense that “a solution which is more just than that 
of the law”486 was reached. However, for Aristotle, practical wisdom is the 
application of the true, the universal order, and such an application was not 
achieved by the Court in Langridge v Levy. 
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In my view, the main problem with Langridge v Levy is not that the result was 
achieved by application of a different principle (because the facts are not ‘on all 
fours’ with those in Dixon v Bell), rather, it is that Lord Parke appears to have read 
the Dixon v Bell dictum as being wider than what it actually is. What the Court in 
Dixon v Bell held is this: where a dangerous thing is in someone’s care, that person 
has a duty to take care with it, to make it safe so that it cannot do mischief to 
others. The Court did not hold: 
 
[W]herever a duty is imposed on a person by contract or otherwise, and that duty 
is violated, any one who is injured by the violation of it may have a remedy 
against the wrong-doer.487  
 
While Gadamer says: 
 
[that] judging the case involves not merely applying the universal principle 
according to which it is judged, but co-determining, supplementing, and 
correcting that principle.488  
 
Lord Parke has done more than supplement the Dixon v Bell principle – he has 
altered it entirely through misunderstanding its scope.  
 
Langridge v Levy may not be called true on Dworkin’s test of true law, either - 
which is that propositions of law may be called true if: 
 
they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due 
process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal 
practice.489  
 
In my view, Lord Parke has not provided the best constructive interpretation of the 
law in the present case. I consider that Chief Justice Ellenborough’s dictum may 
have been applied to the facts of Langridge v Levy, by process of inductive 
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reasoning, so that the scope of the existing test may have been extended (which, as 
we will see, is what has happened in some subsequent cases). However, Lord 
Parke chose not to do so in the present instance, choosing instead to proceed with a 
completely different cause of action.  
 
The judgment cannot be called true in Aristotle’s natural law sense, either. The 
nature of the thing does not assert itself, for the nature of the thing in Langridge v 
Levy was essentially the same as that in Dixon v Bell. Granted, the scope of the 
duty would have been infinitely wide, if left unqualified, in the former case, but 
both involved dangerous items and the harm was of the same kind. Lord Parke 
could have chosen to use analogous inference to refine the scope of duty owed, for 
use in similar cases in the future by reasoning:  
 
[S]ome of the facts at some of their levels of generality [were] more relevant to 
its present decision than [was] the absence of the rest of them.490  
 
Langridge v Levy provided an opportunity for acting on judicial insight into future 
cases involving vendors of dangerous things, and the Court had the opportunity to 
both qualify and extend the scope of the Dixon v Bell dictum to incorporate all 
vendors of dangerous things (not just those who make a false representation about 
them). This would have been the consistent (ie, universal), reasoned and morally 
just approach. If Lord Parke had done so, we would be able to say that he was 
allowing the nature of the thing (ie, the principle) to assert itself and that the Idea 
of law was present in his work. 
 
The next case in the development of negligence is that of Winterbottom v 
Wright.491 In this case, A (the defendant) contracted with the Postmaster-General 
to provide a mail-coach to transport mail-bags to another town. B contracted with 
the Postmaster-General to horse the coach, and he also contracted C (the plaintiff) 
to drive the coach. The plaintiff suffered injury while driving the mail-coach 
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because of defects in its construction, and he brought an action against the 
defendant for damages.492  
 
The Court unanimously held that, because there was no privity of contract between 
the plaintiff and the defendant, the action must fail.  Lord Rolfe states that, in that 
case:  
 
the duty…is shewn to have arisen solely from the contract; and the fallacy 
consists in the use of that word ‘duty’.493  
 
Since there was no contractual relationship between the parties, there could be no 
duty owed to the plaintiff. 
 
The Court appears to have taken its approach, in refusing to consider the tortious 
concept of duty of care, for two reasons. The first is that, as was subsequently 
explained in Heaven v Pender,494 the pleadings were drawn alleging breach of 
contractual duty only.495 The second is that, the Court appears to be concerned on 
policy grounds with the consequences of the defendant owing a duty of care to a 
third party driver. Lord Alderson reasons that, if the plaintiff were able to sue in 
that case, “there is no point at which such actions would stop.”496 Lord Abinger 
explains that, if the plaintiff could sue: 
 
every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by 
the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action.497  
 
The Court states that the operation of these types of contracts must be confined to 
those who enter into them.498  
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The Court also appears to have been influenced by the policy concerns raised in 
Langridge v Levy about a general duty of care test being laid down. While I agree 
that Lord Parke’s re-framing of the Dixon v Bell test is unworkably wide, there was 
here an opportunity for the Court to apply Lord Parke’s wide dictum and qualify it 
by setting down a class of persons to whom a duty is owed, and a general principle 
about remoteness of damage.  
 
However, the Court in Winterbottom v Wright considered that Langridge v Levy 
could be distinguished on the facts because, there the gun was bought for the use of 
the son, and in the present case, the action is brought simply because the defendant 
was a contractor with a third person. Lord Abinger reasons that, in Langridge v 
Levy, the son “was really and substantially the party contracting.”499 For my part, I 
see this statement as being a stretch of privity of contract, though there are 
obviously material differences in the facts of the two cases. Lord Alderson 
reasoned that Langridge v Levy should be distinguished because “[t]here a distinct 
fraud was committed on the plaintiff.”500  
 
It is possible that, if the Court in Langridge v Levy had used analogous inference in 
relation to the facts of Dixon v Bell (which it was open to the Court to do), and if 
the Court in Winterbottom v Wright had taken the consistent, reasoned and morally 
just approach of allowing the nature of the principle to develop and assert itself, we 
may have had a concept of duty of care similar to that laid down in the landmark 
case of Donoghue v Stevenson as early as 1842.  
 
As mentioned above, the judicial task consists in highlighting the tension between 
the law and the facts, and bringing it into the light for examination. In Heidegger’s 
terms, this means that judges must create the World so that Being may dwell in the 
Open. I do not consider that the Court in Winterbottom v Wright engages in 
dialectic, because the case does not engage in the process of thesis, antithesis and 
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synthesis in the context of previous case law. Thus, the opportunity to create a new 
richness of meaning is lost, as is the chance to find and apply the ‘truth’ of the law. 
Good judicial texts will be written to provide an openness (aletheia), a space 
between Saying and meaning that allows the existing legal Idea to speak to us. 
 
If the law is always speaking to us (Saying), which it is, it ought to be both open 
and constant, so that it gains legitimacy for all people and applies even-handedly to 
all people. I consider Winterbottom v Wright to set up unpredictable reasoning in 
the duty of care area, because it does not weigh and balance the body of law as a 
whole in its application to the facts of the case. Further, the Court does not engage 
in Gadamer’s ‘free-play of imagination’, which allows the law to constantly re-
invent itself.  
 
Farrar says that common law principles will often express a moral value base that 
has gained legitimacy at law.501 Broadly, the nature of the thing in this instance 
could be said to be the common law rule that ‘where there is a wrong, there is a 
remedy’.502 Or, more specifically, the ‘basic idea’ may be said to be that where 
there is a lack of care, and the thing itself is left in such a state that it is able to do 
harm, the law will hold the defendant responsible for any consequent damage.503  
 
Judicial opinions ought to be mimesis; that is, they should imitate the real essence 
of a thing, thereby revealing the truth of a thing or matter in the Open, but the 
present case does not do so. Nor do their Lordships engage in practical wisdom, 
because they do not seek out, “on the basis of equity, a solution which is more just 
than that of the law.”504  
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Winterbottom v Wright is not a ‘good’ or ‘important’ case in the duty of care area, 
and it does not adhere to the very best traditions of the common law.505 The case 
does not bring the Idea or the true into the Open, and so (like Langridge v Levy) it 
fails to meet the first part of our definition of art. 
 
The next case for consideration is Longmeid v Holliday,506 which involves the sale 
and purchase of a lamp, called ‘The Holliday Lamp’, by a husband for his wife. 
The defendant was the maker and seller of Holliday Lamps, and he sold one of 
these to the husband. The trial Court found that, at the time the defendant 
warranted the lamp to be fit and proper for the purpose of use, he did not know that 
the lamp was defective. As a result of the defect, the lamp exploded when the wife 
tried to use it, injuring her in the process.507  
 
In the lower Court, the jury found that the defendant was not guilty of any 
fraudulent or deceitful representation, and the husband and wife plaintiffs appealed 
the decision. The principle on which Lord Parke (of Langridge v Levy) decided the 
case on appeal is this: 
 
A tradesman, who contracts with an individual for the sale to him of an article to 
be used for a particular purpose by a third person, is not, in the absence of fraud, 
liable for injury caused to such person by some defect in the construction of the 
article.508  
 
Following the reasoning of Winterbottom v Wright, the Court held that the action 
must fail, because there was no fraudulent misrepresentation to the husband about 
the lamp, and there was no contractual relationship between the defendant and the 
wife. Langridge v Levy was distinguished in the present case, but the Court 
observes that, had the defendant been guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and 
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had he intended it to be used by the wife, then she would have had an action at 
law.509  
 
The reasoning in Longmeid v Holliday makes it of interest for our purposes. Lord 
Parke concedes that there are other cases in existence, besides those of fraud, 
where a third party may sue for damage sustained. In fact, His Lordship gives a 
number of examples: 
 
[I]f an apothecary administered improper medicines to his patient…and thereby 
injured his health, he would be liable to the patient, even where the father or 
friend of the patient may have been the contracting party, [for the apothecary], if 
he gave improper medicines…would be liable to an action for a misfeasance: 
Pippin v Sheppard (11 Price 40).510 
… … … 
A stage-coach proprietor, who may have contracted with a master to carry his 
servant, if he is guilty of neglect, and the servant sustains personal damage, is 
liable to him; for it is a misfeasance towards him, if, after taking him as a 
passenger, the proprietor or his servant drives without due care, as it is a 
misfeasance towards any one travelling on the road.511  
…. …. …. 
And it may be the same when any one delivers to another without notice an 
instrument in its nature dangerous, or under particular circumstances, as a loaded 
gun which he himself loaded, and that other person to whom it is delivered is 
injured thereby, or if he places it in a situation easily accessible to a third person, 
who sustains damage from it. A very strong case to that effect is Dixon v 
Bell...But it would be going much too far to say, that so much care is required in 
the ordinary intercourse of life between one individual and another, that, if a 
machine not in its nature dangerous, - a carriage for instance, - but which might 
become so by a latent defect entirely unknown, although discoverable by the 
exercise of ordinary care, should be lent or given by one person, even by the 
person who manufactured it, to another, the former should be answerable to the 
latter for a subsequent damage accruing by the use of it [Emphasis added].512 
 
The first of the above paragraphs deals with a professional duty of care, and this 
may explain why the Court dismisses the principle contained in it as inapplicable 
to the present situation, although it is arguable that lamp-makers fall into the 
professional category. However, I do not see any material difference between the 
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principle set down in the second and fourth paragraphs. The second paragraph 
appears to dismiss the concerns of Lord Abinger in Winterbottom v Wright that if 
the servant could sue:  
 
every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by 
the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action.513 
 
Lord Parke appears to accept that any person travelling on the road who is injured 
by the stage-coach, being driven without due care, may bring an action in 
misfeasance. The difference in the dicta being that Lord Parke is talking about the 
coach being driven with undue care, as opposed to being of a faulty construction. 
 
The fourth paragraph affirms the distinction Lord Parke makes between careful 
actions and a latent defect in an item that is not in itself dangerous, but curiously 
goes on to say that the defendant would not be liable even though the defect was 
discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care. I question what the conceptual 
difference is between the lack of care and skill drivers and apothecaries are 
expected to take and the lack of care and skill that is expected of a lamp-maker. 
There seems to me to be no difference – at least, not in the sense that the dictum in 
Dixon v Bell cannot be made analogous to the present facts. I consider that Lord 
Parke is confusing the ‘thing’ to be dealt with, in that he is looking at the defect in 
the lamp as opposed to the duty of care of the lamp-maker, which he has already 
said exists for drivers and apothecaries. Further, I think that Lord Parke could have 
made sense of previous authorities if he had not been confused about the principle 
issue for consideration. 
 
In my view, Longmeid v Holliday is neither important nor good in terms of its ratio 
and its reasoning. While the Court does engage in dialectic, the reasoning is unable 
to be relied upon in future decisions, because the premises were flawed. The 
present case does not bring the duty of care Idea of law into the Open, because the 
common law relating to duty of care was neither applied nor developed, and as 
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such the case does not create aletheia in any sense of its usage (ie, neither the true 
nor the Open). In Aristotle’s terms, Lord Parke’s judicial ability as a craftsperson 
may be seen as lacking by the quality of his judgment. 
 
However, the next case of George v Skivington,514 makes for better reading. The 
husband and wife plaintiffs in this case alleged that the defendant represented to 
them that a certain hair-wash would be fit for that purpose, without causing injury 
to the person using it, and that the plaintiff husband bought the hair-wash on the 
basis of that representation. The defendant professed to the husband to have made 
the hair-wash, saying that the ingredients in it were known only to him, and that 
they were carefully compounded by him. The plaintiff wife used the hair-wash, as 
the defendant knew she would do, and was injured as a result. The question for the 
Court was whether the plaintiffs’ declaration showed good cause.515 
 
The principle of the case is espoused by Lord Kelly, who states that where a person  
makes an article sold for a particular purpose, and knows of the purpose for which 
it is bought and for whom the article is bought, he or she has a duty to that person 
to use ordinary care in making the article.516 
 
Unlike the previous cases in this area, Lord Kelly considers neither the false 
representation nor the lack of a contractual relationship between the defendant and 
the plaintiff wife to be relevant to the case.517 Lord Kelly held: 
 
[Q]uite apart from any question of warranty, express or implied, there was a duty 
on the defendant, the vendor, to use ordinary care in compounding this wash for 
the hair. Unquestionably there was such a duty towards the purchaser, and it 
extends, in my judgment, to the person for whose use the vendor knew the 
compound was purchased.518  
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The qualification on the Court’s principle is that the duty will extend to a third 
party only where the defendant knows that that third party will be using the 
product. Lord Pigott explains, in obiter, the policy considerations for this 
qualification: 
 
The case, no doubt, would have been very different if the declaration had not 
alleged that the defendant knew for whom the compound was intended. Suppose, 
for example, a chemist sells to a customer a drug, without any knowledge of the 
purpose to which it is to be applied, which is fit for a grown person, and that drug 
is afterwards given by the purchaser to a child and does injury, it could not be 
contended that the chemist was liable.519 
 
The Court refers to the facts of Langridge v Levy and states that a similar duty 
arose towards the plaintiff wife in this case as was found to exist for the plaintiff 
son in that case.520 However, Lord Kelly widens the principle from fraudulent 
misstatement to a duty that “the article sold should be reasonably fit for the 
purpose it was bought for and compounded with reasonable care.”521 
 
Thus, the Court in this case develops the fraudulent misstatement dictum set down 
in Langridge v Levy, and also (whether intentional or not) develops and refines 
Lord Parke’s dictum about the Dixon v Bell test. In this way, the Court here has 
created a new richness and aptness of meaning in an area of the law where these 
attributes had been lacking.  
 
We said above that good judicial opinions are those written with an openness, a 
space between Saying and meaning that allows for future application and revision, 
as well as for the continuation of the legal Idea in question. George v Skivington is 
one such good judicial text, and is an important case. Here the law remains open, 
yet constant, even in the face of situational revision. The broad, conceptual 
statement set out by Lord Kelly dwells in the realm of generality but equally 
corresponds to the ‘basic idea’ of the common law tradition that we saw cited (but 
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not developed) by Lord Parke in Longmeid v Holliday.522 Further, because the case 
sets out its formal logic, based on intellectual consistency between legal rules, we 
may call the Court’s reasoning both rational and legitimate.523  
 
For Gadamer: 
 
judging the case involves not merely applying the universal principle according 
to which it is judged, but co-determining, supplementing, and correcting that 
principle.524  
 
Arguably, this is what the Court in George v Skivington has accomplished. Further, 
in the present case, we can see how the nature of the thing (ie, the common law 
duty) has asserted itself. The duty of care Idea remains absolute in its essence, but 
is refined and tailored to do justice in the circumstances, as well as for future use.  
 
The Court applied practical wisdom to the facts of this case, and we may recall that 
Aristotle calls practical wisdom application of the true and universal order.525 
Analogous to Plato’s Idea of a thing, natural law is ‘there’ in a way that our moral 
consciousness knows the right outcome and is able to assess the equity or justice of 
a situation. The principle in George v Skivington is true in the natural law sense, 
and in the Platonic sense of the Idea of a thing. The judgment shows the essence of 
the thing, thereby revealing its truth in the Open.  
 
The next case of interest in the developing duty of care case law is the Court of 
Appeal case of Heaven v Pender. The defendant in this case was a dry-dock owner 
(the purpose of which was for ships to dock for repairs) who put up scaffolding 
around the dry-dock so that the ships docked there could be painted and repaired. 
The plaintiff was a tradesperson, employed by a ship’s owner, to paint the ship left 
in the dry-dock for repairs. When the plaintiff used the scaffolding set up by the 
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defendant, a rope that held the scaffolding broke, and the plaintiff was injured as a 
result.526 
 
Brett M.R. (as he then was527) sets out the principle upon which the case is 
decided: 
 
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard 
to another, that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once 
recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with 
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or 
property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such 
danger.528 
 
In the present case, the Court appears to be imputing knowledge to persons in 
situations where a duty to use ordinary care and skill is owed.529 Indeed, the Court 
goes on to find that the defendant must have known of the use to which the 
scaffolding would be put.530 Thus, the Court widens the dictum in George v 
Skivington in this sense. Whether a duty arises is based on the circumstances, the 
position of the person and the risk of danger or injury that could result from 
improper care and skill.  
 
The Court held that the defendant has an obligation to the plaintiff, even though 
there was no contractual relationship between them:  
 
to take reasonable care that at the time he supplied the staging and ropes they 
were in a fit state to be used.531 
 
The  Court further held that, because of the defendant’s neglect in so doing, he is 
liable to the plaintiff for the injury sustained. (The Court was assisted in its 
decision by evidence showing that the ropes were scorched and unfit for use at the 
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time the defendant put up the scaffolding.532) As we can see, there appear to be two 
parts to the Court’s decision, that the defendant owes a duty of care, and that the 
ropes should be in a fit state to be used (ie, fit for their purpose). 
 
In the present case, Brett M.R. makes clear the distinction between contractual 
duty and tortious duty: 
 
If a person contracts with another to use ordinary care or skill towards him or his 
property the obligation need not be considered in the light of a duty; it is an 
obligation of contract. It is undoubted, however, that there may be the obligation 
of such a duty from one person to another although there is no contract between 
them with regard to such duty.533 
 
As we can see, the Court of Appeal’s dictum is wider than the dicta in both 
Winterbottom v Wright and Longmeid v Holliday.  
 
Brett M.R.’s inductive reasoning, and the way he applies analogical inference, is 
worth setting out in full. He begins by surveying the way the law around a duty of 
care has thus far been developed, by setting out the two main strands of ratio. The 
first strand involves cases of collision and carriage, where drivers and railway 
companies are considered under common law to owe a duty to use ordinary care 
and skill to avoid danger or injury to other drivers and passengers (regardless of 
the absence of contractual relationship). The Master of the Rolls states: 
 
And every one ought by the universally recognised rules of right and wrong, to 
think so much with regard to the safety of others who may be jeopardised by his 
conduct; and if, being in such circumstances, he does not think, and in 
consequence neglects, or if he neglects to use ordinary care or skill, and injury 
ensue, the law, which takes cognisance of and enforces the rules of right and 
wrong, will force him to give an indemnity for the injury [Emphasis added].534 
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The next body of case law Brett M.R. considers is that which involves shop-
keepers and proprietors, where “other phraseology has been used”535 to describe 
the duty owed. The courts have used the word ‘invitation’ to denote the trigger for 
a duty of care in these cases, which may be stated as imposing on oneself “a duty 
not to lay a trap”536 for the person entering one’s premises. The Court observes that 
each set of cases, while providing a rule for its own particular circumstances, does 
not provide a rule for the other – even though the two sets of case law are 
analogous. It seems to Brett M.R. “that there must be some larger proposition 
which involves and covers both sets of circumstances.”537 
 
The Court, by a process of inductive reasoning, goes on to set out a larger 
proposition: 
 
The logic of inductive reasoning requires that where two major propositions lead 
to exactly similar minor premises there must be a more remote and larger 
premise which embraces both of the major propositions. That, in the present 
consideration, is, as it seems to me, the same proposition which will cover the 
similar legal liability inferred in the cases of collision and carriage. The 
proposition which these recognised cases suggest, and which is, therefore, to be 
deduced from them, is that whenever one person is by circumstances placed in 
such a position with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did 
think would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his 
own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury 
to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill 
to avoid such danger. Without displacing the other propositions to which allusion 
has been made as applicable to the particular circumstances in respect of which 
they have been enunciated, this proposition includes, I think, all the recognised 
cases of liability. It is the only proposition which covers them all. It may, 
therefore, safely be affirmed to be a true proposition unless some obvious case 
can be stated in which the liability must be admitted to exist, and which yet is not 
within this proposition. There is no such case [Emphasis added].538 
 
In summary, Brett M.R. is acknowledging the universal validity of natural law; 
that is, the rules of right and wrong that exist as ‘the nature of the thing’. As we 
saw above, Plato believes that:  
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[in] [a]ccepting the existence of a realm, an order universal, harmonious and just, 
the wise man will draw upon this to present the ideal of a just political 
community for which he will formulate just laws which in his capacity as a judge 
he will be able to apply in an unequivocal way, without giving rise to criticism or 
controversy.539  
 
Indeed, the judgment cannot be criticised on logical or procedural grounds. The 
principle laid down in Heaven v Pender may be called true in the Dworkin sense of 
the term, as following from the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due 
process, as well as the Aristotlean sense of the term, in that the nature of the thing 
is given the space to assert itself. 
 
The Court has created a new legal test to include prior tests and cover previous fact 
situations. Thus, Heaven v Pender may properly be called an important or good 
case. As the law develops, judges have the opportunity to pull out broad, 
conceptual statements of legal principle, which dwell in the realm of generality but 
that correspond to the ‘basic idea’ of the rule. As we know, these far-reaching 
principles often epitomise the legal system’s basic values or traditions, and we can 
see that in the present case one of these is the fundamental difference between right 
and wrong.  
 
In my view, the Court has succeeded in developing a richness, complexity and 
clarity around the duty of care test, for use in future cases. Brett M.R. has engaged 
in dialectic, because he has uncovered and resolved tensions in prior legal texts, in 
order to create a new richness and aptness of meaning. Brett M.R. has mastered 
legal interpretation such that we are able to see the past in a new light. Indeed, 
Hutchinson says that such “a judicial attitude and approach is in the very best 
traditions of the common law.”540  
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The case shows the benefit of engaging in dialectic, so that tensions may be 
brought into the open, because then judges are in a better position to reason 
questioningly and logically; that is, there is a better opportunity to find and apply 
the universal ‘truth’ of the law. Truth appears in the dialectic of the Open. Further, 
this case allows a space for Saying, in that the broad general concept the Court has 
laid down may be readily applied – in continuation of the legal Idea - and revised 
in future situations. 
 
In terms of policy considerations, the width of the principle is clarified by the 
Court, where Brett M.R. says that the duty concept only extends to the situation 
where the thing supplied would be: 
 
used immediately by a particular person or persons or one of a class of persons, 
where it would be obvious to the person supplying, if he thought, that the goods 
would in all probability be used at once by such persons…541 
 
That is, the goods would be used before a period of time elapses in which a defect 
could or ought to be discovered.542 The above dictum appears to be heading in the 
direction of Lord Atkin’s ‘neighbourhood principle’ (which is good news for Lord 
Parke, as it alleviates his concerns about someone owing a duty of care to the 
whole world). 
 
Further, the principle applies itself only to those in reasonable contemplation of the 
supplier or maker of a thing, and this view is illustrated by the following comment 
of Brett M.R.’s: 
 
It would exclude a case in which the goods are supplied under circumstances in 
which it would be a chance by whom they would be used or whether they would 
be used or not.543 
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In considering previous case law, the Court comments sagely that Langridge v 
Levy was actually a case about remoteness, and ought not have been made into one 
about fraudulent misstatement.544 Further, the Court explains the reasoning in 
Winterbottom v Wright by saying that the problem for Lord Abinger in establishing 
a duty of care was the too-wide dictum in Langridge v Levy, and that he was right 
to be concerned about that dictum being extended further.545 
 
However, Heaven v Pender was distinguished in Le Lievre v Gould,546 which is a 
case where the mortgagees of a builder’s interest in several properties relied to 
their detriment on certificates given by a surveyor (appointed by the builder) to the 
effect that the buildings had reached the stages specified in the plans. The 
certificates turned out to contain untrue statements as to the progress of the 
buildings, and the mortgagees sought to recover the losses they sustained in 
reliance on the surveyor’s certificates. The Court of Appeal held that the defendant 
surveyor owed no duty of care to the mortgagee plaintiffs, because there was no 
contractual relationship between the parties, and there was no evidence of fraud on 
the part of the surveyor.547 
 
The ratio of the case appears to be this: 
 
[The law of England] does not consider that what a man writes on paper is like a 
gun or other dangerous instrument, and, unless he intended to deceive, the law 
does not, in the absence of contract, hold him responsible for drawing his 
certificate carelessly.548 
 
Lord Esher M.R. (previously Brett M.R.) states: 
 
A man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleased towards the whole world if he 
owes no duty to them.549  
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This statement is undoubtedly true, but the question becomes whether a duty is 
owed, and to whom. Lord Esher M.R. considers that Heaven v Pender may be 
distinguished in the present case, as it “has no bearing on the present question.”550 
His Lordship sets out the Heaven v Pender dictum thus: 
 
If one man is near to another, or is near to the property of another, a duty lies 
upon him not to do that which may cause a personal injury to that other, or may 
injure his property.551 
 
The above statement is close to the ratio in Heaven v Pender, but what Brett M.R. 
actually said was that the duty arises, not in a situation of physical proximity or 
nearness, rather “whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a 
position with regard to another.”552 Lord Justice Smith in Le Lievre v Gould 
narrows the Heaven v Pender principle in the following way: 
 
The decision of Heaven v Pender was founded upon the principle, that a duty to 
take due care did arise when the person or property of one was in such proximity 
to the person or property of another that, if due care was not taken, damage might 
be done by the one to the other.553  
 
I would agree with the above re-statement of the Heaven v Pender principle, 
providing Lord Justice Smith intended the word ‘proximity’ to mean ‘in 
foreseeable relation to’ or ‘in reasonable contemplation of’, and not in Lord Esher 
M.R.’s sense of physical proximity. 
 
Lord Esher M.R. goes on to state that actions for misrepresentations contained in 
company prospectuses can only be brought against directors where those 
statements are proved to be fraudulent.554 Further, Lord Esher M.R. states that 
“negligence, however great, does not of itself constitute fraud.”555 With respect, 
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His Lordship’s proposition is true, but it does not follow that negligence may not 
be a common law head of action in itself. 
 
Here, it is accepted that the surveyor was negligent in drawing up the certificates, 
but Lord Esher M.R. reasons: 
 
Such negligence, in the absence of contract with the plaintiffs, can give no right 
of action at law or in equity.556  
 
Lord Justice Bowen agrees with Lord Esher M.R., and his reasoning is that the two 
classes of case law set out in Heaven v Pender (carriage and ‘invitation’ cases) do 
not extend to situations of careless written statements.557 This is despite the fact 
that the common law already recognises a class of cases where a duty of care is 
owed by professionals in the course of their work,558 and it could be easily argued 
that a surveyor is such a professional. 
 
Le Lievre v Gould is not a case that adds to the richness and clarity of the common 
law. Nor can it properly be called dialectic, as the case does not allow a space for 
the uncovering and resolution of the tensions in previous legal texts. Lord Esher 
M.R. appears to narrow the common law principle in Heaven v Pender without 
openly rationalising his decision to do so. The duty of care Idea cannot appear in 
this case, because there is no openness or space created between Saying and 
meaning that would allow for the continuation of the legal Idea in question. In 
other words, the nature of the thing could not assert itself here. 
 
In order to have legitimacy, the present case would need to show that the Court has 
justly weighed up all of the relevant law as a whole, and that the decision reached 
was logically reasoned. The Court applies neither analogical inference nor 
practical wisdom. Despite Le Lievre v Gould being a Court of Appeal decision, it 
cannot be called an important case.  
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Further, the Court’s principle itself may not be called true in Dworkin’s terms 
because it does not follow from the principles of justice, fairness or procedural due 
process that provide for “the best constructive interpretation of the community’s 
legal practice.”559 
 
The final case for our consideration is arguably the most important in the series: 
the House of Lords decision of Donoghue v Stevenson. One evening in August, 
1928, the appellant went with a friend to a café in Paisley, where the friend ordered 
for the appellant ice-cream and a bottle of ginger-beer. The shopkeeper brought the 
items over to the pair, opened the ginger-beer bottle and poured some of the 
contents over the ice-cream, which was contained in a tumbler. The ginger-beer 
was contained in an opaque bottle, which was sealed with a metal cap, precluding 
inspection until the bottle was opened and the contents poured into plain view. The 
appellant drank part of the mixture, and her friend then poured the remaining 
contents of the bottle into the tumbler. As she was doing so, a decomposed snail 
floated out of the bottle and into the tumbler with the ginger-beer. The appellant 
alleged that she became physically ill as a consequence of drinking the 
contaminated ginger-beer, and she brought an action in negligence against the 
drink’s manufacturer.560 
 
The primary question for the House of Lords was whether the appeal ought to be 
allowed. Their Lordships held, in a three to two majority, that the appeal should so 
be allowed. In particular, the Court held: 
 
[A] manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he 
intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him 
with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the 
knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of 
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the products will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a 
duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.561 
 
In terms of remoteness, Lord Macmillan thought the following question to be 
relevant:  
 
Can it be said that [the manufacturer] could not be expected as a reasonable man 
to foresee that if he conducted his process of manufacture carelessly he might 
injure those whom he expected and desired to consume his ginger-beer?562 
 
His Lordship gives the answer that “[t]he possibility of injury so arising seems…in 
no sense so remote as to excuse him from foreseeing it.”563 Lord Macmillan 
comments on the decision appealed from, and says he cannot believe that there is 
no redress in the law of England or the law of Scotland for such a case.564 
However: 
 
[i]t must always be a question of circumstances whether the carelessness amounts 
to negligence, and whether the injury is not too remote from the carelessness.565 
 
In light of the dictum in Heaven v Pender, Lord Macmillan sees it as “a good 
general rule to regard responsibility as ceasing when control ceases.”566 In the 
present case, His Lordship regards the manufacturer’s control as “remaining 
effective until the article reaches the consumer and the container is opened by 
him.”567 
 
Importantly, Lord Atkin sets out a general principle of law relating to duty of care. 
His Lordship begins by observing that negligent liability is merely a species of 
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culpa, and “is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral 
wrongdoing for which the offender must pay.”568 However:  
 
acts or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical 
world be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand 
relief.569  
 
For this reason, common law rules have arisen limiting the range of complaints 
possible, and the extent of their remedy. In an oft-cited passage, Lord Atkin 
explains his famous ‘neighbourhood principle’: 
 
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure 
your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a 
restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which 
you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, 
in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely 
and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in my 
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or 
omissions which are called in question [Emphasis added].570 
 
When we read the italicised parts of the above passage, we can see the ‘basic idea’ 
that Lord Atkin is espousing. While the decision in this case is narrower than Lord 
Atkin’s general principle, relating as it does directly to the facts of the case, the 
general principle ‘stands’ as being binding on lower courts because it emanates 
from the House of Lords, and because it is not obiter (and even if it were obiter, 
the nature of the Court would ensure that it was treated as highly persuasive). In 
fact, as will be seen later, Lord Atkin’s ‘neighbourhood principle’ has received 
subsequent legitimacy at law. 
 
Lord Atkin considers his principle to be in line with the doctrine of Heaven v 
Pender, though he says that as framed in that case, the doctrine was too wide 
(which is perhaps why Lord Esher subsequently narrowed the principle in Le 
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Lievre v Gould).571 Lord Atkin considers that the dictum of Lord Justice Smith in 
Le Lievre v Gould, relating to the width of the Heaven v Pender principle:  
 
sufficiently states the truth if proximity be not confined to mere physical 
proximity, but be used, as I think it was intended, to extend to such close and 
direct relations that the act complained of directly affects a person whom the 
person alleged to be bound to take care would know would be directly affected 
by his careless act.572 
 
That is, the duty is owed where one ought to have the other in reasonable 
contemplation as being so affected (the ‘other’ being one’s neighbour in law).573 
 
Lord Atkin draws particular attention to Brett M.R.’s qualification on the principle 
in Heaven v Pender, where he emphasises the necessity of the goods having to be 
used immediately (ie, before a reasonable opportunity of inspection exists). Lord 
Atkin believes that, with the addition of the ‘immediacy’ qualification, the Heaven 
v Pender dictum as explained by Lord Justice Smith in Le Lievre v Gould 
“expresses the law of England.”574 
 
Insightfully, Lord Atkin goes on to state: 
 
[I]t is of particular importance to guard against the danger of stating propositions 
of law in wider terms than is necessary, lest essential factors be omitted in the 
wider survey and the inherent adaptability of English law be unduly restricted.575 
 
In discussing the established duty of care case law, Lord Atkin considers that 
Langridge v Levy “appears to add nothing of value positively or negatively to the 
present discussion.”576 Further, in discussing the distinction referred to in 
Longmeid v Holliday regarding things dangerous in themselves, and those that may 
become so due to a latent defect in construction, Lord Atkin states: 
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In this respect I agree with what was said by Scrutton L.J. in Hodge & Sons v 
Anglo-American Oil Co, a case which was ultimately decided on a question of 
fact. ‘Personally, I do not understand the difference between a thing dangerous in 
itself, as poison, and a thing not dangerous as a class, but by negligent 
construction dangerous as a particular thing. The latter, if anything, seems the 
more dangerous of the two; it is a wolf in sheep’s clothing instead of an obvious 
wolf.’577 
 
The case of Donoghue v Stevenson reviews and re-states the general principles of 
law that have developed in the duty of care case law over time. By way of the 
process of dialectic, the Court re-assesses the law in light of the situation at hand, 
and in so doing builds up a richer, clearer new dictum that is applicable not only in 
the present case but also to future cases. In taking a dialectical approach, Lord 
Atkin has brought together the particular with the general, and formulated a new 
principle in line with the common law Idea. He has achieved the truth of the law 
by preparing the way for it by creating World, or the Open, and by using an 
inductive process in light of the tension between the law and the facts in previous 
cases, weighing up the relevant law as a whole.  
 
The legal principle, set out by Lord Atkin, may be called true in Dworkin’s sense 
of the word, as the dictum follows from:  
 
the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process that provide the best 
constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.578  
 
Moreover, the ‘nature of the thing’ (ie, the duty of care principle) asserts itself in 
Lord Atkin’s neighbourhood principle. The nature of the Idea shows itself in 
Saying. His Lordship may be said to have accepted the existence of a universal 
order, which is both harmonious and just and, being a wise man, he has drawn 
upon this order to present the true Idea and formulate true law.579 As we may 
recall, art embodies the cosmic order, the Idea, the truth of a thing as equally in a 
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judgment as in a painting. In the judgment, the Idea is the universal and constant 
natural law. 
 
Aristotle’s application of the true, universal order, is ‘practical wisdom’. Practical 
wisdom occurs when judges are faced with a situation in which they must seek out, 
“on the basis of equity, a solution which is more just than that of the law.”580 I 
consider the House of Lords to have applied practical wisdom in the present case. 
Moreover, we know that for Aquinas, natural law is by its nature completely 
rational, and is something that can only be understood in light of human reason. 
 
Lords Atkin and Macmillan reason openly, questioningly and logically, which 
means that they create a space for the Saying of the truth of the law in the duty of 
care area. Due to the importance and goodness of Donoghue v Stevenson, the duty 
of care case law is always speaking to us, and it remains both open and constant in 
the face of future situational revision. As an important case, Donoghue v Stevenson 
alters the legal tradition as well as changes our understanding about the past legal 
situations. Judges who are able to master judicial reasoning and interpretation 
allow the past to be seen in a new light and, as we now know, such an attitude is 
said to be within the very best traditions of the law.  
 
As the law develops, we are able to pull out broad, conceptual statements of legal 
principle, which dwell in the realm of generality but which correspond to the ‘basic 
idea’ of the rule. Their Lordships review the relevant case law and, in particular 
Lord Atkin, pull out of it a broad conceptual statement to cover both past and 
future situations (as does the Court in Heaven v Pender).  Farrar says such far-
reaching principles often epitomise the legal system’s basic values or traditions. As 
Lord Macmillan implies when he says that he cannot believe there is no redress for 
such a case, the overarching common law principle sitting in the background of 
Donoghue v Stevenson is that where there is a wrong there must be a remedy. As 
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we have seen, over-arching common law principles will often express an ethical or 
moral value base that has gained legitimacy at law. 
 
The neighbourhood principle is developed in a rational manner, which gives the 
dictum further legitimacy, because every legal rule and practice must be justifiable 
on logical and rational grounds. Weber’s two grounds of rationality, we may recall, 
are these: “a formal logical aspect based on intellectual consistency between the 
legal rules, principles, standards and concepts”581; and “a substantive ideological or 
value aspect in the sense of conformity with the changing values of society.”582  
The majority’s reasoning meets both of these grounds, because it is consistent with 
the existing legal principles, and it takes into account the changing values of 
society by widening the dicta to include third party purchasers. As Farrar says, the 
“[l]aw must be stable, yet it cannot stand still.”583  
 
Donoghue v Stevenson is now known, in New Zealand as well as in England, as a 
landmark decision. Todd observes: 
 
Lord Atkin’s statement of principle…has come to be recognised as a cornerstone 
of the modern law of negligence. Donoghue v Stevenson itself has achieved a 
fame which is probably unmatched by any other civil case: and the question 
whether the plaintiff is the defendant’s “neighbour” has been asked on countless 
occasions during the last 70 or so years.584 
 
In Anns v London Borough of Merton,585 the House of Lords sets out an 
explanation of how Lord Atkin’s neighbourhood principle ought to be applied in 
the context of the developing law of negligence as a whole. Lord Wilberforce 
explains that there are two stages to the inquiry: 
 
Through the trilogy of cases in this House – Donoghue v Stevenson, Hedley 
Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd, and Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home 
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Office, the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of 
care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that 
situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been held 
to exist. Rather, the question has to be approached in two stages. First, one has to 
ask whether as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered 
damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, 
in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be 
likely to cause damage to the latter, in which case a prima facie duty of care 
arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to 
consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to 
reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or 
the damage to which a breach of it may give rise.586 
 
The Donoghue v Stevenson principle is of such general application that the courts 
do not now need to fit the changing circumstances of life into the static factual 
situations of the past – the principle applies to relationships of proximity between 
the parties, where it would be reasonably contemplated that carelessness on the 
part of one could case harm to the other. (We can see that Lord Wilberforce’s 
dictum clearly echoes Lord Atkin’s statement about the meaning and importance 
of the proximity test.) The second part of the above test relates to the policy 
considerations that have built up over time, relating to the width and applicability 
of the duty of care principle, and we can see these concerns arising as early as 
1837 with the case of Langridge v Levy. 
 
The Anns v London Borough of Merton two-stage approach to the duty of care 
question was affirmed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Connell v Odlum,587 
and has been reaffirmed in several Court of Appeal decisions since then.588 While 
the case of Connell v Odlum reformulates, to an extent, the questions being asked 
at each step of the inquiry, the approach comes directly from that set out in Anns v 
London Borough of Merton. As reformulated by the New Zealand Court of Appeal, 
an affirmative answer to the proximity stage of the inquiry does not set up a 
presumption of a duty of care being owed, and the second stage involves an honest 
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assessment of the policy considerations both for and against such a duty in the 
circumstances of the case.589 The Connell v Odlum approach is “now a routine 
approach to the duty problem.”590  
 
We can see that the case of Donoghue v Stevenson created new law for subsequent 
courts to both follow and reformulate, and this is as it should be; for the law is not 
static, rather it changes with the changing norms and values of society. The Idea of 
the duty of care test remains recognisable and constant, while being open 
(aletheia) to revision. Had the law not developed as it did in earlier times, we 
would now have a very different (maybe less sophisticated, possibly less stable) 
duty of care test for the tort of negligence.  
 
The result is that we now have ‘good’ case law in the duty of care area, despite the 
legal Idea appearing as Saying in only half of the cases reviewed above. Thus, only 
50% of the cases reviewed espouse the Idea of law, the nature of the thing. 
  
Langridge v Levy, Winterbottom v Wright, Longmeid v Holliday and Le Lievre v 
Gould do not met the ‘system of rules or principles’ test in our definition of art, 
because they do not create World in order for the true Idea to be revealed (ie, the 
principle aspect of the definition) and they do not follow the system of rules 
required by our legal system – such as rationality, analogical inference and logical 
reasoning (ie, the rules aspect of the definition). 
 
The task that remains is to discover whether the cases of Dixon v Bell, George v 
Skivington, Heaven v Pender and Donoghue v Stevenson meet the second test in 
our definition of art, that of beauty. Beauty’s function is to grant us access to 
Being, and in this way is a vehicle for the appearing of truth in a work. We have 
seen that truth appears as Saying in 50% of the cases surveyed above, but we now 
need to discover whether those judgments may properly be called art. Beauty 
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defines art qua art, and it is only where a work is beautiful that the universal Idea 
present in a work may shine richly, lastingly and forcefully. 
 
Before analysing our ‘true’ cases in light of beauty, it is necessary to consider the 
nature of beauty itself, and how it affects us as those who experience the work. 
 
Chapter III Beauty and Truth 
 
III.I  Beauty’s Nature and Function 
 
Aquinas believed: 
 
[T]he beautiful is to be defined in terms of knowledge, the good in terms of 
desire…The beautiful is that in which the vision of desire comes to rest: cuius 
ipsa apprehension placet.591  
 
Gadamer further explains that the beautiful “adds, beyond goodness, an orientation 
towards the cognitive faculty: addit supra bonum quemdam ordinem ad vim 
cognoscitivam.”592 Thus, beauty may be called an ontological place in which our 
vision of desire rests, our desire being for knowledge and understanding. 
 
Heidegger sums up eloquently and succinctly the nature of beauty, goodness and 
truth, thus: 
 
What determines thinking, hence logic, and what thinking comports itself toward, 
is the true. What determines the character and behaviour of man, hence ethics, 
and what human character and behaviour comport themselves toward, is the 
good. What determines man’s feeling, hence aesthetics, and what feeling 
comports itself toward, is the beautiful. The true, the good, and the beautiful are 
the objects of logic, ethics, and aesthetics.593  
 
Thus, Heidegger explains: 
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At the outset, we know in a rough sort of way that just as ‘the true’ determines 
our behaviour in thinking and knowing, and just as ‘the good’ determines the 
ethical attitude, so does ‘the beautiful’ determine the aesthetic state.594 
 
Beauty is not only an object of aesthetics, it also determines the aesthetic state. 
Another way to describe the relationship between beauty and aesthetics is to say 
that beauty is the ontology for aesthetics, which is the epistemology – our 
experience of the beautiful in art.  
 
The word ‘aesthetics’ relates back to the Greek word episteme, as do the words 
‘logic’ and ‘ethics’.595 The word episteme can properly be translated as ‘ways and 
means of knowing’.596 The words logike and episteme mean together “knowledge 
of logos”.597 Logic is the knowledge that relates to thinking, as well as to the types 
of and rules pertaining to thought.598 Whereas, the words ethikes and episteme 
mean together “knowledge of ethos”.599 Ethical knowledge relates to the inner 
character of beings and the way in which that character determines our 
behaviour.600  
 
Thus, we can see that the term aesthetics has a close link to those of logic and 
ethics. Logic and ethics both relate to the thought and feeling states of beings, as 
does aesthetics.601 Alexander Baumgarten, in keeping with the above definitions, 
defines aesthetics as the “ars pulchre cogitandi or the ‘art of thinking 
beautifully’.”602 Whereas, Heidegger understands aesthetics in a purely ethical 
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sense. He takes the word to mean “the consideration of man’s state of feeling in 
relation to the beautiful.” 603 
 
Thus, beauty may be summed up as the ontological space created by a work of art 
that both supports and enables our desire for knowledge. Our experience of beauty 
allows us to think beautifully, or as Gadamer puts it, to think ‘intuitively’.604 For 
Gadamer, “beauty is nothing but an invitation to intuition. And that is what we call 
a ‘work’.”605 Gadamer considers that it is because of beauty that we may call a 
work ‘art’.  
 
Circularly, for Gadamer, intuition itself is something which must first be formed 
via the process of intuition. The intuitive process involves a conceptual progression 
from one thing to another, the act of intuitively building up something so it may 
‘stand’ in presence for us.606 According to Gadamer, art is to be characterised as 
“an intuition of the world.”607 Art is intuition itself, being as it is for him a ‘world-
view’, or a view on the world.608 Gadamer further sees intuition as being related to 
the realm of imagination.609 
 
In order to secure Gadamer’s concept of intuition in its proper context, we must 
remember that the semantic fields of logos, nous, dianoia, theoria and phronesis 
all belong to the Classical conceptual world in which ‘intuition’ does its work.610 
The connection becomes relevant when we consider that the status beatitudinus 
can be linked back to the mystics’ vision of the heavens, the “intuitive heavenly 
order”.611 As intuition is directly related to, and is part of, the semantic fields of 
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order, logic, theory and knowledge, and so too is the beautiful; aesthetics being 
“the art of thinking beautifully.”612 
 
The above explanation of beauty’s nature shows us how closely beauty is tied to 
Plato’s Idea (ie, the truth), and also to the creation of the good. Take, for example, 
Aristotle’s illustration of the craftsman and his shoes. We know the technes to be a 
good craftsperson by the quality of her shoes, by whether they imitate the Idea of 
shoes (ie, by whether the shoes themselves are good). The bringing forth of Being 
is done through the ontological vehicle of beauty, which is in turn defined in 
relation to whether the work contains the essence of truth - no matter how much 
the work itself alters; whether it is mimesis. Beauty is defined in relation to the 
true, but it is different from the true, in the sense that beauty is experienced in the 
sensuous realm and is necessary to bring forth Being. Beauty and truth are 
interdependent phenomena. 
 
It was Plato who first began to demand of philosophy that it should inquire in a 
deep way into its objects, and it was he who said that things should be understood 
in their universality, in terms of their very essence.613 Plato’s reason for the need to 
inquire deeply into works is because of his belief that: 
 
[it is] not single good actions, true opinions, beautiful human beings or works of 
art, that [are] the truth, but goodness, beauty, and truth themselves.614 
 
In The Republic, Socrates and Glaucon engage in a dialectic about what constitutes 
goodness, in relation to educating young men. Socrates says, and Glaucon agrees:  
 
Good literature, therefore, and good music, beauty of form and good rhythm all 
depend on goodness of character; I don’t mean that lack of awareness of the 
world which we politely call “goodness”, but a mind and character truly well and 
fairly formed.615  
 … … … 
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The graphic arts are full of the same qualities and so are the related crafts, 
weaving and embroidery, architecture and the manufacture of furniture of all 
kinds; and the same is true of living things, animals and plants. For in all of them 
we find beauty and ugliness. And ugliness of form and bad rhythm and 
disharmony are akin to poor quality expression and character, and their opposites 
are akin to and represent good character and discipline.616 
 … … … 
It is not only to the poets therefore that we must issue orders requiring them to 
portray good character in their poems or not to write at all; we must issue similar 
orders to al artists and craftsmen, and prevent them portraying bad character, ill-
discipline, meanness, or ugliness in pictures of living things, in sculpture, 
architecture, or any work of art, and if they are unable to comply they must be 
forbidden to practise their art among us… We must look for artists and craftsmen 
capable of perceiving the real nature of what is beautiful, and then our young 
men...will benefit because all the works of art they see and hear influence them 
for good…insensibly leading them from earliest childhood into close sympathy 
and conformity with beauty and reason [Emphasis added].617 
 
For Plato, beauty, truth and goodness are intrinsically connected, as well as 
relating to the nature of the thing itself.  
 
For Friedrich Nietzsche, also, beauty ties back into the true. He considers that the 
aesthetic discipline can be directly linked to Pythagoras’s universal mathematical 
regularity. Nietzsche uses the phrase “[e]stimates of aesthetic value”618 to explain 
that the basis of our finding a work beautiful lies in the work’s “logical, 
arithmetical, and geometrical lawfulness.”619 He says that it is our recognition of 
this lawfulness that elicits from us the feeling ‘this is beautiful’.620  
 
In explaining Nietzsche’s views further, Heidegger explains that, underlying all 
pleasurable feelings elicited by a work of art, are “biological feelings of pleasure 
that arise when life asserts itself and survives.”621 For Nietzsche, there are logical, 
mathematical feelings that sit above our physiological feelings. It is these logical 
feelings that form the basis of all of our aesthetic feelings. Nietzsche believes that 
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we can trace the origins of aesthetic pleasure back to the very process of life itself 
(ie, the heavenly order), via the lawful form (ie, art).622   
 
For the ancient Greeks “it was the heavenly order of the cosmos that presented the 
true vision of the beautiful.”623 Here, the Pythagorean element in the Greek view of 
the beautiful may be seen. Gadamer says:  
 
We possess in the regular movements of the heavens one of the greatest intuitions 
of order to be found anywhere. The periodic cycle of the year and of the months, 
the alternation of day and night, provide the most reliable constants for the 
experience of order and stand in marked contrast with the ambiguity and 
instability of human affairs [Emphasis added].624 
 
Human affairs, as Gadamer puts it, take place in the sensuous realm of being, and 
we need art to show us, as mimesis, the order and regularity that only occurs in the 
super-sensuous or cosmic realm. It is in the latter realm that the changeless Idea, 
our Being, dwells, but it is in the sensuous realm that we experience beauty, which 
allows us to access Being. 
 
Gadamer describes the ancient Greek definition of the beautiful as “a universal 
ontological one.”625 For the Greeks, art and nature are discussed in the same 
breath, and not in opposition to each other. The work of art shows the ontological 
dignity of the heavenly, the divine, the cosmological order of all things.626 
 
For the ancients, the connection between heavenly order and us as beings means 
that we strive towards the order that we once knew and for which we continue to 
long. Thus, the order of being is itself seen as divine, as God’s creation.627 Art, as 
mimesis, has its place, its function, squarely within the divine order. Beauty 
functions as a bridge between the two worlds. It is through beauty that we 
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experience truth by gaining access to the Open that art provides for us; we think 
beautifully and this is the epistemology of aesthetics. 
 
Plato himself defines ‘beauty’ using such concepts as “measure, appropriateness 
and right proportions.”628 Similarly, Aristotle sees the elements of beauty as being 
“order (taxis), right proportions (summetria) and definition (horismenon).”629 For 
Aristotle, these elements are present in a particularly exemplary fashion in 
mathematics. The inextricable connection between the mathematical order and the 
cosmic order of the heavens means for us that the kosmos, which Gadamer calls 
“the model of all visible harmony”,630 can be seen as the ultimate example of 
beauty in the visible sphere.  
 
In art the Idea presences because the art-form is able to express, through being 
Open, its true and genuine content, being as it is mimesis of the Idea.631 In order to 
work as an art-form, it must also be beautiful, so that beings can understand and 
know the Idea on an aesthetic level. Plato was the first philosopher to show that 
aletheia is an essential element in the beautiful.632 He says that goodness appears 
in a work of beauty and in this way the Idea is able to reveal itself in its Being.633  
 
Aristotle says that something deserves the label ‘beautiful’ “if nothing can be 
added and nothing can be taken away.”634 What this means is that, where beauty is 
present in a work, we may alter the work’s content and structure by adding, 
subtracting and replacing information, but the central structure in art – its truth or 
essence – remains intact.635 A work of art is beautiful because, in order to be art, it 
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is necessarily mimesis even though its form may change. The ‘living unity’ of the 
work remains.  
 
Art imitates the heavenly order in its logical form, and hence why the ancient 
Greeks say that where there is art (mimesis) there must also be beauty. It follows, 
too, in light of the above discussion, that where there is beauty, there must also be 
truth. 
The gods have no problem in surrendering themselves totally to this encounter 
with the true world, but as we are so unruly, and our vision so clouded, we may 
only glance momentary at the eternal order.636 Once having experienced the true, 
we plunge back toward the earth again, leaving the true in the super-sensuous 
realm, retaining only a vague soul memory of our eternal Beingness.637  
For Plato, “[t]he beautiful reveals itself in the search for the good.”638 The good, in 
manifesting itself in the perfect form, draws towards it a longing for love.639 The 
beautiful has its own radiance, and because of this our souls recognise the truth of 
a work, its goodness. “For beauty alone has this quality that it is what is most 
radiant (ekphanestaton) and lovable.”640 Aesthetics, as we know, works on the 
level of intuition, which comes from the soul – it is our souls that recognise the 
soul-home of the heavens and the logic inherent in the eternal order.641 Beauty 
makes a space for us to access this part of our being through its radiance, and 
because our essential nature gives us an inherent love of the beautiful. 
Thus, art (mimesis) is required to reawaken our soul memory. In Plato’s terms, we 
are souls who have lost our wings because we are weighed down by trivial, earthly 
concerns.642 There is only one experience that will cause our wings to grow again, 
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allowing us to ascend once more. The experience he speaks of is one “of love and 
the beautiful, the love of the beautiful.”643 Plato relates our experience of love and 
the beautiful to our spiritual perception of the beauty inherent in the heavenly and 
true orders of the world.644 Whenever we encounter beauty, we can be assured that 
the truth is not far away, and that we will encounter it – even in the midst of the 
disorder of earthly reality.645  
 
In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates sets out his view of why the wings have fallen away 
from our souls:  
 
Now it is for us to understand the reason why wings are lost, why they fall away 
from a soul. It is more or less like this…The natural property of a wing is to lift 
what is heavy, raising it on high, where the race of the gods lives. Of all the 
things to do with the body, it has the greatest share in the divine; and the divine is 
beautiful, wise, good, and everything of that kind. This is what the soul’s 
plumage mostly feeds on, what makes it grow; whereas what is ugly and bad – all 
the opposites – causes it to waste away and perish.646  
 
Further, Socrates explains: 
 
When a man sees beauty here, in this life, he is reminded of true beauty. He 
grows wings, and stands there fluttering them, eager to fly upwards, but unable to 
do so. Yet still he looks upwards, as birds do, and takes no notice of what is 
below; and so he is accused of being mad…Of all forms of divine possession, 
this is the best – and has the best origins – both for him who has it and for him 
who shares in it. It is this madness which the lover of beauty must experience if 
he is to be called a lover.647  
 
Even though we have entered into earthly life, we still encounter beauty, for it 
shines forth and “we find it sparkling most brilliantly, through the medium of the 
most brilliant of our senses.”648  
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Plato tells us in his Phaedrus that Being dwells in the soul: 
 
Being which really and truly is – without colour, without form, intangible, visible 
to reason alone, the helmsman of the soul, the being to which the category of true 
knowledge applies – dwells in this place. Since the mind of a god, as of any soul 
which cares to accept what is right for it, is fed on intellect and pure knowledge, 
it rejoices when it finally sees what really is. Beholding the truth, it thrives, it 
draws sustenance from it…649  
 … … … 
In this journey… it sees justice itself; it sees self-control; it sees knowledge – not 
knowledge combined with coming-to-be, not the knowledge which varies, I take 
it, in the varied objects which we now describe as being, but that which truly is 
knowledge because it is in what truly is. It feasts its eyes, similarly, on the other 
things which truly are, then sinks back to the inside of heaven, and returns 
home.650  
 
The soul, then, contains the memory of Being; it is the soul that engages in 
remembrance with mimesis, and beauty is the tool to awaken our soul memory of 
Being or the Idea. Being sees justice itself.  
 
For Plato, beauty is experienced:  
 
in the sum of all the stages of the ascent from bodies to souls to institutions to 
insights, as immanent to them all, and therefore no ‘looking away’ from any of 
them is implied.651 
 
As our love of the beautiful emanates from the soul, it may also be termed as a 
spiritual love. The following quote from the great cellist Pablo Casals gives 
credence to this point:  
 
For the past 80 years I have started each day in the same manner. It is not a 
mechanical routine but something essential to my daily life. I go to the piano, and 
I play two preludes and fugues of Bach. I cannot think of doing otherwise. It is a 
sort of benediction on the house. But that is not its only meaning for me. It is a 
re-discovery of the world of which I have the joy of being a part. It fills me with 
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awareness of the wonder of life, with a feeling of the incredible marvel of being a 
human being…652  
 … … … 
I do not think a day has passed in my life in which I have failed to look with 
fresh amazement at the miracle of nature…If you continue to work and to absorb 
the beauty in the world about you, you find that age does not necessarily mean 
getting old.653  
 
In the above passage of Casals’s, we can see connections of the kind Plato stresses 
between goodness, truth and love. For Plato, the true, the good and the beautiful 
are all aspects of the same passion – there is a unity among the trinity, all being a 
necessary aspect of the whole of life.654 The desire to see things in their own light, 
that is, in their truth, goodness and beauty, may be seen as a form of spiritual 
love.655  
 
In the Phaedrus, Socrates puts forward his definition of love, thus: 
 
Well, that love is some form of desire is clear to anyone. And we also know that 
even when they are not in love, men desire what is beautiful. …for each of us 
there are two kinds of thing which rule and guide us... One is our innate desire 
for pleasures, the other is acquired – a capacity for judgement, an aspiration 
towards what is best.656  
 
In The Republic, Socrates states that “to love rightly is to love what is orderly and 
beautiful in an educated and disciplined way.”657 Moreover, for Socrates, to love 
what is orderly is to love what is beautiful.658 To put it another way, our soul 
desires knowledge of the true, and what is true is also what is beautiful – hence, 
our love of the true is our love of the beautiful. 
 
Plato’s Symposium provides a further powerful analysis of the nature of love, and 
of its power for the soul. The Symposium does this by singing the praises of Eros, 
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the god of love.659 Plato’s dialogue is set in the house of Agathon, who is a 
dramatic poet, where there is dinner party held in Agathon’s honour. The 
discussion turns to the topic of love, and each guest in turn is asked to make a 
speech in Eros’s honour. The speeches of Aristophanes and Socrates, both of 
whom are present at the feast, are the most important for our purposes.660  
 
In Plato’s work, Aristophanes says that men have failed to comprehend the power 
of Eros, for if they did so, they would have already built to him the greatest of all 
altars and offered him the greatest of sacrifices.661 Socrates says that Eros is 
inspirational, and that he is the god who can most readily reconnect us with our 
own divine Being.662  
 
In the Symposium, Socrates tells of a meeting with a woman called Diotima, who 
instructs him on the true nature of Eros. He continues in his speech by quoting her 
views about Eros as an intermediary: 
 
‘What then might love be’, I said, ‘a mortal?’ ‘Not in the least,’ she replied. ‘But 
what is he then?’ ‘As I told you earlier, he is not mortal or immortal but 
something between.’ ‘What then, O Diotima?’ ‘A great spirit, O Socrates; for 
every spirit is intermediate between god and man.’ ‘What power does he have?’ I 
asked. ‘He interprets and conveys exchanges between gods and men, prayers and 
sacrifices from men to gods, and orders and gifts in return from gods to men; 
being intermediate he fills in for both and serves as the bond unifying the two 
worlds into a whole entity. Through him proceeds the whole art of divination and 
the skill of priests in sacrifice, ritual, spells, and every kind of sorcery and magic. 
God does not have dealings with man directly, but through Love all association 
and discourse between the two are carried on, both in the waking hours and in 
time of sleep’ [Emphasis added].663 
 
And, on wisdom and love, Socrates says: 
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To be sure wisdom is among the most beautiful of things and Eros is love of 
beauty; and so Eros must be a lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom he 
lies between wisdom and ignorance. The nature of his birth is the reason for 
this.664 
 
Thus, our love of beauty is also our love of wisdom, or knowledge, and Eros is the 
god that unifies the world of beings with Being itself, which although is inherent in 
us, it remains un-accessible to us except through beauty. 
 
Continuing on the dialogue, Diotima describes to Socrates the highest form of 
Eros, that of Platonic love:  
 
It is necessary for the one proceeding in the right way toward his goal to begin, 
when he is young, with physical beauty, and first of all, if his guide directs him 
properly, to love one person and in his company to beget beautiful ideas and then 
to observe that the beauty in one person is related to the beauty in another. If he 
must pursue physical beauty, he would be very foolish not to realise that the 
beauty in all persons is one and the same. When he has come to this conclusion, 
he will become the lover of all beautiful bodies and will relax the intensity of his 
love for one and think the less of it as something of little account.665 
 … … … 
Next he will realise that beauty in the soul is more precious than that in the body, 
so that if he meets with a person who is beautiful in his soul, even if he has little 
of the physical bloom of beauty, this will be enough and he will love and cherish 
him and beget beautiful ideas that make young men better, so that he will in turn 
be forced to see the beauty in morals and laws and that the beauty in them all is 
related.666 
 
Mark Morford and Robert Lenardon, authors of Classical Mythology667, observe 
the following about the above passage: 
 
This then is the Platonic Eros, a love that inspires the philosopher to deny himself 
in the cause of his fellow man and in the pursuit of true wisdom. Whatever the 
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physical roots, the spiritual import is universal, kindred to the passionate love of 
God that pervades all serious religious devotion. Aristotle too thinks in Platonic 
terms when he describes his god as the unmoved mover, the final cause in the 
universe, who moves as a beloved moves the lover [Emphasis added].668 
 
Socrates, in the Symposium, contends that those who take Eros as their inspiration, 
will win fame and reputation. In fact, Socrates argues that Apollo was only able to 
discover archery, medicine and prophecy because his learning was guided by 
desire and love.669 He says this is also the case with the Muses and the arts, Athene 
and weaving, and Zeus and the governance of the gods. Finally, Socrates states that 
Eros is the reason why any arguments arising among the gods are settled promptly, 
that is, because of their love of beauty, “there being no love of ugliness”670 among 
them. 
 
As we can see, in both the Symposium and the Phaedrus, Plato speaks of beauty as 
a hiatus (chorismos) between the world of the human senses and the heavenly 
world of the true.671 As this hiatus, beauty is a vehicle that dwells for us 
ontologically. Plato considers that “[t]he beautiful snatches us from the oblivion of 
Being and grants a view upon Being.”672  
 
The ontological structure of the beautiful is that of ‘appearance’, and one in which 
the truth of a thing emerges in its ‘shining’.673 In Truth and Method, Gadamer 
connects the ontological realm of the beautiful with the ontological realm of the 
intelligible:  
 
If we have described the ontological structure of the beautiful as the mode of 
appearance which causes things to emerge in their proportions and their outline, 
the same holds for the realm of the intelligible.674 
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Globally speaking, things emerge in art because art is mimesis.  
 
Gadamer believes that when we experience the beautiful in both art and nature, we 
experience a “convincing illumination of truth and harmony, which compels the 
admission: ‘This is true’.”675 In art (and in nature) beauty functions as a vehicle 
between the ideal and the real,676 and is present wherever we find the true.  
 
Truth is “the unconcealedness of that which is as something that is.”677 Truth is the 
truth of Being, yet beauty does not occur apart from this truth. Appearance of truth 
in a work of art – as the setting into the work of truth– is beauty. Thus, beauty 
belongs to the happening of truth, that is, of truth’s taking its place in art.678 Beauty 
does not exist in the realm of pure pleasure, nor does it exist as the object or ‘end’ 
of art.679  
 
Where truth sets itself into a work of art, it ‘appears’ for us. Heidegger calls this 
appearing ‘beauty’. He believes that, each time truth establishes itself in a work of 
art, a being is disclosed in a “unique and unrepeatable way”.680 Each work of art 
has its own particular ontology, yet each shares an objective conceptual truth. 
Gadamer illustrates the ‘uniqueness’ and ‘sameness’ point by giving the example 
of a sunset:  
 
An enchanting sunset does not represent a case of sunsets in general. It is rather a 
unique sunset displaying the ‘tragedy of the heavens’. And in the realm of art 
above all, it is self-evident that the work of art is not experienced in its own right 
if it is only acknowledged as a link in a chain that leads elsewhere.681  
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This is because, in part, all sunsets will be different in some way, but the meaning 
of the sunsets, their message or Idea, is unchangeable in all cases.682 As Aristotle 
says, a thing may be called beautiful if nothing can be added or taken away. 
 
As previously stated, for Heidegger “beauty is the appearing of truth, ie, the 
disclosure of Being.”683 Thus, we can see that the beautiful belongs to the 
presencing of truth, of truth’s taking its place. Heidegger believes beauty to lie in 
form, because form “once took its light from Being as the isness of what is.”684 To 
me, this is another way of saying that ‘all art is mimesis’, and it again shows that 
beauty and truth – though they are separate concepts – are inextricably linked 
together in reality. 
 
Plato says it is to beauty alone that the role has been given to be “the most radiant, 
but also the most enchanting.”685 Through its shining, beauty liberates us to be able 
to view Being. Beauty illuminates Being. The beautiful is a hybrid experience, in 
the sense that it works in the realm of the sensuous, and at the same time grants us 
a view upon Being.686 In this light, Heidegger observes that beauty “is both 
captivating and liberating.”687  
 
According to its most proper essence, Heidegger says: 
 
[that] the beautiful is what is most radiant and sparkling in the sensuous realm, in 
a way that, as such brilliance, it lets Being scintillate at the same time. Being is 
that to which man from the outset remains essentially bound; it is in the direction 
of Being that man is liberated.688 
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That which is the most radiant of all the ancient Greeks call ekphanestaton, or that 
which properly ‘shows’ itself.689 What comes into our view when we experience a 
work of art is the self-showing of the Idea. By way of the Idea, a work of art comes 
to be known for us as what it is through the radiant shining of the beautiful, and in 
this way art appears to us in the ontological realm as ekphanestaton (ie, a 
showing).690 We have seen that beauty truly shines, it is eikos.691  
 
The Idea, as such, is the absolute truth. But, in its universal form, truth has “not yet 
objectified universality”,692 which means it remains un-accessible to beings. The 
Idea of the beautiful, on the other hand, is the Idea which is both universal Idea (ie, 
the true) and a configuration of individual reality.693  
 
All the term Idea means, as we have seen with the Idea of truth, is the true; the Idea 
of the beautiful is the truth of beauty, its essence.694 Only the Idea is true. Hegel 
thinks that if we want to understand the beautiful in terms of its essence, we must 
employ conceptual thinking:  
 
whereby the logico-metaphysical nature of the Idea in general, as well as of the 
particular Idea of the beautiful, enters conscious reflection.695  
 
That is, Hegel considers we must conceptualise beauty in its abstract, absolute 
form in order to understand it apart from its ontological function. 
 
Hegel thinks that we ought to come to ‘know’ things in their universality, we 
should be able to find their inner essence, their ‘law’. Theory is about conceiving 
of things in accordance with their absolute Idea.696 
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Hegel identifies two aspects to the Idea of the beautiful. Firstly, the Idea of the 
beautiful has a content of its own, it has a meaning. Secondly, for Hegel, the Idea 
of the beautiful has an expression, an appearance or realisation, of its content. He 
says that both of these aspects are necessarily interrelated, so that “the external, the 
particular, appears exclusively as a presentation of the inner.”697 
 
As both beauty and truth are an Idea, in essence, they could be said to be much the 
same. However, the true is distinct from the beautiful, because:  
 
what is true is the Idea, the Idea as it is in accordance with its inherent character 
and universal principle, and as it is grasped as such in thought.698  
 
Whereas beauty is also the impetus to aesthetic experience, and it exists for us in 
the sensuous realm – the Idea, on the other hand, dwells only in the super-sensuous 
realm, which is only attainable to us through mimesis (which is, by its nature, a 
beautiful imitation of the cosmic order).  
 
Hegel says that what is ‘there’ for thinking is not the sensuous appearance of the 
Idea – not beauty – but only the Idea in its universal form.699 For him, beauty may 
be characterised “as the pure appearance of the Idea to sense.”700 I understand him 
to mean by this that beauty in a work invites us to think intuitively and it is through 
doing so that the Idea comes to stand in the light of its Being for our souls. 
 
As we can see, truth and beauty are interdependent, because it is through the 
radiance of beauty that truth is illuminated in the sensuous. Without beauty, truth 
would remain in the super-sensuous realm, and we would have but only fleeting 
glimpses of its existence. Beauty, as Eros, is our medium between two worlds. 
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Hence, the need for works of art (which are necessarily beautiful), which make a 
clear space that supports and rekindles our view upon Being. Art is a thing that is 
capable of bringing to the fore Being most richly, lastingly and forcefully, and 
according to Plato it does this because art is beautiful.701 Beauty liberates us to 
Being or the Idea by radiating light through and in its appearance, so that Being 
can stand in a clearing of light and be remembered.702 It is because art is beautiful 
that it creates for us the Open or the World, in which the Idea appears. 
 
Yet, it is both truth and beauty that bring about the unveiling of Being for beings, 
as both are related to Being, and both belong together in Being, for Being is truth. 
In this way, truth and beauty “belong together in one, the one thing that is decisive: 
to open Being and to keep it open.”703  
 
However, in the earthly realm of beings, truth and beauty must be treated as 
separate phenomena. This is because the openness of truth, Being, is non-sensuous 
illumination.704 As stated above, Plato calls Being non-sensuous, and it is for this 
reason that it needs beauty’s radiance in order for truth to appear.705 The opening 
up of Being must occur in the clearing, that is at the site where non-Being occurs, 
or in the midst of beings.706 To be sure, the Idea dwells above the order of being 
itself, and the Idea is something that is constant in itself. Yet, the beautiful both 
magnifies and removes the contrast between the Idea and its appearance in the 
thing itself.707  
 
To be clear, the radiance inherent in beauty is not a light that is shed on a work of 
art from outside itself, rather it is the very nature of art-work to be radiant.708 
Radiance is how art presents itself, and it is an inherent part of beauty’s actual 
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being. Beauty’s radiance represents the exactness of universal harmony.709 Plato 
describes the beautiful as something that ‘shines forth’ clearly, thereby drawing us 
(because we love it) to itself. In Plato’s view, beauty is  “the very visibility of the 
ideal.”710 
 
‘To shine’ on an object means to make that object, on which light falls, appear for 
us. Beauty, however, has the mode of being of light in that it shines from within 
itself.711 Without light, nothing beautiful can shine, or appear; with light, a 
beautiful thing appears in its radiance – it makes itself manifest for us. In making 
itself manifest, beauty ‘shows’ us truth. In fact, “it is the universal mode of the 
being of light to be reflected in itself in this way.”712 
 
There is another and equally important dimension to the light that beauty 
emanates. Beauty’s light is not merely the realm of the visible, and it is not the 
light of the sun. Beauty’s light is also the light of the intelligible, it is the light of 
the mind (nous).713 It is from Plato’s profound work on aletheia and beauty that 
Aristotle developed his doctrine of nous and, subsequently, the Christians 
developed their view of the intellectus agens.714 Gadamer philosophises in relation 
to the ontology of beauty: 
 
The mind that unfolds from within itself the multiplicity of what is thought, is 
present to itself in what is thought.715 
 
In summary, it is through beauty that the image of our essence comes into presence 
and we may view ‘the true’. It is that upon which we bestow what Kant calls 
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‘unconstrained favour’, and we do this intuitively in recognition of our essential 
nature.716  
 
Kant also considers that we ought to bestow unconstrained favour on the beautiful. 
For him, the beautiful is that which “purely and simply pleases.”717 Kant further 
defines the beautiful in his work The Critique of Judgement718 as an object of 
‘sheer delight’.719 Sheer delight, can be best described as a process in which the 
beautiful opens up to us as beautiful; it is, in Kantian terminology “devoid of 
interest”.720 Kant states: 
 
Taste is the capacity to judge an object or mode of representation by means of 
delight or revulsion, devoid of all interest. The object of such delight is called 
beautiful.721  
 
What does ‘devoid of all interest’ mean in real terms? Why must his view of 
delight be ‘disinterested’? The word ‘interest’ derives from the Latin mihi interest, 
meaning that something is important to me.722 Heidegger suggests that when we 
take an interest in something it means we want to own it, to possess it for 
ourselves, so that we can control the use of it.723 So, whatever we can properly call 
beautiful - when we can look and say ‘this is truly beautiful’, that thing can never 
be an interest because we cannot control it.724 Put another way, in order for us to 
find a thing beautiful, and have that aesthetic experience of it, we must let it 
encounter us as purely itself; it must be free to appear to us in its own way.725 For 
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Gadamer, also, beauty in both art and nature serves to “give pleasure without any 
interest being involved.”726  
 
Heidegger says of something that is beautiful:  
 
We may not take it into account in advance with a view to something else, our 
goals and intentions, our possible enjoyment and advantage.727  
 
When Kant says we should practice ‘unconstrained favouring’, he means that we 
must freely allow that which encounters us to be as it is in its own way; we must 
freely allow the thing to show us what belongs to it, and thus it will bring its 
essence to us.728  
 
Gadamer says that it was Kant who first considered our experience of art and 
beauty as a philosophical question to be investigated.729 Kant is concerned with  
the question of how an experience of the beautiful can affect us in an objective or 
universal way, and not merely as a matter of subjective, individual taste.730  In this 
way, the object comes forth in its presencing as the essence of what it is, in its 
purity.731 Such coming forth in appearance we call beautiful, and this is why 
Heidegger says that the word beautiful means “appearing in the radiance of such 
coming to the fore.”732 ‘Being present’ belongs to the being of the beautiful itself, 
because even though beauty reflects the Idea or Being, as something supra-
terrestrial, the experience of beauty is a physical one and happens in the sensuous 
realm.733  
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By saying that Beings experience the beauty of art in a sensuous way, we mean 
through the senses of feeling, intuition and imagination. These senses dwell in the 
soul.734 The beautiful captivates us, it advances upon us in a direct and 
overwhelming manner.735 The beautiful, being the most radiant and that which 
“most brightly glistens”,736 shines in the realm of the sensuous as “the most 
luminous mode of perception at our disposal.”737 Vision, via the eyes but through 
the soul, is the best way for us to apprehend Being. The beautiful allows us as 
beings to apprehend Being through the sensuous, that is, through the bodily state of 
feeling.738  
 
Gadamer states that through referring to ancient thought we can see that in the 
beauty of art we encounter a significance that transcends all conceptual thought.739 
How does this transcendence occur? Baumgarten speaks of a cognitio sensitiva or 
‘sensuous knowledge’.740 Cognitio sensitiva means that the apparent particularity 
of sensuous experience we have when engaged with a work compels us to dwell on 
it, engage with it and experience it. Out of that interaction, in the spiritual realm, 
we will come to know the Being of that particular work of art, not merely its 
outward appearance. 741 
 
In analysing Johann Goethe’s statement that “[t]he supreme principle of antiquity 
was the significant, but the supreme result of a successful treatment was the 
beautiful”,742 Kant says there are two things about what it implies for art that are 
worth noting. Firstly, the content of art, the thing itself; and, secondly, art’s manner 
and mode of presentation.743 When considering a work of art, we start off with 
what the work immediately presents to us, and then we ask what its meaning or 
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content is - after first taking in the work’s sensuousness. Hegel says that a work’s 
external appearance has:  
 
no immediate value for us; we assume behind it something inward, a meaning 
whereby the external appearance is endowed with the spirit.744  
 
It is to the soul that the external appearance points.745  
 
Everything we perceive of and experience as beautiful gives us access to a higher 
sphere, so that we may access the spiritual realm.746 According to Hegel, it is in 
this sense:  
 
[that] the beauty of nature appears only as a reflection of the beauty that belongs 
to spirit, as an imperfect incomplete mode [of beauty], a mode which in its 
substance is contained in the spirit itself.”747 
 
Put another way, a work of art does not present what it is, its essence, in the 
external appearance. Rather, it present its isness as truth, which we access via the 
sensuous as opposed to the mental sphere.748 Hegel uses the analogy of a fable, the 
meaning of which dwells in its underlying message, to show us that it is not the 
actual fable or art-work in which its essence presences, rather it is in its 
message.749 And, it is beauty that creates for us an experience of the truth of a work 
via our intuition, via sensuous knowledge.  
 
Hegel describes the beautiful in art as the “the sensuous showing of the Idea.”750 
The Idea, which beings can only glimpse from afar, dwelling as it does in the 
super-sensuous realm, shows itself in the sensuous appearance of the beautiful.751 
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Interestingly, Gadamer calls Hegel’s work on beauty in art, “a bold revival of 
Plato’s insight into the unity of the good and the beautiful.”752 
 
For Hegel, when a work of art presents itself for our sensuous apprehension, it 
elicits sensuous feeling and sensuous intuition.753 However, the work of art is not 
only there for our sensuous apprehension, because:  
 
its standing is of such a kind that, though sensuous, it is essentially at the same 
time for spiritual apprehension; the spirit is meant to be affected by it and to find 
some satisfaction in it.754  
 
The sensuous element only exists for us in a work of art to the extent that it exists 
for the human spirit, regardless of the art-work dwelling independently and 
sensuously. The fact that sensuousness is there for beings can only come from our 
connection to the spirit. Thus, sensuousness itself is an aspect of, and directly 
related to, the spiritual realm.755  
 
In Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art,756 Hegel says that thought is embodied in the 
beauty of art, which means that the material within a work exists for us of its own 
accord, and it is not determined by external thought.757 Our encounter with art 
comes from the naturalness within us, the sensuous and the heart, and in this way 
we come to experience the truth and harmony inherent in the work itself – we are 
“elevated to spiritual universality”.758 
 
Thus, we have seen that beauty, as an object of aesthetics, is defined in relation to 
knowledge itself. Beauty defines art qua art, the work of art itself being an 
invitation to intuition, which dwells in the soul and gives us a view on the world. 
Intuition is related to the mystics’ vision of the heavens and is part of the semantic 
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fields of order, logic and knowledge. Thus, we can see that beauty is closely 
related to the true. Our love of beauty allows us access to Being, which dwells in 
the soul, and it is Eros that inspires us to reconnect with our divine truth.   
 
Beauty is a bridge between the sensuous realm and the realm of the Idea; beauty is 
the ontology in which we experience aesthetic understanding or intuitive thinking. 
Beauty grants us a view upon Being by radiating in non-sensuous illumination, so 
that we can see the isness of a work. Through cognitio sensitiva we come to know 
the truth of a thing (that which Aristotle calls ‘the nature of a thing’), not merely its 
outward appearance. Finally, we see that beauty may be described as the sensuous 
showing of the Idea, and that where there is truth there is beauty also. Another way 
to say this is that art is mimesis, imitation of the beautiful order of the cosmos, so 
whatever we may properly call beautiful must also be truthful and artful, and 
whatever we may properly call art must also be both beautiful and true.    
 
Before providing an analysis of the duty of care case law in order to see whether it 
may be called beautiful in light of the above discussion, another matter regarding 
aesthetics must be considered: Nietzsche’s philosophy of rapture and his views on 
our love of the beautiful. Nietzsche’s work on aesthetics is set out separately below 
because of the divergence of his views about truth and the importance of art from 
those of Plato. I will look briefly at the differences in each philosopher’s theory, 
and sum up with a possible explanation for this, so as to proceed with some 
consistency (or at least, explainable inconsistency) between them. 
 
III.II Nietzsche on Platonism and Aesthetics 
 
Heidegger says that for Nietzsche, in agreement with Plato, “[h]owever fleeting its 
epiphanes may be, art is reminiscent of stable Being, the eternal, constant, 
permanent ideai.”759 While Nietzsche appears to skirt around the question of truth 
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proper in his seminal work The Will to Power,760 he nevertheless talks of Being in 
the same sense as Plato does.761 For Nietzsche, art is “that Being which wills itself 
by willing to be Becoming.”762 For Nietzsche, Becoming is the way in which a 
being wills itself back to Being. 
 
Thus, when Nietzsche proclaims that ‘God is dead’, he is not saying it because he 
does not believe in the super-sensuous realm. Rather, Heidegger considers the 
phrase to be a statement of Nietzsche’s formula for sensuous experience, and says 
that it helps us make sense of his philosophy of inverted Platonism.763 In 
Nietzsche’s theory of inverted Platonism, the sensuous becomes being proper, ie, 
the true; for him, the true becomes the sensuous.764 In opposition to Plato, 
Nietzsche says only the sensuous is true, it is the only true realm.765  
 
Nietzsche says:  
 
My philosophy an inverted Platonism: the farther removed from true being, the 
purer, the finer, the better it is. Living in semblance as goal.766  
 
For Nietzsche art is worth more than truth, because art occurs in the sensuous – we 
can feel it, experience it and be changed by it.767 
 
What Nietzsche means when he says that art is of more value than truth is that art, 
as something sensuous, is more real for beings, more connected to beings, than is 
the super-sensuous truth of which Plato speaks.768 Plato views the super-sensuous 
as being of higher value than art, but Nietzsche sees that art is more valuable 
                                                 
760
 Nietzsche, F The Will to Power (trans)  Kaufmann, W and Hollingdale, R (1967). 
761
 Heidegger, supra n 759 at 237. 
762
 Ibid, 218.  
763
 Ibid, 154. 
764
 Ibid. 
765
 Ibid, 148. 
766
 Ibid, 153-154.  
767
 Ibid, 149. 
768
 Ibid, 140. 
 133
because it occurs more in being.769 For him the value of a thing is measured by its 
ability to contribute to and enhance the actuality of beings in the world. Thus, art is 
the being that is most in being, and becomes for him “the basic occurrence within 
beings as a whole.”770  
 
For Plato, the Idea dwells in the super-sensuous; it is the true, our true Being. To 
invert Platonism means to turn upside-down the standard relation so it becomes its 
opposite: 
 
[W]hat languishes below in Platonism, as it were, and would be measured against 
the super-sensuous, must now be put on top; by way of reversal, the super-
sensuous must now be placed in its service.771  
 
Overturning Platonism for Nietzsche means that he does not view the super-
sensuous as pre-eminent, it is no longer the ideal. According to Heidegger, 
Nietzsche’s reasoning is that “[b]eings, being what they are, may not be despised 
on the basis of what should and ought to be.”772 In saying this, Nietzsche poses the 
question of what does being itself mean? For, if we take away our Being-ness - 
what we are in essence, then what are we exactly? Not only that, but his view 
opens up the questions of what we should strive for, and from whence do we gain 
knowledge. And, even, what is knowledge? His answer is that beings are sensuous, 
and as such we ought to liberate ourselves from trying to attain something that for 
him is unreal.773 Yet, Heidegger maintains that, for Nietzsche,  “the true is to be 
attained on the path of knowledge.”774 Even in inversion, Nietzsche shares his 
normative view with Plato, that truth is grasped on the path of knowledge. 
 
What is different, however, is that for Nietzsche the true is the sensuous. Art is 
created out of the sensuous realm, for the sensuous and the truth lie within 
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themselves, within beings themselves but not as the super-sensuous.775  For 
Nietzsche: 
 
[a]rt and truth, creating and knowing, meet one another in the single guiding 
perspective of the rescue and configuration of the sensuous.776 
 
Confusingly, Heidegger says in The Will to Power as Art that for Nietzsche art is 
“yes-saying to the sensuous, to semblance, or what is not ‘the true’ world.”777 So, 
does that mean that for Nietzsche art is affirmation of the un-true world, or that 
which is un-true? As, in Nietzschean terms, the truth means true beings, or beings 
proper. For Nietzsche, that art is “the will to semblance as the sensuous.”778 But, 
concerning the will to semblance, Nietzsche says:  
 
The will to semblance, to illusion, to deception, to Becoming and change is 
deeper, more ‘metaphysical’, than the will to truth, to reality, to Being.779  
 
The true is still meant here in a Platonic sense, as the Idea, the Being of beings, or 
the super-sensuous. For Nietzsche it is the will to the sensuous that is 
metaphysical, and that metaphysical will is actual in art – hence art being worth 
more to him than truth.780 In contrast, the Platonic will to true beings, as Being, is a 
‘no-saying’ to the physical world of beings, and it is our present world in which art 
makes its home.781 The world in which beings dwell is the true world for 
Nietzsche, hence he declares with respect to the relation of art and truth that “art is 
worth more than truth”.782 Thus, his inversion of Platonism means that the 
sensuous must stand higher than the super-sensuous, simply because it is more 
genuine.  
 
Heidegger asks, of Nietzsche’s philosophy on art:  
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Yet what does ‘Being’ mean, if the sensuous can be said to be more in being? 
What does ‘sensuous’ mean here? What does it have to do with ‘truth’? How can 
it be even higher in value than truth? What does ‘truth’ mean here? How does 
Nietzsche define its essence?783  
 
His answer is that “all this is obscure.”784 He does not see any way in which 
Nietzsche’s statement ‘art is worth more than truth’ can be grounded in 
philosophy.785  
 
We know that both truth and beauty are related to Being, by way of the disclosing 
of the Being of beings. Truth, as the super-sensuous, is revealed through beauty, in 
the sensuous. Being becomes liberated for beings.786 Heidegger considers:  
 
If beauty and truth in Nietzsche’s view enter into discordance, they must 
previously belong together in one. That one can only be Being and the relation to 
Being.787  
 
One aspect of Nietzsche’s theory on art may shed some light. He says that art must 
be grasped in terms of the artist, and not its recipients. He sees art, as sensuous 
creation, from the point of view of the creator. In this way, the art-work is created 
out of the sensuous, as it comes from and through the artist.788 However, what he 
doesn’t appear to properly address is the effect of art on beings, or the content of 
art proper. Nietzsche seems to be process driven when it comes to art, and his view 
is very much grounded in the physical as opposed to the spiritual. For Nietzsche, 
“[b]elief in the body is more fundamental than belief in the soul.”789  
 
He says that art is essentially an aesthetic state, which comes to presence in being 
and from which emerges a state proper to beings. Put another way: 
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Art belongs to a realm where we find ourselves - we are the very realm. Art does 
not belong to regions which we ourselves are not, and which therefore remain 
foreign to us, regions such as nature.790  
 
In this way, Nietzsche says, “[w]e have art in order not to perish from the truth.”791 
Yet, it is art’s value Nietzsche is concerned with, not that of the Idea.792 He 
measures the value of a thing by the ways in which it enhances the actuality of 
beings, which for him is the truth. Art is more valuable than truth because art is 
more ‘in being’ than the super-sensuous realm.793 
 
For Nietzsche: 
 
Whatever philosophical standpoint one may adopt today, from every point of 
view the erroneousness of the world in which we think we live is the surest and 
firmest fact that we can lay eyes on.794  
 
Art, for Nietzsche is creation, as it dwells in the sensuous. Creation is in turn 
related to beauty. Truth, on the other hand, is related to knowledge. Thus, there is 
for Nietzsche a discordance between art and truth that arouses dread.795 Unlike in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy on art and truth, there is no such discordance in Platonism 
(though, there does exist a necessary distance between the Idea and the Real).796  
 
Heidegger believes that the distance found in Plato’s works between art and truth 
is actually fortuitous for Plato’s philosophy, in the sense that once art establishes 
World, beings engage with Being in a spiritual concordance.797 In this way, we can 
see that for Plato the distance is capable of resolution through art, but for Nietzsche 
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it becomes a discordance that arouses dread because he sees truth as existing in the 
sensuous.798 
 
For Plato, the distance between truth and beauty arises because, when we consider 
that art brings forth the beautiful and allows truth to shine in its sensuousness, we 
can see that the realm of truth and the realm of beauty are in fact far apart.799 Yet, 
it is also correct to say that truth and beauty belong together in one, they are 
inextricably linked together for beings.800 Beauty elevates beings beyond the 
sensuous, and allows us to enter into the true. In this way, accord prevails in the 
distance between the two because the beautiful, “as radiant and sensuous, has in 
advance sheltered its essence in the truth of Being as super-sensuous.”801 
 
Plato speaks, in The Republic, of “an ancient quarrel between philosophy and 
poetry”,802 which is to say, a quarrel between “knowledge and art, truth and 
beauty.”803 However, this is not a discordance in the sense that Nietzsche uses the 
word, rather the quarrel relates more to the distance between fundamental 
opposites.804  
 
James Wilcox, in his book Truth and Value in Nietzsche: A Study of his Metaethics 
and Epistemology,805 analyses Nietzsche’s philosophical premise:  
 
Only the true has value. 
Only the nonhuman (transcendent, ‘absolute’ , non-perspectival) is true. 
Nothing we believe is nonhuman. 
Therefore, nothing we believe has value.806 
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Wilcox says that Nietzsche’s reasoning is formally valid, in that the conclusion 
follows from the premises.807 The only way to avoid the conclusion of Nietzsche’s 
nihilism would be to reject one or more of his premises. Wilcox describes the first 
two premises as “sources of modern intellectual despair”,808 in that they require of 
reason something that reason is unable to provide: 
 
a truth which reason does not itself create; and then they condemn reason for its 
failure to live up to the demand.809  
 
Wilcox believes the third premise to be merely a formulation of Nietzsche’s own 
skepticism, and that Nietzsche appears to regard it as his only tenable option.810 
 
For my part, I consider that Nietzsche’s take on truth is understandable, given that 
he views art from the perspective of the artist. However, I also agree with 
Heidegger that his philosophy on truth and Being is obscure. There is another 
important aspect to Nietzsche’s philosophy of aesthetics that may assist us in 
understanding why he values art above truth (reality above concept), and that is his 
theory of ‘the grand style’.  
 
As mentioned above, Nietzsche views Becoming is an active will to Being. He 
calls our active will to Being ‘the grand style’.811  The grand style is in Nietzsche’s 
view “the whole of artistic actuality”.812 Through the grand style, art comes into its 
essence. For Nietzsche, “[t]hree good things are proper to art: elegance, logic, 
beauty; along with something even better: the grand style.”813  What is the grand 
style?  
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The grand style consists in contempt for trivial and brief beauty; it is a sense for 
what is rare and what lasts long.814 
 
Nietzsche’s aesthetics examines the state of creation, and enjoyment, of art. His 
aesthetics is physiological, and involves that which is at furthest remove from the 
spiritual realm (and from the spirituality in the work itself).815 Heidegger says that, 
for Nietzsche: 
 
[t]he aesthetic state is the one which places itself under the law of the grand style 
which is taking root in it. The aesthetic state itself is truly what it is only as the 
grand style.816 
 
Nietzsche believes that art, in the proper sense of the word, is art in the grand style; 
that is, art desires to bring life itself to power with “perspectival shining and letting 
shine.”817 Art is both liberating and clarifying with a view to transforming the 
sensuous in two ways: firstly, it sets up a thing in the light of Being; and secondly, 
it shows the thing in such clarity as to illuminate the light of life itself.818  
 
Nietzsche interprets the Being of beings as ‘will to power’ and, according to 
Heidegger, Nietzsche considers art to be “the supreme configuration of will to 
power.”819 Hence, another possible reason for Nietzsche viewing art as higher than 
truth itself, more in being than the super-sensuous realm. 
 
The will to power “releases all things to their essence and their own bounds.”820 
Nietzsche’s view of art as “the greatest stimulant of life”821 means simply that art 
is an arrangement of will to power.822 
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A stimulant is that which propels forward or advances something, it lifts something 
beyond itself, thus increasing its power.823 Heidegger says that for Nietzsche a 
stimulant is something that “conducts one into the sphere of command of the grand 
style.”824 Nietzsche views the word stimulant as meaning power itself; that is, art is 
‘will to power’.825   
 
Art is the countermovement to the nihilism that Nietzsche considers exists, and it is 
also a state of rapture as an object of physiology.826 (By physiology, Nietzsche 
means physics in a broad sense.) Art may also be seen as an object of metaphysics. 
All of these factors are inclusive of each other for Nietzsche.827  
 
In the Platonic view, our grasp of the Idea in any given work is grounded upon 
Eros, which in Nietzsche’s philosophy of aesthetics equates to his term 
‘rapture’.828 Nietzsche’s formula for human greatness is amor fati, which means: 
 
that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all 
eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it – all idealism is 
mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary – but love it.829  
 
In Nietzsche’s conception of art, there are two important basic determinations: 
rapture and beauty. Rapture and beauty are inextricably linked: “[r]apture is the 
basic mood; beauty does the attuning.”830 In Nietzsche’s aesthetics, rapture and 
beauty determine his entire aesthetic state in that they convey what opens itself up 
in that state, and what pervades it.831 Rapture and beauty are related in that beauty 
is disclosed in rapture; and, at the same time, it is beauty that moves us to the 
feeling of rapture.832  
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Nietzsche says that “the effect of artworks is arousal of the art-creating state, 
rapture.”833 We can understand two things from Nietzsche’s statement. Firstly, that 
he views aesthetics from the perspective of, and in relation to, the artist.834 
Secondly, that Nietzsche considers rapture to be the creating force of art-works; 
rapture is the state of creativeness that resides in the physical and psychic state of 
the artist.835 The form of an art-work allows that which we encounter in the art 
itself to radiate in appearance.836 For Nietzsche, “[g]enuine form is the only true 
content.”837  
 
Nietzsche talks of states of feeling which, although psychical, emanate from the 
bodily state of being.838 Seen as a whole, he sets out an indissoluble unity between 
the corporeal-psychical, that is the living state. For Nietzsche, this corporeal-
psychical state of being is where aesthetics occurs, it is our aesthetic state as well 
as our ‘nature’.839 Thus, when Nietzsche uses the term physiology to refer to the 
bodily state, he means it in the sense of both the physical and the psychical.840  
 
It is through our physical and psychic states that we experience rapture. As rapture 
is of vital importance to Nietzsche’s theory of aesthetics, it is prudent to set out in 
his words what the concept means. Nietzsche explains, in Twilight of the Idols841:  
 
If there is to be art, if there is to be any aesthetic doing and observing, one 
physiological precondition is indispensable: rapture. Rapture must first have 
augmented the excitability of the entire machine: else it does not come to art. All 
the variously conditioned forms of rapture have the requisite force: above all, the 
rapture of sexual arousal, the oldest and most original form of rapture…In 
addition, the rapture that comes as a consequence of all great desires, all strong 
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affects; the rapture of the feast, contest, feat of daring, victory; all extreme 
movement; the rapture of cruelty; rapture in destruction; rapture under certain 
meteorological influences, for example, the rapture of springtime; or under the 
influence of narcotics; finally, the rapture of will, of an overfull, teeming will.842 
 
Heidegger summarises the above passage by saying that “rapture is the basic 
aesthetic state, a rapture which for its part is variously conditioned, released, and 
increased.”843 He believes the above passage of Nietzsche’s to be clearest and most 
unified explanation of his definition of the aesthetic state.844  
 
For Nietzsche, “[w]hat is essential in rapture is the feeling of enhancement of force 
and plenitude.”845 Rapture is the “physiological precondition of art”,846 and what is 
essential about the precondition is feeling. Heidegger says: 
 
[that] feeling means the way we find ourselves to be with ourselves, and thereby 
at the same time with things, with beings that we ourselves are not.847  
 
Rapture must always be rapturous feeling, and feeling is the way that we are, 
corporeally. It is not that the body is a burden that we carry around in earthly form; 
we do not ‘own’ a body as such, rather we are bodily beings.848  
 
Nietzsche emphasizes two main points about rapture, which he wishes for us to 
understand. Firstly, that rapture is a feeling of force or enhancement; secondly, that 
rapture involves a feeling of plenitude.849 The feeling of enhancement or force is 
our capacity to extend beyond ourselves as beings; it is a relation between beings 
in which we experience being more fully in being, as feeling richer qua beings.850 
Enhancement may be understood in terms of a mood, an elation, that carries us 
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along with it in its buoyancy. Plenitude may be understood as an attunement that is 
open to everything and exists in a state of responsiveness to experience.851 “The 
mood of rapture is…an attunement in the sense of the supreme and most measured 
determinateness.”852  
 
Heidegger says there is a third aspect of the feeling of rapture:  
 
the reciprocal penetration of all enhancements of every ability to do and see, 
apprehend and address, communicate and achieve release.853  
 
In The Will to Power, Nietzsche speaks of two states in which art emerges as a 
force of nature in beings, these are the Apollonian and the Dionysian.854 For 
Nietzsche, the Greek god Dionysus is more an epistemological concept than an 
actual being, which makes sense when we remember that Dionysus is the god who 
is passionate about sensuousness, sexuality and the physical world. Dionysus is 
supremely unafraid of reality as it is, including all of its harshness and terror.855 
 
Nietzsche developed the distinction between the Dionysian and Apollonian states 
of rapture in his first treatise, The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music.856 In 
his early work, Nietzsche distinguished between Apollonian and Dionysian rapture 
by saying that the former relates to our dream-state and the latter is the name for 
rapture itself.857 Something similar is set out in The Will to Power as Art, “[b]oth 
states are rehearsed in normal life as well, only more weakly: in dreams and in 
rapture.”858 
 
                                                 
851
 Ibid. 
852
 Ibid, 113. 
853
 Ibid, 100. 
854
 Ibid, 97. 
855
 Wilcox, J Truth and Value in Nietzsche: A Study of his Metaethics and Epistemology (1974) 54. 
Dionysus is traditionally known, in Greek mythology, as the god of vegetation – in particular, of the vine, 
the grape and the imbibing of wine. However, Dionysus embraces much more in terms of his earthly 
passions and wild spirituality. See Morford, M and Lenardon, R Classical Mythology (3rd ed) (1985). 
856
 Nietzsche, F The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music (ed) Tanner, M (trans) Whiteside, S (1993). 
857
 Heidegger, supra n 824 at 97.  
858
 Nietzsche, F The Will to Power (trans)  Kaufmann, W and Hollingdale, R (1967) 798. 
 144
While rapture is set out as being but one of two aesthetic states, Nietzsche clearly 
sees rapture as the basic aesthetic state.859 Having said that, Nietzsche tends to blur 
the one into the other. For example, Nietzsche states in The Will to Power: “In 
Dionysian rapture there is sexuality and voluptuousness: in the Apollonian they are 
not lacking.”860  
 
For Nietzsche, the Dionysian and the Apollonian are both held out as being types 
of rapture; that is, they both manifest the basic aesthetic state. It is this basic 
aesthetic state that is fundamental to Nietzsche’s doctrine of aesthetics.861 The 
Apollonian and Dionysian are two “forces of nature and art”,862 and it is in the 
reciprocity of their relationship, that all development of future art consists.863 
 
Socrates says, in Plato’s Phaedrus, that in ‘supernatural madness’ we will find four 
parts, which represent the work of four gods: Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses and 
Eros (Eros includes Aphrodite). Apollo provides us with inspiration, Dionysus 
with ecstatic madness or passion, the Muses with creativity and as for Aphrodite 
and Eros, they provide us with the madness of love of which erotic love is the 
finest.864 The reason for Socrates talking of Aphrodite and Eros in the same breath 
is because Eros is the male counterpart of Aphrodite, and he shares many of her 
characteristics.  Eros and Aphrodite represent all of the facets of love and desire.865  
 
To sum up, we can see that Nietzsche values art over truth, and perhaps this is 
because: form is seen as the only true content (ie, the sensuous is the true world); 
art is viewed as will to power (ie, the Being of beings); and aesthetics is 
conceptualised as applied physiology (seen predominantly from the artist’s point of 
view). With this knowledge, we may better understand Nietzsche’s basic position 
on art. 
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For Nietzsche, there are two main aesthetic states: rapture and beauty; although, 
rapture is for him pre-eminent because it is concerned with creativity and provides 
a feeling of enhancement and plenitude. Beauty is disclosed in rapture, and it is 
also beauty that transports us into rapturous feeling. Nietzsche views Apollo and 
Dionysus as the two forces of nature and art (ie, states of rapture).  
 
I have set out here Nietzsche’s divergent views on art and truth, and provided a 
brief summary of his philosophy of aesthetics, because I have discussed 
Nietzsche’s philosophical views throughout this thesis, and because they differ in 
important ways from Plato’s thoughts on beauty and truth.  
 
The following chapter provides an analysis of 4 of the duty of care cases I 
considered earlier in light of their constancy of the Idea, with a view to 
determining whether they may be said to be beautiful as well as true. In doing so, I 
will take into account all that has been said in the present chapter about beauty and 
its relationship with truth. 
 
III.III  Beautiful Case Law: Duty of Care 
 
This part of the thesis aims to discover whether the cases of Dixon v Bell, George v 
Skivington, Heaven v Pender and Donoghue v Stevenson meet the second test in 
our definition of art, that of beauty. We have seen that truth appears as Saying in 
these cases, but we now need to discover whether those judgments may properly 
be called art. Beauty defines art qua art, and it is only where a work is beautiful 
that the universal Idea present in a work may shine richly, lastingly and forcefully. 
 
The first case for our consideration is Dixon v Bell, which laid down the general 
principle that, where a dangerous thing is in someone’s care, that person has a duty 
to make it safe and unable to do mischief.866 Thus, where there is a want of care, 
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and the thing itself causes harm, the law will hold the defendant responsible for the 
consequent harm.867  
 
In this case, Lord Ellenborough CJ recognises the natural law propositions of right 
and wrong, and allows them to come to the fore; that is, he allows the Idea of law 
to assert itself. The Court creates the Open by reasoning in a logical manner and 
providing space for the principle of the case to presence in Saying. Further, in 
applying practical wisdom, the Court provides for the application of the true, 
universal order in the world in a “unique and unrepeatable way”.868 
 
The work of Dixon v Bell is, in my view, beautiful simply because it is mimesis – 
the judgment imitates the heavenly order by inviting the Idea of law to presence in 
the work. Beauty is the ontological space created by an art-work that supports and 
enables our desire for knowledge, and by experiencing beauty we are able to think 
beautifully, or intuitively. The dictum in Dixon v Bell invites us to think intuitively, 
because we are able to grasp the universal order and regularity in its principle. The 
ratio of the case awakens the universal knowledge of Being inherent in the soul, 
and it does so by being open, ordered and logical. 
 
Lord Ellenborough CJ is, in my view, a good technes, because his work imitates 
the Being of the law. In my view, the judgment brings forth Being through beauty, 
which as we know is itself defined in relation to whether a work holds within it the 
essence of truth. Through the beauty in the Court’s decision, beauty radiates the 
true, making the principle espoused presence for us richly, lastingly and forcefully.  
 
In order to work as an art-form, a judgment must be beautiful, so that beings can 
understand and know the Idea on an aesthetic level. Dixon v Bell succeeds in doing 
just that, and thus may be called a work of art. 
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The next case of George v Skivington espouses the principle that where a person 
makes an article sold for a particular purpose, and knows of the purpose for which 
it is bought and for whom the article is bought, he or she has a duty to that person 
to use ordinary care in making the article.869 
 
George v Skivington is a good judicial text, because the law here remains both 
open and constant, even in the face of situational revision. The case is written with 
an openness and provides a space between Saying and meaning that allows the 
legal Idea to presence. The Court reasons logically and consistently, and the 
judgment may properly be called rational.  
 
Moreover, the Court applies the universal duty of care principle to the facts of the 
case, and in doing so the nature of the thing asserts itself in the work.  The duty of 
care Idea remains absolute in its essence, but is refined and tailored to do justice in 
the circumstances, as well as for future use. The principle in George v Skivington is 
true in the natural law sense, and in the Platonic sense of the Idea of a thing, the 
case revealing its truth in the clearing of the Open. It is through beauty that we 
experience truth by gaining access to the Open that art provides for us; we think 
beautifully about it, which is the epistemology of aesthetics. 
 
The ‘living unity’ of the work is present in George v Skivington, and it can 
properly be seen as mimesis. The judgment creates an ontological space of beauty, 
in order to allow the reader to experience its essence – that is, to think beautifully 
about the Idea present in the work. The work does so by being logical, ordered and 
rational, as well as by allowing the nature of the thing to assert itself. Nietzsche 
believes that it is our recognition of such order and logic in a work (as imitation of 
the heavenly order) that elicits from us the feeling that something is beautiful.870  
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We know that the appearance of truth in a work of art – as the setting into the work 
of truth– is beauty. Thus, beauty is the appearing of the Idea in a work, so 
wherever truth presences, beauty radiates. For the ancient Greeks, radiance is 
ekphanestaton, meaning that something properly shows itself. The Idea of law not 
only shows itself in George v Skivington, it also radiates for us ontologically 
through the lawful and beautiful form of the work. Without beauty, the truth of the 
judgment would remain in the super-sensuous realm, and be un-accessible to us as 
a sensuous experience. The Court in George v Skivington brings Being to the fore, 
by using beauty as a vehicle, so that it presences richly, lastingly and forcefully in 
the work’s being. Thus, the judgment fulfils our definition of art. 
 
In the Court of Appeal case of Heaven v Pender, Brett M.R. sets out a legal 
principle that acknowledges the universal validity of natural law; that is, the rules 
of right and wrong exist as ‘the nature of the thing’ in his dictum. The decision is 
fair, logical and rational, and the principle laid down by the Court may be called 
true in both Dworkin and Aristotlean terms.  
 
In my view, the Court has succeeded in developing a richness, complexity and 
clarity around the duty of care test, for use in future cases. In engaging in dialectic, 
Brett M.R. resolved the tensions in prior legal texts, and has created a new richness 
and aptness of meaning. As we know, truth appears in the dialectic of the Open, 
and this allows a space for Saying – that is, for the continuation of the legal Idea or 
the nature of the thing. 
 
Art imitates the heavenly order in its logical form, which is why the ancient Greeks 
say that where there is art (mimesis) there must also be beauty. Heaven v Pender is 
a beautiful case because it is mimesis, it is good and it is a rational and reasoned 
presentation of the legal Idea. Readers are able to understand and know the Idea on 
an aesthetic level, as I have done with the work, because the judgment is beautiful. 
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Gadamer believes that when we experience the beautiful in both art and nature, we 
experience a “convincing illumination of truth and harmony, which compels the 
admission: ‘This is true’.”871 Upon reading Heaven v Pender, one ought to have 
that very experience of saying, intuitively, ‘this is true’. The dictum is right, 
ordered and universal.  
 
Put simply, beauty is the appearing of truth; beauty belongs to the presencing of 
truth, even though beauty exists for us as a sensuous experience. Beauty, as Eros, 
is our medium between the sensuous and super-sensuous, and it calls the truth to 
us. Heaven v Pender radiates its beauty so that the Idea of the work may stand in 
the light and be remembered by our souls. Out of our sensuously engaging with the 
work, we come to know the Being of that particular judgment, and not merely its 
outward appearance. Heaven v Pender may be called beautiful, as well as true, and 
thus meets our definition of art. 
 
Finally, we come to the famous case of Donoghue v Stevenson. The judgment 
expertly reviews and re-states the relevant principles of law, and engaging in 
dialectic, the Court builds up a richer, clearer new dictum in line with the common 
law Idea that stands in the Open for use in future cases. The case is orderly, 
logically reasoned and rationally applied. 
 
The bringing forth of Being is done through the ontological vehicle of beauty, 
which is in turn defined in relation to whether the work contains the essence of 
truth – ie, whether it is mimesis. While beauty differs from the true, we know that 
it is defined in relation to the presence of the true, the Idea of cosmic order in a 
work.  We are able to think beautifully when engaging with the dictum laid down 
in Donoghue v Stevenson, showing that the work is beautiful in itself. 
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The judgment is beautiful for us, not only because it makes space for the nature of 
the thing to presence, but also because it is logical, rational and ordered – 
imitating, as it does, the heavenly order of the cosmos. In recognising the inherent 
order in the work, we feel the work to be beautiful, and our soul aesthetically 
intuits the work’s essence.  
 
We know the Idea on an aesthetic level through beauty, and this is the way in 
which an art-form works as an art-form; beauty defines art qua art. My experience 
of the judgment of Donoghue v Stevenson compels me to say it is true, and 
Gadamer believes that it is by this experience of compulsion when engaging with a 
work that we know whether or not a work is beautiful. We may properly call 
Donoghue v Stevenson a beautiful judgment, as well as being true, and because it 
meets our definition of art, this is a case in which the truth of the law shines richly, 
lastingly and forcefully.  
 
In summary, the cases of Dixon v Bell, George v Skivington, Heaven v Pender and 
Donoghue v Stevenson not only fulfil the ‘system of rules and principles’ portion 
of our definition of art, they may also be called beautiful. Thus, the above 4 cases 
fall within our definition of art, which means that they radiate the truth of law in a 
rich, lasting and forceful manner.  
 
Case law should be able to apply and communicate the Idea of law in a rich, 
lasting and forceful manner because of the important social and moral function of 
judge-made law. It is both encouraging and, at the same time, unfortunate that a 
mere 4 out of the 8 cases surveyed radiate the truth of law in this manner. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen that, where a judgment meets the definition of art, it will be 
successful in relaying the ‘truth’ of the law in a rich, lasting and forceful manner. 
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An important co-requisite of the test, of whether a judgment can be defined as art, 
is that it must also be a work of ‘beauty’. 
 
We have seen that case law should be able to apply and communicate the true 
principles of the law in a rich, lasting and forceful manner because of its important 
social and moral function. Further, the law must be taken to be always speaking, 
and every person must live with certainty of the substance of the law. 
 
I have defined art as being literary works, which deal with rules and principles 
governing human activity, produced using skill and imagination, which require 
knowledge and judgement, and which are beautiful. The artistic factors of truth 
(the principle aspect) and beauty in a judgment have been my main focus in this 
thesis, although I have also considered the case law above in light of the rules 
aspect of our definition of art. I have taken it to be a given that all of the other 
aspects of the definition of art are met in relation to the judicial opinion.  
 
Art’s function has been described as conveying truth in the world. I have explored 
and defined the concept of truth, referring to both the ancient Greek view of the 
cosmic order and Aristotle’s view of natural law. I have further attempted to make 
clear the analogy between truth as Idea (in the Greek sense) and the law as Idea (in 
Aristotle’s natural law sense).  
 
I have aimed to show that the legal conception of truth in a judgment, as set out in 
the principle of the case, is analogous to the universal Idea of truth. For 
completeness, I have also considered the context in which the judicial opinion is 
created.  
 
I have explored several of the main cases that have developed the concept of ‘duty 
of care’ in the tort of negligence, with a view to discovering whether in this area of 
judicial opinion the truth or principle has remained constant throughout the case 
law’s development. The analysis was undertaken with reference back to the 
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“system of rules and principles governing a particular human activity”872 portion of 
our agreed definition of art. 
 
I have further, and vitally, explored the nature and function of ‘beauty’. Beauty has 
been shown to be the vehicle for truth appearing in a work of art. A work must be 
beautiful if we are to meaningfully access the Idea. I then considered half of the 
cases surveyed above in light of our view of beauty, to see whether each of them 
may properly be called beautiful.873  
 
The thesis shows that the cases of Dixon v Bell, George v Skivington, Heaven v 
Pender and Donoghue v Stevenson meet both of the tests of truth and beauty in our 
definition of art. Being both truthful and beautiful – that is, meeting our definition 
of art, these cases allow the universal Idea present in them to shine richly, lastingly 
and forcefully.  
 
Further, we know that the cases of Langridge v Levy, Winterbottom v Wright, 
Longmeid v Holliday and Le Lievre v Gould do not meet the ‘system of rules and 
principles’ test in our definition of art, because they do not create World in order 
for the true Idea to be revealed (ie, the principle aspect of the definition), nor do 
those cases follow the system of rules required by our legal system.  
 
The order of being is viewed by the ancient Greeks as divine, as God’s creation. 
Art, as mimesis, has its place, its function, squarely within the divine order. Beauty 
functions as a bridge between the two worlds. It is through beauty that we 
experience truth by gaining access to the Open that art provides for us. Judge-made 
law should facilitate our knowledge of the order of being, the very truth of our 
nature. 
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